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EQUITY RENEWED: PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTIONS TO SECURE POTENTIAL
MONEY JUDGMENTS
Rhonda Wasserman*
Abstract. Whenever a plaintiff sues a defendant for money damages, she runs the risk
that the defendant will attempt to render herself unable to satisfy the expected money
judgment by hiding or dissipating assets. Although most states have statutes that author-
ize prejudgment attachment of the defendant's assets to prevent this result, the attachment
statutes are poorly designed to reduce the plaintiff's risk. The attachment statutes are
both under- and over-inclusive: they do not authorize the attachment of property located
outside the state, thereby failing to prevent the dissipation of all of the defendant's prop-
erty, yet they grant the plaintiff a lien in the attached property (a security interest to which
she is not entitled) and authorize the attachment of property in the hands of innocent third
parties on the plaintiff's word that the property is the defendant's.
Courts can reduce the risk of harm to plaintiffs more effectively without interfering with
the rights of innocent third parties by granting preliminary injunctions to bar the dissipa-
tion of assets. Although courts typically have refrained from issuing preliminary equitable
relief in actions in which the plaintiff's final remedy is at law, the reasons for this hesitancy
do not obtain in this context. Neither precedent nor the "no adequate remedy at law"
requirement for equitable relief should dissuade courts from using preliminary injunctions
in cases in which the plaintiff can demonstrate that she is likely both to succeed on the
merits of her claim and to be unable to collect on her expected money judgment if the
defendant is not restrained.
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Preliminary Injunctions
Interim relief is very much the creation of equity since, to be effective, it
usually needs the equitable weapon of the injunction. 1
Equity will not be overnice in balancing the efficacy of one remedy against
the efficacy of another, when action will baffle, and inaction may confirm,
the purpose of the wrongdoer.2
INTRODUCTION
Consider three cases. In case one, a riparian landowner commences
an action seeking a permanent injunction to bar a chemical company
from discharging dangerous chemicals into the stream that runs along
her land. The landowner may also seek a preliminary injunction to
maintain the status quo pendente lite.' The court will grant the pre-
liminary injunction on the theory that money would not compensate
for the harm the landowner would suffer if the company were free to
continue discharging the chemicals into the stream during the pen-
dency of the action; because it would be irreparable, the harm should
be avoided.' The preliminary injunction, which would prohibit the
company from engaging in the challenged conduct pending trial,
would be of the same type as the final relief sought-equitable.
1. Patrick Devlin, Equity, Due Process and the Seventh Amendment: A Commentary on the
Zenith Case, 81 MICH. L. REv. 1571, 1588 (1983).
2. Falk v. Hoffman, 135 N.E. 243, 244 (N.Y. 1922) (Cardozo, J.), cited in Deckert v.
Independence Shares Corp., 311 U.S. 282, 289 n.3 (1940).
3. See, eg., Chalk v. United States Dist. Court, 840 F.2d 701 (9th Cir. 1988) (directing
district court to issue a preliminary injunction requiring the county department of education to
reinstate plaintiff, a person with AIDS, to his classroom duties pending resolution of his claim for
a permanent injunction seeking same relief); Roso-Lino Beverage Distribs., Inc. v. Coca-Cola
Bottling Co., 749 F.2d 124 (2d Cir. 1984) (granting a preliminary injunction to enjoin defendants
from terminating plaintiff as a Coca-Cola distributor pending arbitration of plaintiff's claim for
wrongful termination); Public Interest Research Group v. CP Chem. Inc., 26 Env't Rep. Cas.
(BNA) 2017 (D.N.J. 1987) ("not for publication" opinion granting preliminary injunction to
enjoin defendants from discharging chemicals into river in violation of pollutant discharge
permit).
4. See, eg., Chalk, 840 F.2d at 709-10 (holding that the emotional and psychological harm
plaintiff would suffer if removed from his position as classroom teacher and reassigned to an
administrative position would be irreparable); Roso-Lino Beverage Distribs., 749 F.2d at 125-26
(holding that "the loss of Roso-Lino's distributorship, an ongoing business representing many
years of effort and the livelihood of its husband and wife owners, constitutes irreparable harm");
Public Interest Research Group, 26 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 2021 (holding that "threat to the
health and well being of the citizenry" caused by unabated dumping of highly toxic substances
"is certainly a sufficient showing of irreparable harm"). As a general rule, prospective harm to
real estate is deemed irreparable. See DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, THE DEATH OF THE IRREPARABLE
INJURY RULE 38 (1991) (noting that "a wide range of wrongs relating to land are regularly held
to inflict irreparable injury").
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In case two, a brother sues his sister, seeking the return of an
antique painting she obtained from him under false pretenses.' As in
case one, if the brother states a claim for equitable replevin, he may be
entitled to a preliminary equitable remedy that would require his sister
to return the painting to him pendente lite, or at least bar her from
disposing of the painting until his claim is resolved on the merits.6
Here, the concern is that the property is irreplaceable, that the sister
5. See, e.g., In re IBP Confidential Business Documents Litig., 754 F.2d 787, 789 (8th Cir.
1985) (holding that documents containing "sensitive, confidential information about IBP's
internal operations and business strategies... constitute the kind of unique property recoverable
in an action for equitable replevin"); Cumbest v. Harris, 363 So. 2d 294, 296 (Miss. 1978)
(holding that equity will require specific performance of a contract involving "peculiar,
sentimental or unique" goods); Coven v. First Say. & Loan Ass'n, 55 A.2d 244 (N.J. Ch. 1947)
(awarding equitable replevin of plaintiff's research files); Chabert v. Robert & Co., 76 N.Y.S.2d
400, 401 (App. Div. 1948) (holding that complaint stated a claim for equitable relief to compel
return of "irreplaceable oil of unique quality"); HENRY L. MCCLINTOCK, HANDBOOK OF THE
PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY § 45 (2d ed. 1948); 1 JOHN N. POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE
§ 185 (5th ed. 1941); M. T. Van Hecke, Equitable Replevin, 33 N.C. L. REv. 57, 57 (1954)
(discussing situations in which "a plaintiff who needs the article in specie and who fears that the
defendant will frustrate the sheriff's efforts may regard equity as likely to be more successful
through its in personam order that the defendant deliver the chattel to the plaintiff"); see also
U.C.C. § 2-502 (1987) (permitting a buyer, who has paid for goods identified to the contract, to
recover the goods "from the seller if the seller becomes insolvent within ten days after receipt of
the first installment of their price"); U.C.C. § 2-716 (1987) (authorizing court to grant specific
performance as a remedy for a buyer "where the goods are unique or in other proper
circumstances"); JOHN N. POMEROY & JOHN C. MANN, SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF
CONTRACTS § 12, at 32 (3d ed. 1926) (stating that "where the chattels are... unique.., so that
others of a similar nature and equal value could not be procured by means of damages assessed
according to legal rules .... contracts concerning them will be specifically enforced in equity, and
a delivery of them will be decreed, although they might be recovered in the common-law actions
of detinue or replevin"); cf Gindin v. Silver, 243 A.2d 354 (Pa. 1968) (reversing equitable decree
that ordered return of diamond ring; holding that replevin constituted an adequate remedy at
law).
6. See, e.g., Kimberly & European Diamonds, Inc. v. Burbank, 684 F.2d 363 (6th Cir. 1982)
(affirming summary judgment in favor of plaintiff, who alleged that diamond had been
wrongfully converted by defendants, and noting that district court had granted a preliminary
injunction enjoining the defendant in possession of the diamond from disposing of it and ordering
him to deliver it to a receiver); Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co., 470
F. Supp. 1308, 1325 (N.D.N.Y. 1979) (holding that replevin was an inadequate remedy to
recover materials fabricated for project because some of materials were located outside state and
because replevin would permit defendant to reclaim chattels by posting bond; granting
preliminary injunction requiring defendant to ship materials); Wilson v. Sandstrom, 317 So. 2d
732, 738 (Fla. 1975) (affirming grant of temporary mandatory injunction requiring kennel owners
to produce racing greyhound dogs at the track; viewing dogs as "a i-ique product, not readily
obtainable on the market"); Steggles v. National Discount Corp., 39 N.W.2d 237, 239 (Mich.
1949) (holding that "the status quo could be best preserved by placing plaintiff in possession of
the car which had been taken from him by the deceit and trickery of the finance company";
affirming grant of preliminary injunction); Schweber v. Rallye Motors, Inc., 12 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. (Callaghan) 1154 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1973) (in action seeking specific performance of contract
to sell Rolls Royce, granting preliminary injunction to enjoin defendant from selling or
transferring the car pendente lite).
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may dispose of it prior to resolution of the brother's claim, and that
the loss of the property could not be adequately compensated by
money. Hence the harm would be irreparable. Again, equity will
intervene, even prior to final judgment, to prevent irreparable harm.
In case three, a businessperson gave money to an attorney to hold as
trustee or escrow agent. The businessperson now alleges misappropri-
ation and seeks imposition of a constructive trust.7 As in cases one
and two, the businessperson in this case may also be entitled to a pre-
liminary equitable remedy, here an injunction to "freeze" the fund
pending trial, thus assuring its availability at the conclusion of the
trial.' As in case two, the court will spare the businessperson the
potential irreparable harm that would be caused by the attorney's dis-
posal of the disputed property during the pendency of the action.
These three cases illustrate the general proposition that "equitable
powers... are definitely available to secure future equitable remedies
when the movant can demonstrate all the requirements for a prelimi-
nary injunction .... [O]nce a plaintiff establishes an equitable cause of
action, the district court may use its full equitable powers to grant
appropriate preliminary relief as well." 9
7. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF RESTIuTTIoN, introductory note to Chapter on
Remedies at 88 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 1983); DAN B. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF
REMEDiEs § 2.5 (1973) (noting that "we expect to see equity involved in claims against
fiduciaries"); id. § 5.16 (stating that "[w]here money is taken from the owner by a conscious
wrongdoer the owner may enforce either a constructive trust or an equitable lien on the fund");
Federal Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Dixon, 835 F.2d 554, 562 (5th Cir. 1987) (holding that FSLIC,
as receiver for savings and loan association, had right to pursue equitable causes of action,
including constructive trust, accounting and restitution, against officers and directors of S & L,
who allegedly had defrauded it).
8. See, eg., Deckert v. Independence Shares Corp., 311 U.S. 282 (1940) (holding that
plaintiffs were entitled to a preliminary injunction to restrain defendants from transferring assets
during the pendency of the action where plaintiffs stated a claim for final equitable relief and
demonstrated a risk of dissipation of assets by defendants); Dixon, 835 F.2d at 566 (affirming
district court order granting a preliminary injunction to enjoin defendants from disposing of
property or assets in an action by FSLIC as receiver alleging fraud, gross mismanagement and
self-dealing, and seeking both legal and equitable relief; limiting reach of preliminary injunction
to those assets subject to equitable remedies); USACO Coal Co. v. Carbomin Energy, Inc., 689
F.2d 94, 97-98 (6th Cir. 1982) (holding that a promoter who uses funds obtained in breach of a
fiduciary duty to acquire property holds that property as constructive trustee, and that the
district court had authority to preliminarily enjoin the promoter from transferring assets outside
the country to secure plaintiffs' equitable remedy); Heckmann v. Ahmanson, 214 Cal. Rptr. 177,
189 (Ct. App. 1985) (affirming grant of preliminary injunction to enjoin transfer of money as to
which a constructive trust was sought in action alleging breach of fiduciary duty); Greenspan v.
Mesirow, 485 N.E.2d 1196 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985) (holding that a preliminary injunction should
have been granted in action by settlors and beneficiaries of trust against the trustees to
preliminarily enjoin the trustees from using trust assets to pay their own litigation expenses).
9. Dixon, 835 F.2d at 560 n.1, 562.
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Now consider a fourth case. A widower seeks advice from a stock-
broker when deciding how to invest the insurance proceeds he
received upon his wife's death. The broker, who has a financial inter-
est in a new, high-risk venture, fails to mention this personal stake to
the widower and grossly misrepresents the financial security of an
investment in this new company. The broker convinces the widower
to invest all of his money in the new venture. When the venture fails
and the widower learns that he has been defrauded, he sues the broker
for money damages to compensate him for the broker's past wrongful
conduct. He fears that the broker has or is about to render herself
judgment-proof by transferring all of her assets to a Swiss bank
account in her husband's name, so the widower seeks a preliminary
injunction to bar the broker from dissipating the assets pendente lite.
Like the businessperson in case three, the widower seeks to collect
money from the defendant. Like the businessperson in case three, the
widower may have reason to believe that the defendant, unless
restrained, will attempt to render herself judgment-proof by transfer-
ring the assets outside the jurisdiction or to a third party. Like the
plaintiff in all of the earlier cases, the widower seeks a preliminary
equitable remedy to preserve the efficacy of his final remedy. But the
widower will probably lose on his motion for a preliminary injunction.
Why?
Unlike the remedies sought by the first three plaintiffs, the wid-
ower's final remedy, money damages, is undoubtedly "at law."' 0 Fur-
thermore, a legal remedy-prejudgment attachment--exists to secure
the plaintiff's damages remedy during the pendency of the action.
Thus, courts invoke the adage that equity will not intervene where the
plaintiff has an "adequate remedy at law" and deny plaintiffs in such
cases any kind of preliminary equitable relief." As the Fifth Circuit
has stated, "as a general rule, [a preliminary injunction to freeze
10. In classifying a remedy as legal or equitable, courts typically rely on history and the
nature of the remedy, asking whether the relief would have been issued by the common law
courts or the chancellor prior to the merger of law and equity, and whether it merely declares the
law, relying on the execution process for enforcement (in which case it will be deemed legal), or
whether it issues in personam, backed by the contempt power (in which case it will be deemed
equitable). Domas, supra note 7, §§ 2.1, 2.2, 2.6. Money judgments, which historically issued
from the law courts and which impose no personal obligations on the defendant, are considered
the quintessential legal remedy. See, eg., Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 196 (1974) (noting
that "the relief sought here--actual and punitive damages-is the traditional form of relief
offered in the courts of law"); Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 476 (1962) (stating that
"insofar as the complaint requests a money judgment it presents a claim which is unquestionably
legal"); see also Rhonda Wasserman, Equity Transformed: Preliminary .Injunctions to Require the
Payment of Money, 70 B.U. L. REv. 623, 658 n.133 (1990).
11. See cases cited infra note 187.
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assets] is not permissible to secure post-judgment legal relief in the
form of damages." 2
This Article takes issue with the law's general preference for attach-
ment over a preliminary injunction to secure a future damages rem-
edy, and challenges the underlying principle that preliminary equitable
relief should be available only to secure a permanent equitable remedy
of the same type. 3 It argues that a preliminary injunction to restrain
the dissipation of assets should be available in cases like the widower's
in case four to the same extent that it is available to the businessperson
in case three.
This Article is divided into five parts. Part I identifies the three
kinds of harm a plaintiff may suffer, paying particular attention to the
harm a plaintiff will suffer if she cannot collect immediately upon a
money judgment, or what this Article calls tertiary harm.14 Part II
describes prejudgment attachment, the legal remedy courts currently
use in an effort to prevent tertiary harm. It demonstrates that prejudg-
ment attachment was initially designed to obtain quasi-in-rem jurisdic-
tion over an absent defendant, and only incidentally protected the
plaintiff from tertiary harm. Part II then explains why modem-day
attachment is a poor vehicle for preventing such harm. Part III offers
12. Dixon, 835 F.2d at 560 (citing DeBeers Conscl. Mines v. United States, 325 U.S. 212,
219-20 (1944) and ITT Community Dev. Corp. v. Barton, 569 F.2d 1351, 1360-61 (5th Cir.
1978)).
13. This Article does not address the availability of preliminary injunctive relief in actions in
which injunctive relief is specifically authorized by statute. See Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v.
Antonio, 843 F.2d 1311 (10th Cir. 1988) (affirming grant of preliminary injunction pursuant to
state RICO statute); Federal Trade Comm'n v. Southwest Sunsites, Inc., 665 F.2d 711, 718 (5th
Cir. 1982) (holding that the Federal Trade Commission Act authorizes the district court to
"exercise the full range of equitable remedies traditionally available to it," including the issuance
of "temporary, ancillary relief preventing dissipation of assets or funds that may constitute part
of the relief eventually ordered in the case"); Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Muller,
570 F.2d 1296, 1300 (5th Cir. 1978) (noting that Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act
of 1974 authorizes temporary injunctive relief without a showing of irreparable harm or
inadequacy of legal remedy; affirming grant of preliminary injunction to bar defendant "from
further dissipating the funds he allegedly has already misappropriated ... in order to preserve
the status quo so that an ultimate decision for the Commission could be effective"); cf. Carol L.
Dunne, Note, In re Fredeman Litigation: The Fifth Circuit Joins the Ninth-No Injunctive Relief
for Private RICO Plaintiffs, 63 TuL. L. REv. 421 (1988) (discussing Fifth Circuit's opinion);
Donald R. Lee, Note, The Availability of Equitable Relief in Civil Causes of Action in RICO, 59
NoTRE DAME L. REv. 945, 957 n.67 (1984) (arguing that plaintiffs in civil RICO actions should
be able to seek preliminary injunctive relief and "the full range of ultimate equity relief" under
18 U.S.C. § 1964). Nor does this article address in any detail the forfeiture provisions under
RICO and the continuing criminal enterprise statute. See 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1963(a), 1963(d) (West
Supp. 1991) (authorizing pre-conviction restraining orders to preserve forfeitable property); 21
U.S.C.A. §§ 853(a), 853(e) (West Supp. 1991) (authorizing same in continuing criminal
enterprise (CCE) drug-related prosecutions); infra notes 155 and 182.
14. See infra notes 26-28 and accompanying text.
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the preliminary injunction as an alternative to prejudgment attach-
ment, and establishes that a plaintiff seeking money damages as her
final remedy may be able to satisfy the traditional requirements for a
preliminary injunction. It also demonstrates the many advantages
such injunctions have in preventing tertiary harm.
Part IV considers the reasons why many courts have refrained from
granting such relief. Part IV first demonstrates that the Supreme
Court precedent lower courts cite in concluding they lack authority to
issue preliminary injunctions to freeze assets' 5 actually supports,
rather than undermines, the availability of such relief in money dam-
ages cases. Part IV then defuses the argument that courts should not
grant preliminary injunctions to freeze assets where an adequate rem-
edy at law exists by demonstrating the futility of even requiring a
showing of inadequacy. Part IV concludes by considering whether
courts should refrain from issuing preliminary injunctions on the the-
ory that doing so would permit plaintiffs to evade carefully crafted
legislative policies and protections reflected in the attachment statutes.
Finally, Part V presents and analyzes the American experience with
preliminary injunctions to freeze assets in two discrete contexts as well
as England's recent experience with Mareva injunctions, preliminary
injunctions that secure assets for the satisfaction of a potential money
judgment.
I. THREE KINDS OF HARM
A plaintiff who sues to collect money damages potentially faces
three kinds of harm: primary, secondary, and tertiary. 6 Primary
harm "includes all of the harm proximately caused by the defendant's
conduct that the plaintiff will suffer even if the ultimate relief she seeks
is available immediately upon commencement of the suit."' 7 Thus, if
a plaintiff has an accident, incurs medical bills, and endures pain and
suffering, the amount of her primary harm is the amount she would be
15. United States v. First Nat'l City Bank, 379 U.S. 378 (1965); Be Beers Consol. Mines, Ltd.
v. United States, 325 U.S. 212 (1945); Deckert v. Independence Shares Corp., 311 U.S. 282
(1940).
16. This schema classifies harm temporally: primary harm results from actions taken before
commencement of the suit; secondary harm results from delay between commencement of the
suit and entry of judgment; tertiary harm results from delay between entry of judgment and
satisfaction. The actual harm suffered as primary harm, related secondary harm and related
tertiary harm is identical. See infra notes 22 and 27 and accompanying text. Likewise, the actual
harm suffered as unrelated secondary harm and unrelated tertiary harm is identical. For a more
thorough discussion of the differences between primary and secondary harm, see Wasserman,
supra note 10, at 627-30.
17. Id. at 628.
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entitled to collect if she could recover the day she commenced her
suit. 8 Similarly, if a defendant breaches a contract for the sale of wid-
gets and the plaintiff "covers" with more expensive replacement goods
and suffers some consequential and incidental damages as well,1 9 the
amount of the plaintiff's primary harm is the amount she would be
entitled to collect if she could recover immediately upon commence-
ment of the action. Because the full amount of the plaintiff's primary
harm is determined upon impact or breach, it cannot be avoided or
abated by equitable relief, and a remedy at law for damages should be
adequate.2 °
Secondary harm is "harm that results from delay in receiving relief
for primary harm., 21 Thus, if the personal injury plaintiff must wait
years to obtain a money judgment for her primary harm and lacks the
resources to seek appropriate medical care, her physical injuries may
actually worsen while she awaits judgment. Or, if she diverts all avail-
able funds to pay for the medical care needed, she may incur late pen-
alties on bills or lose her home. All of this additional delay-caused
harm is secondary.22
The contract claimant, too, may suffer secondary harm if she is
delayed in obtaining judgment for the primary harm suffered: most
obviously, she loses the interest on the amount owed (unless prejudg-
ment interest is available).23 If she could have invested the amount of
18. Id.
19. See U.C.C. § 2-712 (1987) (permitting buyer to "cover" by purchasing goods in
substitution for those due from the seller, and permitting recovery of difference between cost of
cover and the contract price together with incidental or consequential damages, less expenses
saved as a result of seller's breach); U.C.C. § 2-715 (1987) (defining incidental and consequential
damages).
20. Wasserman, supra note 10, at 628.
21. Id. at 629.
22. Id. at 629-30 (distinguishing between related secondary harm and unrelated secondary
harm).
23. Traditionally, prejudgment interest was available only on liquidated claims or claims
based on a formula from which the amount due could be ascertained, DOBBS, supra note 7, § 3.5;
it was not allowed on nonpecuniary claims or unliquidated pecuniary claims. Id. Some states
have modified the traditional rules by statute. See, eg., CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 3287, 3291 (West
1970 & Supp. 1991) (allowing prejudgment interest in contract actions for unliquidated claims,
and in personal injury actions if defendant rejects plaintiff's settlement offer and plaintiff obtains
a more favorable judgment); N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. § 5001 (McKinney 1963) (permitting
prejudgment interest as of right in all contract and property damage actions brought at law);
TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.05 (West 1987 & Supp. 1992) (requiring that
"[fludgments in wrongful death, personal injury, and property damage cases . .. include
prejudgment interest"); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-44 (1987) (allowing prejudgment interest in
personal injury actions). See generally John C. Keir & Robin C. Keir, Opportunity Cost: A
Measure ofPrejudgment Interest, 39 Bus. LAw. 129 (1983); Kenneth Ross & Donna M. Goelz,
The Availability of Prejudgment Interest in Tort Actions, 8 J. PROD. LIAB. 79 (1985); James D.
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the judgment in her business and could have realized a higher rate of
return on the money than the statutory rate of interest, then she suffers
secondary harm even if she receives prejudgment interest.24 Further-
more, in cases in which the recovery is needed for living expenses, the
contract claimant suffers the same kinds of secondary harm as the per-
sonal injury claimant.25
Finally, a plaintiff who proceeds to trial and prevails may obtain a
judgment in her favor but may not be able to collect on that judgment
for some time, if ever. Any harm the plaintiff suffers as a result of her
inability to collect immediately upon her judgment is tertiary harm.2 6
Like secondary harm suffered prior to entry of the judgment, tertiary
harm may be related or unrelated to the kinds of harm the plaintiff
suffers as her primary harm.2 7 Thus, a personal injury plaintiff who
must wait months before collecting on her judgment may suffer from
exacerbated physical injuries (related tertiary harm), or she may lose
her home if she diverts all her income to pay for medical care (unre-
lated tertiary harm).
Tertiary harm can be caused by different facto:rs, and can be more
or less severe depending upon its duration. In discussing these alter-
natives, some additional terminology may prove helpful. For example,
Wilson et al., Prejudgment Interest in Personal Injury, Wrongful Death and Other Actions, 30
TRIAL LAW. GUIDE 105 (1986); Anthony E. Rothschild, Comment, Prejudgment Interest:
Survey and Suggestion, 77 Nw. U.L. REV. 192 (1982).
"In the absence of express congressional consent to the award of interest separate from a
general waiver of immunity to suit, the United States is immune from an interest award."
Library of Congress v. Shaw, 478 U.S. 310, 314 (1986). Although the Court has since intimated,
in a 5-4 decision, that the Eleventh Amendment does not provide the states with similar
immunity from interest awards, Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274, 281 n.3 (1989) (dicta), at least
one of the courts of appeals has questioned whether "the dispute in the Supreme Court over the
reach of the Eleventh Amendment has been finally resolved." Reopell v. Massachusetts, 936
F.2d 12, 15 (1st Cir. 1991). The retirement of Justice Brennan, the author of the majority
opinion in Jenkins, underscores the possibility that Jenkins' dicta will be rejected, and Shaw's
reasoning will be extended to protect the states from awards of interest.
24. Even if the contract claimant could borrow the amount owed or assign her claim, she
would still suffer some secondary harm in the form of transaction costs, the difference between
the amount of prejudgment interest she eventually receives and the amount paid on the loan, the
difference between the full value of the claim and the discounted amount she receives upon
assignment, and the like. Cf. Wasserman, supra note 10, at 627 n.18.
25. For a discussion of the kinds of secondary harm a contract claimant might suffer and an
explanation of why such harm is less likely to be irreparable than the personal injury plaintiff's
secondary harm, see id. at 627 n.18, 629 n.21 , 630 n.22, and 642 n.62.
26. Theoretically, tertiary harm is a subset of secondary harm, in that it is suffered as a result
of the plaintiff's inability to collect immediately upon commencement of her action. For
purposes of this Article, secondary harm will refer to the harm suffered as a result of delay
between commencement of the action and entry of the judgment, and tertiary harm will refer to
the harm suffered as a result of delay after entry of the judgment.
27. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
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passive tertiary harm, which results from mere delay or inaction on
the part of one or both parties in obtaining satisfaction of the judg-
ment, may be distinguished from active tertiary harm, which results
from actions the defendant takes to avoid the judgment, for example,
by dissipating or hiding her assets.28 Similarly, temporary tertiary
harm, which the plaintiff suffers if she is eventually able to collect on
her judgment, may be distinguished from permanent tertiary harm,
which she suffers if she can never collect. In some cases of permanent
tertiary harm, the defendant never had assets to satisfy the plaintiff's
claim and the permanent harm is thus passive; in other cases, the
defendant had assets but transferred them to others without sufficient
consideration or otherwise dissipated them in an effort to avoid pay-
ment on the judgment. In this class of cases, the tertiary harm is both
active and permanent.
Unlike primary harm, both secondary and tertiary harm can be
avoided, at least some of the time, if the trial court grants preliminary
relief.29 This Article advocates the use of preliminary injunctions to
prevent active tertiary harm. 0 In cases in which the defendant has
28. This terminology is a shorthand way of describing the conduct that gives rise to the harm.
Whether the product of action or inaction, misfeasance or nonfeasance, the delay-related harm
itself is identical. Cf Wasserman, supra note 10, at 629 n.21 (distinguishing between quasi-
primary secondary harm and true related secondary harm).
Taking an appeal may cause active tertiary harm because the appeal may delay plaintiff's
recovery on the judgment. See Gary Stein, Note, Expanding the Due Process Rights of Indigent
Litigants: Will Texaco Trickle Down, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 463, 500 (1986) (noting that "[a]ppeals
represents one powerful tool in the judgment debtor's arsenal of delaying tactics") (citing PAUL
D. CARRINGTON et al., JUSTICE ON APPEAL 134 (1976)). Under Rule 38 of the Federal Rules of
Appellate Procedure, the court of appeals "may award just damages and single or double costs to
the appellee" if it determines "that an appeal is frivolous." FED. R. App. P. 38; see also infra
note 31.
29. A previous work addresses the problem of secondary harm in the personal injury context,
and advocates the use of mandatory preliminary injunctions to require defendants to pay some
money to plaintiffs in advance of trial on the merits in cases in which plaintiffs can satisfy the
traditional requirements for preliminary injunctive relief. Wasserman, supra note 10.
30. This Article is not advocating any preliminary equitable relief to prevent passive tertiary
harm. Before issuance of the judgment, the court will have no way of knowing whether the
defendant will promptly offer to satisfy the judgment, whether she will "lie low" and wait for the
plaintiff to take action to enforce the judgment, or whether the plaintiff will do so expeditiously.
Simply put, the court will not know whether the plaintiff will suffer passive tertiary harm, and
therefore preliminary relief to avoid it would be speculative. Even if a court could foresee passive
tertiary harm, the only preliminary equitable relief that it conceivably could issue to prevent it
would be an injunction requiring the plaintiff to seek prompt enforcement of her judgment or an
order requiring the defendant to pay the judgment expeditiously upon entry. But a court could
not enjoin the plaintiff to grant relief to the plaintiff, and even if it could, the prospect of jailing
her for failing to enforce her own judgment seems ludicrous. The prospect of jailing a defendant
for failing to satisfy a judgment she lacks assets to satisfy smacks of imprisonment for debt, a
remedy that offends public policy. See Wasserman, supra note 10, at 655 (citing Dan B. Dobbs,
Should Security be Required as a Pre-Condition to Provisional Injunctive RelieF?, 52 N.C. L. REV.
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assets at the commencement of the action and plaintiff can establish a
demonstrable risk that the defendant will dissipate those assets unless
restrained, a court can and should prevent the plaintiff's active terti-
ary harm by freezing that portion of the defendant's assets necessary
to satisfy the plaintiff's anticipated money judgment.31
II. PREJUDGMENT ATTACHMENT AND ITS
LIMITATIONS IN PREVENTING TERTIARY HARM
A defendant intent upon rendering worthless a future money judg-
ment against her may attempt to rid herself of assets that could be
levied upon in execution. Assuming the defendant does not want to
lose complete control of the assets, she will not give them away.
Instead, she will want to make the assets unreachable for purposes of
satisfying the judgment, but within her control for her own purposes.
To this end, she may move assets outside the state or country;32 trans-
fer possession of the assets to a third party; grant an interest in the
assets to a third party; or conceal the assets withhi the state or coun-
try. All of these actions will cause the plaintiff active tertiary harm.
1091, 1109 (1974); Peter Linzer, On the Amorality of Contract Remedies--fficiency, Equity, and
the Second Restatement, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 111, 123 (1981)). Even if the defendant had assets
with which to satisfy the judgment, it would be troubling to jail her for mere inaction in failing to
offer those assets to satisfy the judgment.
31. This Article also argues that if, prior to a ruling on the plaintiff's motion, the defendant
has already transferred assets beyond the reach of the court, the court may restrain the defendant
from dissipating those assets or actually require her to return the assets to the state in which the
court sits. See infra notes 177-81 and accompanying text.
The state and federal courts currently protect plaintiffs from active tertiary harm if the
defendant appeals from the judgment by requiring a supersedeas bond to stay execution. See
FED. R. App. P. 8(b) (stating that "[r]elief available in the court of appeals under this rule [for a
stay of the judgment] may be conditioned upon the filing of a bond"); Stein, supra note 28, at
468-69, 500-01 (citing authorities; noting that "[s]upersedeas bonds protect judgment creditors
* . . by eliminating the effect of dissipation of assets"). A supersedeas bond is "[a] bond required
of one who petitions to set aside a judgment or execution and from which the other party may be
made whole if the action is unsuccessful." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1438 (6th ed. 1991). A
supersedeas bond and post-judgment interest should compensate the plaintiff for most of her
appeal-related tertiary harm if her financial need is not great. See infra notes 135 and 144 and
accompanying text.
32. See, e.g., Charles M. Bruce et al., Protection of Assets Trusts: Fallout From Litigation
Explosion, N.Y. L.J., Sept. 13, 1991, at 1 (discussing use of "a trust created under the laws of a
non-U.S. jurisdiction.., to protect assets against future creditors"; noting that in suits against
the settlor, "[t]here would be no pre-judgment lien 'freezing' the assets [i.e., attachment] because
a U.S. court order ordinarily could not reach the assets . . . in the hands of a non-U.S.
custodian"); Marcia Chambers, Little Guys Give Much Protection, THa NAT'L L. J., July 1, 1991,
at 13-14 (discussing decision by small Colorado law firm to place its assets in a Manx Trust,
formed under the laws of the Isle of Man, to protect them from creditors; the Isle of Man does
not enforce judgments of foreign countries).
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The prejudgment remedy most commonly used to prevent this terti-
ary harm is attachment. 33 Part A describes the common features of
the states' prejudgment attachment statutes. Part B reviews the his-
tory of prejudgment attachment, and demonstrates that the remedy
was not designed to prevent tertiary harm. Part C then establishes
that prejudgment attachment is a poor vehicle for preventing tertiary
harm because it causes the defendant unnecessary harm, fails to ade-
quately protect the plaintiff, and has several negative collateral conse-
quences, including harm to innocent third parties and increased
satellite litigation.
33. Prejudgment attachment is a preventative, rather than a restorative, measure. If the
defendant has already transferred her assets to a third party before issuance of the attachment
order, the plaintiff will have to invoke fraudulent conveyance law to reach the property in the
hands of the third-party transferee. See generally UNIFORM FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE ACT
§§ 4-7, 10, 7A U.L.A. 427 (1985 & Supp. 1991) (defining as fraudulent all conveyances by
persons who are or will be thereby rendered insolvent, conveyances without fair consideration
when the person making them is engaged in business and is left with "unreasonably small
capital," conveyances without fair consideration when the person making them intends to incur
debts beyond her ability to pay as they mature, and conveyances made with actual intent to
hinder, delay or defraud present or future creditors; providing that in an action by a creditor
whose claim has not matured, the court may "restrain the defendant [transferee] from disposing
of his property, appoint a receiver to take charge of the property, set aside the conveyance or
annul the obligation, or make any order which the circumstances of the case may require");
UNIFORM FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT, 7A U.L.A. 639 (1985 & Supp. 1991) (expanding the
remedies available to creditors and harmonizing definitions with the Bankruptcy Code); FED. R.
Civ. P. 18(b) (permitting a plaintiff to "state a claim for money and a claim to have set aside a
conveyance fraudulent as to that plaintiff, without first having obtained a judgment establishing
the claim for money").
Because the remedies available under fraudulent conveyance law require jurisdiction over the
property at issue or personal jurisdiction over the transferee, the plaintiff may have difficulty
pursuing her underlying claim against the transferor and her fraudulent conveyance claim
against the transferee in the same forum. See generally Cosmopolitan Health Spa, Inc. v. Health
Indus., Inc., 362 So. 2d 367 (la. Dist. Ct. App. 1978) (reversing trial court order, which denied
defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction in fraudulent conveyance action
against third-party transferee); Poplar Grove State Bank v. Powers, 578 N.E.2d 588 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1991) (holding that Illinois court lacked personal jurisdiction over Iowa-domiciled transferee
in fraudulent conveyance action); Jahner v. Jacob, 252 N.W.2d 1 (N.D. 1977) (reversing
judgment against third-party transferees in fraudulent conveyance action who were not subject to
personal jurisdiction in North Dakota); Malis v. Zinman, 261 A.2d 875 (Pa. 1970) (holding that
fraudulent conveyance action to set aside transfer of real property in Pennsylvania was an in rem
action, and that Pennsylvania court had jurisdiction to proceed even if the transferor and the
third party trar.sferee were both domiciled in Massachusetts); 1 GARRARD GLENN,
FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES AND PREFERENCES § 92a, at 159 (2d ed. 1940) (noting that "the
court will not entertain the suit unless the property is within the State and subject to its control";
"when ... personal property is so located outside of the State, that it will not be within the
court's control, then the case is like that of land, and a suit attacking the fraudulent transfer will
not be entertained"). Cf infra part II.C.2 (describing the limited geographic reach of an
attachment order).
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A. Anatomy of a Prejudgment Attachment Statute
All states except Pennsylvania 34 have enacted statutes authorizing
prejudgment attachment, a remedy generally characterized as legal as
opposed to equitable.35 Although the state statutes vary, they can be
described collectively for present purposes.
The statutes permit a plaintiff, upon the filing of a bond,36 to obtain
a prejudgment order for the attachment of the defendant's property in
a wide variety of circumstances, such as in cases in which the defend-
ant is a nonresident of the state or a foreign corporation,3 7 the defend-
ant threatens to remove property from the state with intent to hinder,
defraud or delay creditors,38 and in contract cases for the payment of
money in which the contract is unsecured or the security has become
valueless.39 In all cases the plaintiff must establish the probable valid-
ity of her claim.' The statutes typically permit the court to issue the
attachment order on an ex parte basis.41 With a few exceptions (most
34. See infra note 78.
35. See supraAnote 10; see also, e.g., EBSCO Indus., Inc. v. Lilly, 840 F.2d 333, 334-35 (6th
Cir.) (noting that "Ohio state courts have held that the attachment provisions provide a legal, as
distinguished from an equitable, prejudgment remedy"), cert denied, 488 U.S. 825 (1988);
Allstate Sales & Leasing Co. v. Geis, 412 N.W.2d 30, 32 (Minn. App. 1987) (holding that
plaintiff "did not show it lacked an adequate legal remedy in the attachment statute").
36. See, eg., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 489.210 (West 1979 & Supp. 1991); D.C. CODE ANN.
§ 16-501(e) (1989); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 76.12, 77.031 (West 1987); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110,
4-107, 4-108 (Smith-Hurd 1983 & Supp. 1991); N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & Rt § 6212 (McKinney
1980); TEX. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 61.023 (West 1986); TEX. R. CIv. P. 592, 592a.
37. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 16-110-101, 16-110-103 (Michie 1987); CAL. CIV. PROC.
CODE § 492.010 (West 1979 & Supp. 1991); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, 4-101 (Smith-Hurd
1983); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2715.01 (Page Supp. 1990); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE
ANN. §§ 61.002, 61.005 (West 1986).
38. See, e.g., ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-2402 (Supp. 1990); COLO. R. Civ. P. 102(c); ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 110, 4-101 (Smith-Hurd 1983); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 425.301 (Baldwin
1979); MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-303 (1989); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 42-9-1 (Michie
1978).
39. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 8-501 (1990); MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-18-101 (1991); OR. R.
Civ. P. 84A.(2)(a); UTAH R. Civ. P. 64C; WYo. STAT. § 1-15-201 (1988).
40. See, e.g., ALASKA Civ. R. 89(d); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 484.090 (West Supp. 1991);
D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-501(c) (1989) (plaintiff must aver that she has "a just right to recover
what is claimed in [her] complaint"); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 76.24 (West 1987) (if defendant moves
to dissolve the writ, plaintiff must prove "the grounds upon which the writ was issued and a
reasonable probability that the final judgment in the underlying action will be rendered in his
favor"); N.J. Civ. PRAC. R. 4:60-5(a) (court must find that there is "a probability that final
judgment will be rendered in favor of the plaintiff").
41. See, e.g., ALA. R. Civ. P. 64(b); ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-2402 (Supp. 1990); CAL.
CIv. PROC. CODE § 485.010 (West 1979 & Supp. 1991); N.Y. CIv. PRAC. L. & R. §§ 6210, 6211
(McKinney 1980 & Supp. 1991); TEX. R. Civ. P. 592.
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commonly for wages and property exempt from execution),42 virtually
all of the defendant's real and personal property is subject to prejudg-
ment attachment, whether tangible or not.43 Even property in the
hands of third-party garnishees may be subject to prejudgment attach-
ment.' The prejudgment attachment order directs the sheriff to seize
tangible property, and to attach constructively the rest of the defend-
ant's property.4 The statutes usually permit the defendant (or the
garnishee) to post a bond to obtain the return of the attached property,
and often permit the defendant to obtain its return without posting a
bond upon a showing that the attachment order issued improperly.46
B. The History of Prejudgment Attachment
1. Prejudgment Attachment in the Common Law Courts
The common law did not authorize a default judgment,47 so if a
defendant did not respond to the original writ, the court would issue a
series of successive writs to coerce his appearance. 48 The least coer-
cive writ, after the summons, was a writ of attachment against his
property.4 9 If the attachment did not produce the defendant's appear-
ance, the court would issue writs of distringas or "distress infinite" for
the seizure of additional property and for the profits of the defendant's
42. See, eg., ALASKA STAT. § 09.40.030 (1983); CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE §§ 487.010, 487.020
(West 1979 & Supp. 1991); HAWAII REV. STAT. §§ 651-92, 651-121, 651-124 (1988); IND. R.
TRIAL PRO. 64(B); MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.4031 (West 1987).
43. See, eg., ALA. CODE § 6-6-70 (1975); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 3508 (1975); MD. Crs.
& JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 3-302, 3-305 (1989); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 521.050, 521.240,
521.250 (Vernon 1953 & Supp. 1991); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 42-9-4 (Michie 1978).
44. See, eg., COLO. R. Civ. P. 102(e); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, §§ 3502, 3509 (1975 & Supp.
1990); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-502(a) (1989); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 77.031 (West 1987); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 110, 4-115, 4-126 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1991); N.Y. CIv. PRAC. L. & R. § 6214
(McKinney 1980).
45. See, e.g., ALA. CODE §§ 6-6-70, 6-6-73 (1975); D.C. CODE §§ 16-508, 16-509 (1989); ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 110, 4-110, 4-113,4-119,4-124 (Smith-Hurd 1983 & Supp. 1991); OHIO REv.
CODE ANN. § 2715.09 (Page Supp. 1990); TEx. CIv. PRAc. & RFM. CODE § 61.042 (West 1986).
46. See, eg., ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-1536 (1982 & Supp. 1990); ARK. CODE ANN.
§ 16-110-130 (1987); DEL. Civ. R. 4(3)(B); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 76.18, 77.24 (West 1987); ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 110, 4-119, 4-120 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1991); N.Y. CIV. PRAC. L. & R.
§§ 6222, 6223 (McKinney 1980); TEX. R. CIV. P. 592, 599.
47. It was not until 1725 that a statute authorized the plaintiff "to enter a common
appearance or file common bail for the defendant . . . and to proceed thereon, as if such
defendant.., had entred [sic] his, her or their appearance, or filed common bail" if the defendant
did not "appear at the return of the process or within four days after such return." 12 Geo., ch.
29, § 1 (Eng.).
48. ROBERT W. MILLAR, CIVIL PROCEDURE OF THE TRIAL COURT IN HISTORICAL
PERSPECTIVE 74 (1952).
49. Id. at 75, 487 n.29; 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *280.
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land." The attachment and early distresses seized only so much of the
defendant's property as was reasonable or likely to compel his appear-
ance. 1 Succeeding distresses attached increasing amounts of prop-
erty, until the defendant, in the words of Blackstone, was "gradually
stripped of it all by repeated distresses."
5 2
The sole purpose of the attachment or distress was to compel the
defendant's appearance; it did not provide security for the plaintiff's
claim.5" In fact, if the defendant appeared in t.Ae action after an
attachment, his property was discharged. 4 If the defendant did not
appear, the seized property was forfeited to the Crown.5 Before 1769
or so, the attached property could not be used even to pay the plain-
tiff's costs.5 6 Even after 1769, however, it was not contemplated that
the property could be used to satisfy the plaintiff's claim. 7 Thus, the
attachment remedy in the common law courts was not designed to
prevent tertiary harm and did not accomplish that result.
50. 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 49, at *280; MILLAR, supra note 48, at 74-75, 487 n.29;
THEODORE F.T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 385 (5th ed. 1956).
51. MILLAR, supra note 48, at 487 n.29.
52. 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 49, at *281, quoted in MILLAR, supra note 48, at 487 n.29. As
in the common law courts, the chancery employed a series of increasingly severe measures to
compel the defendant's appearance, including a subpoena, an attachment, an attachment with
proclamations, a commission of rebellion, a sergeant at arms, and finally, sequestration. 3
BLACKSTONE, supra note 49, at *443-44; 9 WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH
LAW 349-50 (3d ed. 1944); MILLAR, supra note 48, at 362.
53. MILLAR, supra note 48, at 481; Nathan Levy Jr., Attachment, Garnishment and
Garnishment Execution: Some American Problems Considered in the Light of the English
Experience, 5 CONN. L. Rav. 399, 405 (1972-73) (noting that foreign attachment in early Law
Merchant and by custom in the Mayor's Court and the Sheriff's Cour of London developed "at
least partly [in] response to the failure of the common law courts to provide plaintiffs' remedies
which were as efficient"); William E. Mussman & Stefan A. Riesenfeld, Garnishment and
Bankruptcy, 27 MINN. L. REv. 1, 10 n.33 (1942) (noting that "[c]ommon law attachment in
contrast to foreign attachment according to the customs of London did not permit any
satisfaction of plaintiff out of the attached chattels but they were forfeited to the king").
54. MILLAR, supra note 48, at 75 (quoting RICHARD BOOTE, A HISTORICAL TREATISE OF
AN ACTION OR SUIT AT LAW 26 (4th ed. 1805)); JOSEPH H. KOFFLER & ALLISON REPPY,
HANDBOOK OF COMMON LAW PLEADING 74 (1969); see also Hubbard v. Hamilton Bank, 48
Mass. (I Met.) 340, 342 (1844) (noting that "[o]riginally, an attachment on mesne process seems
to have been instituted merely for the purpose of compelling the appearance of the defendant in
court to answer to the suit"); Penoyar v. Kelsey, 44 N.E. 788 (N.Y. 1896) (noting that original
purpose of common law attachment "was to acquire jurisdiction of th2 defendant by compelling
him to appear in court through the seizure of his property").
55. Penoyar, 44 N.E. 788; 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 49, at *280; MILLAR, supra note 48, at
487 n.29; Levy, supra note 53, at 423; Mussman & Riesenfeld, supra note 53, at 10 n.33.
56. 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 49, at *280 (citing 10 Geo. 3, ch. 50, §§ 3, 4 (1769)); MILLAR,
supra note 48, at 487 n.29 (citing same).
57. Penoyar, 44 N.E. at 789 (noting that "'[t]he practice of attaching the effects of a
defendant and holding them to satisfy a judgment, which the pla:_ntiff may recover, when,
perhaps, judgment may be for the defendant, is unknown to the common law' ") (quoting Bond
v. Ward, 7 Mass. 123, 128 (1810)); MILLAR, supra note 48, at 487 n-29.
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2. Foreign Attachment Under the Custom of London
Prejudgment attachment was used as a jurisdictional tool in the
local courts as well. As early as 1287 under the early Law
Merchant,58 and later under the Custom of London in the Lord
Mayor's Court and the Sheriff's Court,59 prejudgment attachment was
available to obtain quasi-in-rem jurisdiction over the defendant.
Designed specifically to force the defendant into court to defend his
property, this early foreign attachment, like the attachment in the
common law courts, was dissolved if the defendant appeared.6"
Unlike common law attachment, however, the foreign attachment
under the Custom of London permitted the plaintiff to satisfy her
claim out of the attached property if the attachment did not accom-
plish its objective and coerce the defendant's appearance.61
The phrase "foreign attachment" was not literally accurate, as the
procedure was never limited to "foreign" defendants, 62  and the
"attachment" authorized was really a garnishment, or attachment of
the debtor's property in the hands of a third party.63 Either the
58. Levy, supra note 53, at 405 (citing Howell v. Mules, Fair Court of St. Ives, A.D. 1287, 1
Select Cases Concerning the Law Merchant 28-29 (Selden Society 1908)); see also PLUcKNETT,
supra note 50, at 392-93 (discussing the Statute of Merchants of 1285, which authorized the
seizure of defendant's property and the sale of his chattels to satisfy mercantile debts).
59. Connecticut v. Doehr, III S. Ct. 2105, 2115 (1991) (citing Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U.S.
94, 104 (1921)); WILLIAM BOHUN, PRIVILEGIA LONDINI: OR, THE LAWS, CUSTOMS AND
PRIVILEDGES OF THE CITY OF LONDON 189 (1702) [hereinafter BOHUN]; MILLAR, supra note
48, at 480; Levy, supra note 53, at 405. Customs were practices that the citizens of London
developed, which the King and Parliament ultimately recognized as privileges even though they
were not enjoyed elsewhere. Levy, supra note 53, at 406 (citing WILLIAM BOHUN, PRIVILEGIA
LONDINI: OR, THE LAWS, CUSTOMS AND PRIVILEDGES OF THE CITY OF LONDON 80 (3d ed.
1723)); CHARLES D. DRAKE, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SUITS BY ATTACHMENT IN THE
UNITED STATES 1-2 (7th ed. 1891). By the close of the fourteenth century, foreign attachment
was well established in many other English cities and on the Continent. Levy, supra note 53, at
405-06. But it was the Custom of London that influenced the development of attachment in the
United States. Levy, supra note 53, at 406; MILLAR, supra note 48, at 481.
60. MILLAR, supra note 48, at 482-83; ALEXANDER PULLING, THE LAWS, CUSTOMS,
USAGES, AND REGULATIONS OF THE CITY AND PORT OF LONDON 189 (2d ed. 1854); Levy,
supra note 53, at 405, 423.
61. Levy, supra note 53, at 423. Thus, under common law attachment, the property seized
was forfeited to the Crown if the defendant failed to appear; under foreign attachment, the
property seized was paid to the plaintiff in the event of default.
62. Id. at 408. According to Professor Levy, the word "foreign" meant "not civic." Id.
(citing The Mayor and Aldermen of London v. Cox, 2 L.R.-E.&.I. App. 239, 265 (H.L. 1867)).
Professor Millar suggests that a foreigner was "one dwelling outside the city" of London.
MILLAR, supra note 48, at 481.
63. Id. at 483; PULLING, supra note 60, at 187-88; Levy, supra note 53, at 408-09. Foreign
attachment also included a procedure known as "sequestration," pursuant to which goods
belonging to the defendant, found in a warehouse or house with no attendant, could be attached.
BOHUN, supra note 59, at 218; MILLAR, supra note 48, at 483; PULLING, supra note 60, at 192;
Levy, supra note 53, at 418.
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defendant or the garnishee could dissolve the attachment by posting
bail for the defendant's appearance." There is no evidence that this
form of pretrial attachment was ever intended or used to secure a
plaintiff's judgment against a defendant who in fact appeared but
threatened to waste his assets. 5 Thus, like the common law attach-
ment, foreign attachment under the Custom of London was designed
for purposes other than the prevention of tertiary harm.
3. The Transformation of Prejudgment Attachment in Early
America
The colonists drew on both English traditions of attachment in set-
ting up their own judicial systems. The colonists used "common
attachment" to attach tangible property in the defendant's own posses-
sion66 to coerce his appearance without furnishing any security for the
plaintiff's claim.67 They also adopted foreign attachment68 as early as
the late 1600's to permit the prejudgment attachment of the defend-
ant's property in the hands of third parties, 69 or what the New Eng-
land colonies called "trustee process."70
While both forms of prejudgment attachment were designed as
jurisdictional tools,71 they were transformed by the colonies into
rather blunt tools for preventing tertiary harm. In 1659, for example,
64. MILLAR, supra note 48, at 482; Levy, supra note 53, at 411.
65. Joseph J. Kalo, Jurisdiction as an Evolutionary Process: The Development of Quasi in Rem
and In Personam Principles, 1978 DUKE L.J. 1147, 1159 (noting that "if the defendant appeared
the attachment was dissolved, which meant that a dishonest defendant could appear and then use
the time between the entry of the judgment and the issuance of a writ of execution to dispose of
the property that had been under attachment").
66. MILLAR, supra note 48, at 486.
67. Id. at 486-87; Kalo, supra note 65, at 1157-59.
68. Levy, supra note 53, at 401 (noting that foreign attachment "suited the needs of an
expanding credit economy and of a people, averse to imprisonment for debt, who travelled at will
among 'limitedly sovereign' states spread over a large territory"); see also Mills v. Findlay, 14
Ga. 230, 232 (1853) (noting that custom of London was "the foundation of all of our Attachment
Laws"); DRAKE, supra note 59, at 1-3; MILLAR, supra note 48, at 485; Julius Goebel Jr., King's
Law and Local Custom in Seventeenth Century New England, 31 COLUM. L. REV. 416, 417,
420-21 (1931) (stating that "at the outset of the seventeenth century local custom and local
courts were still an immensely important part of the law administration in England," and noting
that the colonists resorted to the customary law with which they had grown up when they
developed a civil order in America).
69. Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94, 104 (1921) (noting that Delaware's attachment statute,
like the attachment statutes of other states, "traces its origin to the Custom of London, under
which a creditor might attach money or goods of the defendant either in plaintiff's own hands or
in the custody of a third person, by proceedings in the mayor's court or in the sheriff's court");
MILLAR, supra note 48, at 486; Kalo, supra note 65, at 1161.
70. MILLAR, supra note 48, at 486-87.
71. See supra parts II.B.1-2.
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the Massachusetts colony adopted a statute, which revolutionized the
common attachment remedy. It provided that goods attached would
not be released upon the defendant's appearance, but "shall stand
engaged until the judgment or execution granted upon the said judg-
ment be discharged."72 Another Massachusetts statute, enacted in
1701, provided that attached property should not be released until 30
days after the judgment was entered for plaintiff, "that he may take
the same by execution, for satisfying of such judgment in whole or in
part, so far as the value thereof can extend, if he think fit, unless the
judgment be sooner or otherwise satisfied, any law, usage or custom to
the contrary notwithstanding." 3 All of the New England jurisdic-
tions ultimately followed Massachusetts's lead in transforming com-
mon attachment from a means of compelling the defendant's
appearance into a method of assuring the plaintiff's satisfaction. 4
Similarly, although trustee process, like the foreign attachment from
which it derived, was originally restricted to cases against absent or
absconding debtors, in 1795 Massachusetts made it available against
debtor-defendants generally,7" and the other New England jurisdic-
tions followed suit.7" This change, together with the transformation of
common attachment, completed the metamorphosis of prejudgment
attachment from a jurisdictional tool to a rather heavy-handed means
of preventing tertiary harm. 77
72. Colonial Laws of Massachusetts 144 (1887) and Charter & General Laws of the Colony
and Province of Massachusetts Bay 192 (1814), quoted in MILLAR, supra note 48, at 488.
According to the court in Hubbard v. Hamilton Bank, 48 Mass. (1 Met.) 340, 342-43 (1844), the
provision was first enacted in a colonial ordinance of 1650 and was reenacted in 1659 (citing Anc.
Chart. 51, 193). Professor Kalo also concludes that the statute was enacted in 1650. Kalo, supra
note 65, at 1160.
73. Acts of 1701-02, c. 5, § 11, 1 Acts & Resolves of the Province of Massachusetts Bay
(1869), quoted in MILLAR, supra note 48, at 488.
74. MILLAR, supra note 48, at 488; Owenby v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94, 105 (1921) (noting that
"it naturally came about that the American colonies and States, in adopting foreign attachment
as a remedy for collecting debts due from non-resident or absconding debtors, in many instances
made it a part of the procedure that if defendant desired to enter an appearance and contest
plaintiff's demand he must first give substantial security, usually in the form of special bail").
75. Mass. Laws 1794, ch. 65 (Act of Feb. 28, 1795), 1 Mass. Gen. Laws to 1822, 464 (1823),
cited in MILLAR, supra note 48, at 489.
76. MILLAR, supra note 48, at 489.
77. Attachment was used primarily in aid of debt collection, as 90 percent of all civil suits in
the eighteenth century were debt cases. BRUCE H. MANN, NEIGHBORS AND STRANGERS: LAW
AND COMMUNITY IN EARLY CONNECTICUT 12 (1987); see also Kalo, supra note 65, at 1150
(stating that "[t]he most significant factor influencing the course of development of jurisdictional
principles in colonial America was the problem of debt collection in an economy heavily
dependent on credit'); Thomas D. Russell, Historical Study of Personal Injury Litigation: A
Comment on Method, 1 GA. J. S. LEGAL HIsT. 109, 117-19 (1991) (noting the paucity of tort
actions, and the predominance of contract and debt actions, during the nineteenth century).
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C. The Limited Utility of Prejudgment Attachment in Preventing
Tertiary Harm
Conceivably, a remedy designed for one purpose might actually
serve another purpose as well. Thus, that prejudgment attachment
was not originally designed to prevent tertiary harm does not in itself
compel the conclusion that attachment is ill-equipped to prevent terti-
ary harm. But the variance between its historical purpose and its cur-
rent use at least raises the question of the efficacy of the remedy today.
In fact, prejudgment attachment has proven to be a poor vehicle for
preventing tertiary harm.
1. Subject Matter Restrictions on Attachment
Most obviously, prejudgment attachment fails to protect the plain-
tiff from tertiary harm if it is unavailable in the kind of case the plain-
tiff has commenced, or does not reach the only property the defendant
has that would be available to satisfy the plaintiff's judgment. For
example, Pennsylvania has rescinded all of its statutory provisions for
attachment,78 so the prejudgment remedy at law is not available in any
action brought in federal or state court in Pennsylvania. Many states
authorize attachment only in certain kinds of cases-in contract
actions,7 9 for example. Other states vary the availability of the remedy
78. PA. R. Civ. P. 1251-79 explanatory comment 1989 (noting rescission of rules governing
foreign attachment); PA. R. Civ. P. 1285-92 (noting rescission of rules governing fraudulent
debtor's attachment); PA. R. Civ. P. 1462 (suspending Acts of Assembly that applied to practice
and procedure in fraudulent debtor's attachment); PA. R. Civ. P. 1480 (abolishing the action of
domestic attachment); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. (Supp. 1991).
In 1976, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals held that Pennsylvania's foreign attachment
procedures, then codified at PA. R. CIv. P. 1251-79, were unconstitutional. See Jonnet v. Dollar
Say. Bank, 530 F.2d 1123 (3d Cir. 1976). Following Jonnet, the legislature concluded that:
[N]either foreign attachment nor fraudulent debtor's attachment ,erve well their original
functions of acquiring jurisdiction over the defendant and immobilizing property from
which an eventual judgment might be satisfied. In light of the modern long-arm statute
which has extended in personam jurisdiction over nonresident defendants to the broadest
extent permissible under the Constitution and the incorporation of the minimum contacts
required for in personam jurisdiction into the in rem and quasi-in-rem theories, there seems
little need for the jurisdictional function of the remedies. In addition, the procedural
complexities of fraudulent debtor's attachment have rendered it almost useless and the
potential for misuse of the writ when the grounds of fraud are not actually present make the
second function of sequestering property dubious at best.
PA. R. Civ. P. 1251-79 explanatory comment 1989. This comment echoes the argument made
here that the attachment remedy, initially designed to coerce the defendant's appearance in
court, is a poor vehicle for preventing tertiary harm.
79. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 09.40.010 (1983) (authorizing attachment only in actions upon
contracts or for collection of state tax or license fees); CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE §§ 483.010,
492.010 (West Supp. 1991) (authorizing attachment only in actions on claims for money based
upon contract where the amount of the claim is a "fixed or readily ascertainable amount," or in
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depending upon the residency status of the defendant (probably a ves-
tige of the jurisdictional roots of attachment). 0 Moreover, some states
limit the kinds of property that may be subject to attachment. 8, In
these cases and others in which prejudgment attachment is unavaila-
ble, it does not protect the plaintiff from tertiary harm.82
2. Limited Geographic Reach of Attachment
Like state statutes that authorize issuance of subpoenas83 and writs
of execution upon judgments,8 4 state statutes that authorize the issu-
actions for the recovery of money against nonresident defendants who are natural persons or
foreign corporations or foreign partnerships not registered with the state; limiting availability of
attachment against individuals to claims arising out of their business conduct); D.C. CODE ANN.
§ 16-501(a) (Michie 1989) (permitting attachment only in actions for recovery of specific
personal property, a debt, or damages for breach of contract); HAW. REv. STAT. § 651-2 (1988)
(permitting attachment only in actions "upon a contract, express or implied"); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 27-18-101 (1991) (authorizing attachment only in actions upon contracts for the direct
payment of money and actions upon a statutory stockholders' liability); OR. R. Civ. P. 84A
(authorizing attachment against resident defendants only in contract actions); WIs. STAT. ANN.
§ 811.03 (West 1977 & Supp. 1991) (authorizing prejudgment attachment in specified actions on
contracts or judgments, and in tort actions only against nonresident defendants, foreign
corporations, and defendants whose addresses are unknown and unascertainable).
80. See, eg., ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-110-103 (Michie 1987) (authorizing attachment in
actions for torts committed in the state only against nonresident defendants); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 32-08.1-03 (Supp. 1991) (limiting cases in which attachment may issue against resident
defendant, and authorizing attachment in tort actions only if defendant is a nonresident, a
foreign corporation, or a person whose residence is unknown and unascertainable); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2715.01 (Page Supp. 1990) (distinguishing between resident and nonresident
defendants in authorizing attachment).
See also In re Fredeman Litig., 843 F.2d 821, 826 (5th Cir. 1988) (holding that attachment
under Texas law was unavailable because defendants were subject to personal service in Texas
and because plaintiffs' claims were entirely unliquidated); Anderson Foreign Motors, Inc. v. New
England Toyota Distrib. Inc., 492 F. Supp. 1383, 1389 (D. Mass. 1980) (noting that state laws
"vary widely" in the extent to which they limit the availability of attachment to specified classes
of cases).
81. The most common (and sensible) limitation is the exemption from attachment of property
that would be exempt from execution. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 09.40.030 (1983); ME. REv.
STAT. ANN. tit. 14, §§ 4151, 4422, 4451 (West 1980 & Supp. 1990); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
223, § 42 (West 1985); NEv. REv. STAT. § 31.020(h) (1987); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-08.1-10
(Supp. 1991); TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 61.041 (West 1986). Other limitations
exist, however. See, e.g., USACO Coal Co. v. Carbomin Energy, Inc., 689 F.2d 94, 98-99 (6th
Cir. 1982) (concluding that attachment and lis pendens under state law would not adequately
protect plaintiffs because the statutes probably did not reach mineral properties severed from the
earth).
82. See infra part IV.C for a discussion of limitations on the plaintiff's ability to evade
statutory limitations by seeking injunctive relief.
83. See Rhonda Wasserman, The Subpoena Power: Pennoyer's Last Vestige, 74 MINN. L.
REV. 37, 68-78 (1989).
84. See, eg., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 699.510, 699.520 (West 1987) (writ of execution
directs "levying officer in the county where the levy is to be made" to enforce money judgment);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 56.031 (West 1969) (execution directed to "the sheriffs of the state and shall
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ance of writs of attachment limit the geographic reach of the judicial
process. In many states, the attachment order directs the sheriff to
attach only property found within the county in which she serves.8 5
Although many state statutes permit the issuance of several writs of
attachment to sheriffs in several counties within the state,8 6 and some
permit the sheriff of one county to attach property in another county if
the defendant has moved it there after the attachment order issued,
7
no state statute purports to authorize the attachment of property
outside the territory of the state.
The limited territorial reach of the state attachment statutes has
hampered both state and federal courts in pre3erving defendants'
assets to satisfy an expected future judgment. State courts have held
that they cannot attach stock owned by a defendant unless the certifi-
cates are physically present within the state, 8 that they cannot attach
a bank account maintained by the defendant at a branch outside the
state, 9 that they cannot attach a debt owed to the defendant by a
be in full force throughout the state"); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, 12-106 (Smith-Hurd 1984)
(judgment may be enforced "by the proper officer of any county, in this State"); N.Y. Civ.
PRAc. L. & R. § 5230(b) (McKinney 1978) (execution issues "to the sheriffs of one or more
counties of the state"); PA. R. Civ. P. 3103 (writ of execution "may be directed to the sheriff of
any county within the Commonwealth"); see also Stiller v. Hardman, 324 F.2d 626, 628 (2d Cir.
1963) (noting that "[i]n the absence of a statute providing for the registration or summary
enforcement of foreign judgment .... it is usually necessary to bring an action of debt on a
foreign money judgment and to obtain a new judgment of the forum before execution will
issue").
85. See, eg., IDAHO CODE § 8-504 (1990); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, 4-110, 4-112 (Smith-
Hurd Supp. 1991); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-1-11-6 (Burns 1986); N.Y. CIV. PRAC. L. & R. § 6211
(McKinney 1980); TEx. R. Civ. P. 593, 597.
86. See, eg., FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 76.16, 76.17 (West 1987); IDAHO CODE § 8-504 (1990);
IND. CODE ANN. § 34-1-11-7 (Burns 1986); Mo. R. CIv. P. 85.06; MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 27-18-
206 (1991); R.I. R. Civ. P. 4(j)(2).
87. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 18-3-30 (Michie 1991); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, 4-116
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1991); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-1-11-11 (Burns 1986); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 6.25.150 (West Supp. 1991).
88. See, e.g., Giroir v. Giroir, 536 So. 2d 830, 833 (La. Ct. App. 1988) (holding that "since...
the stock certificates... were not in Louisiana when.., the writ issued, they were not subject to
attachment"; attachment attempted to obtain quasi-in-rem jurisdiction over nonresident
defendant); Johnson v. Wood, 189 A. 613, 618 (N.J. Cir. Ct. 1936) (holding that because stock
certificates were located in New Hampshire, "there is not present in this state [New Jersey] any
property of the defendant which can be attached").
89. See, e.g., Land Mfg., Inc. v. Highland Park State Bank, 470 P.2d 782, 784 (Kan. 1970)
(holding that where individual had a sum on deposit in Chase Manhattan Bank in New York,
"the monies or credits were not located or attached in Kansas"); McCloskey v. Chase Manhattan
Bank, 183 N.E.2d 227 (N.Y. 1962) (holding that "balances maintained by the individual
[defendant] in the German branch [of Chase Manhattan Bank] were payable only in Germany at
that branch and that the funds were not subject to attachment in New York"), cited in Gavilanes
v. Matavosian, 475 N.Y.S.2d 987, 990 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1984); Therm-X-Chemical & Oil Corp. v.
Extebank, 444 N.Y.S.2d 26, 27 (App. Div. 1981) (noting that "the general rule in New York is
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garnishee under a contract negotiated outside the state,90 or, more
generally, that they cannot attach property found outside the state,91
or garnish property held by the garnishee outside the state.9z Federal
courts that have attempted to use state attachment remedies pursuant
that in order to reach a particular bank account the judgment creditor must serve the office of the
bank where the account is maintained"; holding that such rule is not obsolete "where the...
bank does not have high speed computers with central indexing capabilities to keep track of its
depositors' accounts"); Cronan v. Schilling, 100 N.Y.S.2d 474, 476 (Sup. Ct. 1950) (noting that
"the law seems well established that a warrant of attachment served upon a branch bank does not
reach assets held for, or accounts maintained by, the defendant in other branches or in the home
office"), aff'd, 126 N.Y.S.2d 192 (1953), app. denied, 127 N.Y.S.2d 809 (1954); Bluebird
Undergarment Corp. v. Gomez, 249 N.Y.S. 319, 322 (City Ct. of N.Y. 1931) (holding that "the
debt owed by a branch finds its situs within the territorial jurisdiction of such branch"; money on
deposit in Puerto Rican branch of bank could not be attached by service on New York branch);
see also Thomas S. Erickson, Comment, Creditor's Rights-Garnishment-Garnishment of
Branch Banks, 56 MICH. L. Rv. 90, 96 (1957) (concluding that "[in the foreign branch area,
.. even without a statute, garnishment is effective only as to the branch served"); R1F. Chase,
Annotation, Attachment and Garnishment of Funds in Branch Bank or Main Office of Bank
Having Branches, 12 A.L.R.3D 1088, 1089 (1967) (concluding that "when it comes to attachment
or garnishment,.. . 'each branch... is a separate entity .. .,' and accounts or deposits may be
seized only by serving the writ at the branch... supposedly holding the funds for the debtor").
90. Apollo Metals, Inc. v. Standard Mirror Co., 231 N.E.2d 655, 658 (Ill. 1967) (holding that
"for the purpose of the execution of the writ [of attachment against a garnishee] there must be
actual property in the possession of the garnishee within the jurisdiction of the court authorizing
the writ"; "the contract debt which Apollo sought to attach came into being pursuant to
negotiations held outside of Illinois"; "payment under the contract was to be made outside of
Illinois"; holding that attaching creditor failed to meet burden of proving that debt was subject to
attachment in Illinois; attachment for purposes of obtaining quasi-in-rem jurisdiction).
91. See. eg., Saltzman v. Indemnity Ins. Co., 274 N.Y.S. 806, 807 (Sup. Ct. 1934) (German
resident "had no property on which a levy could be made within this jurisdiction"); Stricklin v.
Hodgen, 172 S.E. 770, 772 (S.C. 1934) (holding that "funds of the defendant ... which the
attachment sought to reach, had been forwarded by telegraphic transmission beyond the limits of
this state, to a point in Florida, before the attempted execution of the attachment warrant";
vacating attachment); see also, eg., Allstate Sales and Leasing Co. v. Geis, 412 N.W.2d 30, 32-33
(Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (noting that "[a] state court cannot attach assets located outside the
state"); ABKCO Indus., Inc. v. Apple Films, Inc., 350 N.E.2d 899, 901 (N.Y. 1976) (noting that
"[tangible personal property obviously has a unique location and can only be attached where it
is .... [S]ome intangibles are deemed to have become embodied in formal paper writings.., and
in such instances attachment depends on the physical presence of the written instrument within
the attaching jurisdiction."); Gavilanes v. Matavosian, 475 N.Y.S.2d 987, 989 (N.Y. Civ. Ct.
1984) (stating that "[it is well established that a New York court can not attach property not
within its jurisdiction"); Buckeye Pipe-Line Co. v. Fee, 57 N.E. 446, 448 (Ohio 1900) (stating
that "[n]o question is or could be made that property without the state, can by virtue of a process
of attachment, be seized by an Ohio officer, and, of course, such property could not be delivered
into court"); Bruce et al., supra note 32 (discussing inability to attach assets placed in a trust
created under foreign law); 7 CJ.S. Attachment § 65 (1980) ("the court cannot attach property
which is not within the territorial limits of its jurisdiction").
92. See, e.g., Buckeye Pipe-Line, 57 N.E. at 448 (stating that "property which may be
sequestered in the hands of a garnishee must be within the state in order that it may be taken...
for it is in contemplation that the officer will seize the property in the possession of the
garnishee"); see supra note 33 (discussing the jurisdictional principles that limit the availability of
remedies under fraudulent conveyance law to set aside transfers after the fact).
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to Federal Rule 64 of Civil Procedure93 also have noted that attach-
ment applies only against property found within the state in which the
federal court sits.94 Thus, in cases in which the defendant has prop-
erty in several states, or has already moved her property outside the
state in which the action is pending, the attachment remedy will be
ineffectual. To take advantage of it, the plaintiff would have to initiate
multiple proceedings in the several states in which the defendant had
property.95
93. See infra note 309.
94. See, eg., EBSCO Indus., Inc. v. Lilly, 840 F.2d 333, 336 (6th Cir.) (finding that
attachment remedy was inadequate because it could not reach assets located outside state), cert.
denied, 488 U.S. 825 (1988); Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Rodenberg, 622 F. Supp. 286, 288 (D.
Md. 1985) (rejecting plaintiff's argument that a federal court sitting in Maryland may "apply
Maryland's attachment procedures extraterritorially to accomplish the objectives of Rule 64";
interpreting Maryland's attachment statute as authorizing attachment only within the territorial
limits of the state); Fleming v. Gray Mfg. Co., 352 F. Supp. 724, 726 (D. Conn. 1973) (holding
that under Connecticut law, attachment of a security requires seizure); Lantz Int'l Corp. v.
Industria Termotecnica Campana, 358 F. Supp. 510, 514 (E.D. Pa. 1973) (noting that under
Pennsylvania law, "the basis for the writ of foreign attachment is the presence of property of the
defendant within the jurisdiction of the court") (emphasis added); Nederlandsche Handel-
Maatschappij, N.V. v. Sentry Corp., 163 F. Supp. 800, 803 (E.D. Ila. 1958) (holding that "the
securities cannot be attached because they are without the geographical limits of this Court and
therefore beyond the jurisdiction"); Westerman v. Gilbert, 119 F. Supp. 355, 358-59 (D.R.I.
1953) (holding that defendant's interest in shares of stock of a Rhode Island corporation was not
subject to attachment in Rhode Island unless the certificates themselves were physically present
in the state and actually seized).
Rule 64 could be amended to permit nationwide attachment in federal actions. But the
problem of the limited geographic reach of attachment would continue to exist in state courts
and in all actions in which the property is located abroad.
95. See, e.g., EBSCO, 840 F.2d at 336 (finding attachment remedy inadequate because it
could not reach assets located outside state, and plaintiff would have to initiate attachment
proceedings in several states); Clark Equip. Co. v. Armstrong Equip. Co., 431 F.2d 54, 57 (5th
Cir. 1970) (upholding preliminary injunction to require defendant to assemble and make
available to plaintiff collateral, which was located in five states; noting that "no one possessory
action would provide an adequate remedy"), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 909 (1971); Wilkerson v.
Sullivan, 727 F. Supp. 925, 936 (E.D. Pa. 1989) (stating that "a legal remedy is normally
considered inadequate if it would result in a multiplicity of lawsuits"); Northeast Women's
Center, Inc. v. McMonagle, 665 F. Supp. 1147, 1153 (E.D. Pa. 1987) (in granting permanent
injunction, stating that "[tihe legal remedy is inadequate if the plaintiff's injury is a continuing
one, where the best available remedy at law would relegate the plaintiff to filing a separate claim
for damages each time it is injured anew"); Howell Pipeline Co. v. Terra Resources, Inc., 454 So.
2d 1353, 1357 (Ala. 1984) (affirming grant of preliminary injunction to enjoin defendant from
failing to honor contract because in absence of injunction, plaintiff would have to sue monthly for
damages); State ex rel. Missouri Highway and Transp. Comm'n v. Marcum Oil Co., 697 S.W.2d
580, 581 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985) (stating that "where an injury committed by one against another is
continuous or is being constantly repeated, so that plaintiff's remedy at law requires the bringing
of successive actions, that remedy is inadequate").
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3. Intrusiveness of Attachment
The word attachment, which derives from the Latin term attingo
and the French term attacher, meaning to take or touch, implies
seizure.96 In fact, virtually all of the state attachment statutes author-
ize the sheriff to physically seize the defendant's tangible property,
whether found in the possession of the defendant or in the possession
of a third party. 97 Most states permit the sheriff to sell the property-
before the plaintiff's claim against the defendant is finally heard on the
merits-if the property attached is perishable, likely to depreciate sig-
nificantly, or is expensive to keep.98 Moreover, the sheriff may be
authorized to use necessary force to attach the property. 99 Although
the attachment of real property is constructive, i"° the attachment lien
nevertheless encumbers the property, affects the defendant's credit rat-
96. Buckeye Pipe-Line, 57 N.E. at 448 (citing Hollister v. Goodale, 8 Conn. 332 (1831)).
97. See, eg., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 482.080, 488.050, 488.090, 488.335 (West Supp.
1991) (court issuing writ of attachment may also issue an order directing defendant to transfer
possession of the property attached to the levying officer; officer may take property into custody
if plaintiff has paid officer sum to cover costs of taking and keeping property); D.C. CODE ANN.
§§ 16-508, 16-509 (1989 replacement volume) (authorizing attachment of personal property by
taking it into officer's possession and custody); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 76.13, 76.22 (West 1987)
(writ of attachment commands sheriff "to attach and take into custody so much of the lands,
tenements, goods, and chattels of the party against whose property the writ is issued as is
sufficient to satisfy the debt demanded with costs"; officer attaching property retains custody of
it); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, 4-110, 4-119 (Smith-Hurd 1983 & Supp. 1991) (property "shall
be ... attached in the possession of the officer "; officer "shall take and retain the custody and
possession of the property attached"); N.Y. CIv. PRAC. L. & R. §§ 6214(c), 6215 (McKinney
1980) (personal property or debt is attached by serving order of attachment on defendant or
garnishee; person served transfers property into actual custody of sheriff or pays debts, upon
maturity, to sheriff; levy by seizure, as opposed to service, is an alternative).
98. See, eg., ALA. CODE § 6-6-77 (1975); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 488.700 (West Supp.
1991); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 76.22 (West 1987); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, 4-125, 4-145 (Smith-
Hurd 1983 & Supp. 1991); N.Y. CIv. PRAc. L. & R. § 6218 (McKinney 1980); TEx. R. Civ. P.
600-05. See generally D.C. Barrett, Annotation, Construction and Effect of Provision for
Execution Sale on Short Notice, or Sale in Advance of Judgment Under Writ of Attachment,
Where Property Involved Is Subject to Decay or Depreciation, 3 A.L.R.3D 593 (1965 & Supp.
1990) (discussing statutory provisions that authorize sale of attached property prior to
judgment).
99. Carples v. Cumberland Coal & Iron Co., 148 N.E. 185, 185 (N.Y. 1925) (confirming
sheriff's authority to "break open a safe deposit box of the defendant in aid of the attachment');
LEO 0. MYERS, DEBTOR-CREDITOR RELATIONS, MANUAL AND FORMS 248 (1986) (citing
Burton v. Wilkinson, 18 Vt. 186 (1846)); cf W.D.M., Annotation, Right of Officer to Break Into
Building to Levy Under Execution, 57 A.L.R. 210 (1928) (discussing officer's limited right to use
force to levy under an execution).
100. See, eg., ALASKA STAT. § 09.40.050 (1991) (peace officer files a certificate with recorder
of the recording district in which the real property is situated and a lien in plaintiff's favor
attaches to the property); COLO. R. Civ. P. 102(h) (real property is attached by filing copy of the
writ with recorder of the county); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 76.16 (West 1987) (when real property is
attached, written notice of levy is filed with clerk of the circuit court for the county in which the
property is located).
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ing and may even place her mortgage mn technical default."' Thus,
attachment deprives the defendant of possession and use of her per-
sonal property as well as unencumbered title to her real estate. The
severity of these deprivations has caused some commentators and
courts to note that an attachment order dramatically changes the bar-
gaining power between plaintiff and defendant, giving the plaintiff sub-
stantial leverage over the defendant.
10 2
4. Creation of Attachment Lien
If the goal of the prejudgment remedy is to preserve the status
quo-to prevent the defendant from hiding or transferring assets with
fraudulent intent-but otherwise not to give the plaintiff any interest
in defendant's property until final judgment, the attachment order is
not well-tailored to meet this goal. An attachment order actually
improves the plaintiff's position in the event that the defendant's
assets are subject to competing claims, both within and outside the
bankruptcy setting. 103
During the pendency of most tort cases and many contract cases,
the plaintiff has no security interest in any of the defendant's property.
As an unsecured creditor, she is subordinate to claimants who obtain a
lien (by agreement, statute or judicial process) before she can enforce
her judgment against the defendant's property. In a bankruptcy pro-
ceeding, unless the unsecured creditor falls into one of the priority
101. Connecticut v. Doehr, 111 S. Ct. 2105, 2113 (1991) 'noting that "[a]ttachment
ordinarily clouds title; impairs the ability to sell or otherwise alienate the property; taints any
credit rating; reduces the chance of obtaining a home equity loan or additional mortgage; and
can even place an existing mortgage in technical default where there is an insecurity clause").
102. See, eg., Doehr, I11 S. Ct. at 2118 (commenting on "the use of attachments as a tactical
device to pressure an opponent to capitulate"); DAVID G. EPSTEIN, DEBTOR-CREDITOR LAW IN
A NUTSHELL 24 (4th ed. 1991) (listing "leverage" as fourth advantage that attachment provides
creditor; "[b]y directing the sheriff to levy on property essential to the defendant/debtor, the
creditor greatly strengthens its bargaining position. Deprivation of property used daily or
essential to a business may induce the debtor to pay even if the claim is of questionable
validity."); Barry L. Zaretsky, Attachment Without Seizure: A Proposal for a New Creditors'
Remedy, 1978 U. ILL. L.F. 819, 825, 837 (noting that "[a]ttachment also provides creditors with
a strong leverage device for inducing debtors to settle.. . "); Dean Gloster, Comment, Abuse of
Process and Attachment: Toward a Balance of Power, 30 UCLA L. REV. 1218, 1218-19 (1983)
(noting that "[t]he settlement leverage created by the seizure of a debtor's assets allows for
significant creditor abuse").
103. See Zaretsky, supra note 102, at 825 (identifying, as one of the benefits of prejudgment
attachment, that a creditor may, "prior to judgment, . . . obtain absolute security for the
satisfaction of an eventual judgment").
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classes,"~ she is the low person on the totem pole when the defend-
ant's assets are distributed.1 0 5
If, however, the plaintiff obtains a prejudgment attachment against
a defendant, she acquires an attachment lien in the attached prop-
erty.10 6 Her attachment lien gives her priority over unsecured credi-
tors and claimants who obtain liens on the same property that were
created or perfected later than the attachment. 0 7 Because this attach-
ment lien also constitutes a "judicial lien" in a bankruptcy proceed-
ing,108 the plaintiff is treated as a secured creditor with a substantially
104. Section 507 of the Bankruptcy Code identifies certain expenses and claims that have
priority, including administrative expenses of preserving the estate, unsecured claims for wages
or contributions to employee benefit plans, and unsecured claims for certain taxes. 11 U.S.C.
§ 507 (1988).
105. HARVEY M. LEBOWrrZ, BANKRUPTCY DESKBOOK 16, 329-34 (1986).
106. Many states have statutory provisions that detail when the attachment lien attaches.
See, ag., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 488.500 (West Supp. 1991) (the levy of writ of attachment
creates an attachment lien); TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 61.061 (West 1986) ("an
executed writ of attachment creates a lien"); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-557 (Michie 1984) ("the
plaintiff shall have a lien from the time of the levying of such attachment").
In early England, on the other hand, the foreign attachment "created no security interest such
as [would] survive the bankruptcy of the defendant prior to execution under the Custom of
London." Levy, supra note 53, at 412.
107. THOMAS S. CRANDALL et al., DEBTOR-CREDITOR LAW MANUAL 6.04[1][f] (1985)
(noting that "[tlhe property subject to the lien serves as security for the judgment .... From a
priority standpoint, interests obtained by third parties subsequent to the acquisition of the
attachment lien are usually subordinate to the attaching creditor's lien due to the standard
priority rule of 'first in time, first in right.' "); 6 THEODORE EISENBERG et al., DEBTOR-
CREDITOR LAW 26.02[D] [2] (1990) (stating that "ordinarily, a prior valid lien, one that is 'first
in time' regarding other liens, gives a prior legal right which is entitled to prior satisfaction out of
the property affected"); MYERS, supra note 99, at 248 (stating that "attachment... becomes an
attachment lien from the time of the levy of the writ and priority as between attachment liens and
other liens or claims is determined by priority in time"). Under Article 9 of the Uniform
Commercial Code, a creditor with an attachment lien has priority over a secured party if the lien
arises prior to the perfection of the security interest. See U.C.C. § 9-301(l)(b); ARNOLD B.
COHEN, BANKRUPTCY, SECURED TRANSACTIONS AND OTHER DEBTOR-CREDITOR MATTER
21-601 n.9, 21-607.1 n.1, 21-608.21 (1981).
108. The term "judicial lien" is defined in the Bankruptcy Code as a "lien obtained by
judgment, levy, sequestration, or other legal or equitable process or proceeding." 11 U.S.C.
§ 101(36) (Supp. 1991). A prejudgment attachment creates a judicial lien within the meaning of
§ 101. See, eg., In re Coston, 65 B.R. 224, 226 (Bankr. D.N.M. 1986) (holding that "the lien
acquired as a result of the attachment by the creditor is a judicial lien, as defined in § 101 .... ");
In re Blondheim Modular Mfg., 65 B.R. 856, 865 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1986) (holding that creditor
"had a valid and effective prejudgment attachment lien on the debtor's personal property ... and
... is thus a secured creditor in the instant bankruptcy proceeding .... "); In re McNeely, 51
B.R. 816, 819 (Bankr. D. Utah 1985) (noting that "the lien acquired by attachment is a vested
interest of the attaching creditor, which affords specific security for the satisfaction of the debt"
and that the term "judicial lien" in § 101 "encompasses a lien established by attachment or
garnishment"); In re Eichorn, 11 B.R. 81, 82 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1981) (holding that an
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improved position on the totem pole of claims when distributions are
made in bankruptcy.1"9
Because the attachment lien benefits the plaintiff vis-a-vis other
creditors of the defendant and because these other creditors cannot
obtain superior liens after the fact, they may feel constrained to pro-
tect themselves by forcing the debtor into involuntary bankruptcy. 10
In fact, they have incentive to do so promptly, because they may be
able to have the attachment lien avoided if they file the bankruptcy
petition within 90 days of the levy on the attachment order. 1 Thus,
even if the plaintiff seeks an attachment order for the sole purpose of
preventing dissipation, she may unwittingly alarm the defendant's
other creditors and ultimately, albeit indirectly, force the defendant
into bankruptcy.
5. Direct Effect on Third Parties
An attachment order not only indirectly affects the rights and
actions of third-party creditors as a practical matter, but it may
directly affect the interests of other third parties by requiring them to
attachment is a "transfer," which would "enable the creditor to be a secured creditor rather than
an unsecured creditor .... ").
Because the attachment typically is obtained under state law, the creditor's "secured" status in
the bankruptcy proceeding depends initially on whether she has a valid attachment under state
law. COHEN, supra note 107, at 21-100; GEORGE M. TREISTER et al., FUNDAMENTALS OF
BANKRUPTCY LAW § 6.03 (2d ed. 1988).
109. See cases cited supra note 108; see also COHEN, supra note 107, $ 21-400, at 335;
LEBOWITZ, supra note 105, at 18. In fact, if the amount of the plaintiff's claim is less than the
value of the property securing it, the plaintiff may even obtain interest on the claim (unless the
lien can be avoided). 11 U.S.C. § 506(b) (1988 & Supp. 1991).
110. EPSTEIN, supra note 102, at 26; Zaretsky, supra note 102, at 835 (noting that "[t]hose
creditors who cannot get priority will have incentive to force the debtor into involuntary
bankruptcy, so that the trustee in bankruptcy can invalidate some or all of the prior liens and
distribute the assets pro rata among creditors"). But see infra note 171.
111. The trustee in bankruptcy's authority to avoid transfers by the debtor on account of an
antecedent debt made while the debtor was insolvent within 90 days of the filing of the petition
(or within one year if the creditor was an insider), 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (1988 & Supp. 1991),
includes the authority to avoid attachment liens obtained during that period. See, eg., In re
Corporacion de Servicios Medico-Hospitalarios de Fajardo, 98 B.R. 639, 642 (Bankr. D.P.R.
1989) (holding that attachment of funds could be avoided in bankruptcy as a preferential
transfer); In re Coastal Fisheries, Inc., 57 B.R. 657 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1986) (holding that
attachment of real estate could be avoided); In re Eichorn, 11 B.R. 81 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1981)
(same). Thus, even a plaintiff who has obtained an attachment under state law may lose her
secured status in the bankruptcy. See generally 2 DANIEL R. COWANS, COWANS BANKRUPTCY
LAW AND PRACTICE §§ 10.7, 10.8 (1989) (outlining trustee's power to avoid preferences under
§ 547); COHEN, supra note 107, 22-206.4 (same); Mussman & Riesenfeld, supra note 53
(arguing that party obtaining writ of garnishment should be able to retain priority over other
creditors in bankruptcy proceeding if service of garnishment summons was made four months
before the filing of the petition).
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participate in the litigation as third-party garnishees. Most state
attachment statutes contain special provisions for attaching the
defendant's property or credits in the hands of a third-party gar-
nishee. 12 Although these provisions vary, they typically recognize
that the garnishee may deny that the property in her hands belongs to
the defendant or that she owes the defendant a debt. Thus, the stat-
utes adopt often detailed procedures for resolving these issues before
compelling the garnishee to relinquish the property in question. 3
As a means of preventing active tertiary harm to the plaintiff, these
garnishment provisions are overbroad and unduly cumbersome. They
fail to distinguish between third parties who are in complicity with a
defendant attempting to avoid a judgment and totally innocent third
parties. Garnishment provisions thus permit a plaintiff to force an
innocent third party into the lawsuit and require the third party to
defend against a claim the defendant might not have brought against
her. Although this effect on innocent third parties may be justified
once the plaintiff has reduced her claim to judgment (at least then we
can be sure of the merits of the plaintiff's claim against the defend-
ant),1" 4 before then it seems like a rather singleminded and harsh
means of reducing the plaintiff's risk of tertiary harm at the expense of
innocent third parties.
III. THE PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND ITS
EFFICACY IN PREVENTING TERTIARY HARM
Given the many problems with prejudgment attachment as a means
of preventing tertiary harm, courts should consider alternative reme-
112. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 77.01-77.031 (West 1987); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 525.010-
525.310 (Vernon 1953 & Supp. 1991); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-440.21 (1983); OHIo REv. CODE
ANN. § 2715.09.1 (Anderson Supp. 1990); TEX. R. Civ. P. ANN. R. 658-79 (West 1991).
113. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 77.04, 77.07 (West 1987) (requiring garnishee to answer
the writ, and permitting garnishee to move to dissolve the writ; providing for trial of disputed
issues of fact); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 525.130, 525.140, 525.180, 525.190 (Vernon Supp. 1991)
(permitting discovery against garnishee; requiring garnishee to file answer, permitting plaintiff to
except or deny the garnishee's answer;, authorizing trial of disputed issues); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§§ 1-440.23, 1-440.28, 1-440.29 (1983) (requiring garnishee to file answer; permitting garnishee
to assert lien or other interest in property; authorizing trial of disputed issues); OHIO REv. CODE
ANN. §§ 2715.09.1, 2715.13, 2715.29 (Anderson Supp. 1990) (requiring garnishee to file answer;
permitting a "special examination" of the garnishee; requiring garnishee to answer questions
under oath); TEX. R. Civ. P. ANN. R. 664a, 665, 666 (West 1991) (permitting garnishee to move
to dissolve the writ; requiring that garnishee's answer be under oath; permitting discharge of
garnishee).
114. See, eg., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 77.03 (West 1987); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 571.71 (West
Supp. 1991); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 525.440 (Vernon 1949 & Supp. 1991); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-
440.46 (1983); OHIo REv. CODE ANN. §§ 2715.37, 2716.01 (Anderson Supp. 1991) (all
permitting post-judgment garnishment).
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dies. This Article advocates the use of preliminary injunctions to bar
the defendant from dissipating assets during the pendency of the
action.
In deciding whether to grant preliminary injunctive relief in any
context, courts typically require the plaintiff to satisfy four criteria:
that she is likely to succeed on the merits of her claim; that she will
suffer irreparable harm if preliminary relief is denied; that this harm
outweighs the harm the defendant will suffer if the preliminary injunc-
tion is granted; and that the public interest will be furthered (or at
least not harmed) by the grant of the preliminary injunction.115 As
this section of the Article will demonstrate, a plaintiff who seeks
money damages at trial may satisfy these criteria i the defendant has
or is about to dissipate assets in an effort to frustrate a future money
judgment. If, as Professors Wright and Miller have suggested, "the
most compelling reason in favor of entering [a preliminary injunction]
is the need to prevent the judicial process from being rendered futile
by defendant's action or refusal to act," ' 6 then the case in favor of
preliminary injunctions to enjoin the dissipation of assets is compelling
indeed.1 1 7
A. Likelihood of Success on the Merits
A plaintiff seeking money damages as her final remedy should have
no greater difficulty demonstrating a likelihood of success on the mer-
its than a plaintiff who seeks the kind of ultimate relief that, under
current jurisprudence, entitles her to a preliminary injunction freezing
assets. 118 Thus, while trial courts may (and should) decline to grant
115. DOBBS, supra note 7, at 108-09; Susan H. Black, A New Look at Preliminary Inunctions:
Can Principles From the Past Offer Any Guidelines to Decisionmakers in the Future, 36 ALA. L.
REv. 1, 26 (1984); Arthur D. Wolf, Preliminary Injunctions: the Varying Standards, 7 W. NEW
ENG. L. REv. 173, 182 (1984). Often courts will balance the four factors, so that a stronger
showing on one prong may compensate for a weaker showing on another. Black, supra, at 30; see
also LAYCOCK, supra note 4, at 118-23 (discussing different formulations of the standard).
116. 11 CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 2947, at 424 (1973); accord Tri-State Generation & Transmission Ass'n v.
Shoshone River Power, Inc., 805 F.2d 351, 355 (10th Cir. 1986) (noting that "[i]n issuing a
preliminary injunction, a court is primarily attempting to preserve the power to render a
meaningful decision on the merits"); Placid Oil Co. v. United States Dep't of the Interior, 491 F.
Supp. 895, 903 (N.D. Tex. 1980) (noting that "a Federal District Court may issue a preliminary
injunction to. . . preserve the Court's power to render a meaningful decision after a trial on the
merits").
117. See, eg., USACO Coal Co. v. Carbomin Energy, Inc., 689 F.2d 94, 99 (6th Cir. 1982)
(noting that "[t]he harm that the district court sought to prevent by means of the injunction was
the dissipation and concealment of defendants' assets that would render the litigation
meaningless").
118. Accord Wasserman, supra note 10, at 636.
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interim equitable relief to plaintiffs with weak claims, there is no a
priori reason why a plaintiff seeking money damages should be unable
to satisfy the "likelihood of success on the merits" requirement for
preliminary injunctive relief.
B. Irreparable Harm 119
By necessity, courts make decisions regarding requests for prelimi-
nary injunctions and other interim relief on less than full information.
Thus, when a plaintiff comes into court seeking interim relief and
alleges that she will suffer harm during the pendency of the action, the
court must inquire into both the likelihood that the harm will occur,
and the nature of the harm the plaintiff will suffer.1 2°
A plaintiff's unsubstantiated allegation that a defendant is about to
dissipate assets will be insufficient to justify issuance of a preliminary
injunction. The plaintiff will have to offer some proof that a genuine
risk of such dissipation exists. 21 But it will be difficult, if not impossi-
ble, for the plaintiff to obtain direct evidence of fraudulent intent on
the part of the defendant. Thus, courts will have to infer an intent to
dissipate assets from other actions by or characteristics of the
defendant.
In the case three class of cases referred to in the Introduction and in
other cases in which courts have granted preliminary injunctions to
freeze assets, the courts have based their finding of irreparable harm
on evidence that the defendant was a foreigner with few ties to the
United States; 122 that the defendant refused to disclose the location of
119. For a thorough discussion of the irreparable injury rule, the argument that the rule does
not control most cases in which specific relief is sought, and an explanation of the distinctive role
the irreparable injury requirement plays in the context of preliminary injunctions, see LAYCOCK,
supra note 4, at 110-32; Douglas Laycock, The Death of the Irreparable Injury Rule, 103 HARV.
L. REV. 688, 728-32 (1990).
120. See, eg., 11 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 116, § 2948 (stating that an applicant must
demonstrate that she "is likely to suffer irreparable harm" and that she has no "adequate
alternative remedy in the form of money damages or other relief") (emphasis added).
121. Id. (stating that "[tihere must be a likelihood that irreparable harm will occur.
Speculative injury is not sufficient; there must be more than an unfounded fear on the part of the
applicant.").
122. See, eg., United States v. First Nat'l City Bank, 379 U.S. 378, 385 (1965) (upholding
authority to issue preliminary injunction; "[i]f such relief were beyond the authority of the
District Court, foreign taxpayers facing jeopardy assessments might either transfer assets abroad
or dissipate those in foreign accounts under control of American institutions before personal
service on the foreign taxpayer could be made."); USACO Coal Co. v. Carbomin Energy, Inc.,
689 F.2d 94, 98 (6th Cir. 1982) (finding irreparable harm given "that defendant.., has no ties to
the United States except the property and assets held by the defendant companies, companies
that he owns or controls"); International Controls Corp. v. Vesco, 490 F.2d 1334, 1354 (2d Cir.
1974) (enjoining removal of yacht from jurisdiction in light of fact that defendants were
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her assets; 123 that she had engaged in prior questionable or fraudulent
dealings;124 that the assets in question were the product of wrongdo-
ing;12 that the defendant was insolvent and threatened with multiple
lawsuits;' 2 6 or that the defendant had actually anncunced a plan to sell
or transfer assets and to distribute the proceeds to others without mak-
ing adequate provision for the plaintiff and other creditors. 127 In Eng-
"effectively immunized from execution because they both are beyond the reach of the court,
enjoying the protection of the Bahamanian government").
123. See, eg., EBSCO Indus., Inc. v. Lilly, 840 F.2d 333, 336 (6th Cir.) (affirming grant of
preliminary injunction on showing that "the defendant had taken spe.ific steps to conceal assets
and had refused to disclose what assets he has or where they are located"), cert. denied, 488 U.S.
825 (1988).
124. See, eg., id. at 336 (affirming grant of preliminary injunction on showing that "the
defendant had taken specific steps to conceal assets"); In re Feit & Drexler, Inc., 760 F.2d 406,
416 (2d Cir. 1985) (upholding preliminary injunction on basis of finding that defendant had
engaged in numerous and substantial efforts to hide and secrete assets); USACO Coal, 689 F.2d
at 98 (finding risk of dissipation given defendant's "previous questionable dealings in matters
connected to the present lawsuit"); Productos Carnic, S.A. v. Central Am. Beef & Seafood
Trading Co., 621 F.2d 683, 686 (5th Cir. 1980) (finding irreparable harm given that defendant
"once attempted to transfer the beef [in issue] to a fictitious trading company, that [defendant]
may have altered documents while the beef was in San Salvador, and that [a] bank account in Ft.
Lauderdale, Florida, was closed and over $300,000 withdrawn"); American Say. Bank v.
Cheshire Management Co., 693 F. Supp. 42, 49 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (granting preliminary
injunction given the likelihood that defendant had converted property in which plaintiff had an
interest); Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Antonio, 649 F. Supp. 1352, 1355 (D. Colo. 1986)
(granting preliminary injunction in light of defendant's "apparently... systematic effort to hide
his assets in secret bank accounts," to obtain a sham divorce from his wife, and then to convey
assets to her); Mishkin v. Kenney & Branisel, Inc., 609 F. Supp. 1254, 1256 (S.D.N.Y. 1985)
(noting that defendants' "past fraudulent conduct and their current actions indicate an intent to
defeat and defraud the rights of... its creditors").
125. See, eg., Federal Say. & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Dixon, 835 F.2d 554, 562 (5th Cir. 1987)
(affirming authority to fashion preliminary equitable remedy "where the evidence strongly
indicates that the assets were ill-gotten gains at the expense of an interest of the public protected
by law"); Antonio, 649 F. Supp. at 1355 (granting preliminary injunction in light of defendant's
"central role in the heist money scheme").
126. See, e-g., Deckert v. Independence Shares Corp., 311 U.S. 282, 290 (1940) (upholding
preliminary injunction issued on basis of "allegations that [defendant] was insolvent and its assets
in danger of dissipation or depletion"); Taxpayers Against Fraud v. Link Flight Simulation
Corp., 722 F. Supp. 1248, 1255 (D. Md. 1989) (noting that "Singer is threatened by [many]
lawsuits, preferences to creditors[] ... and its assets are in danger of dissipation and depletion");
American Say. Bank, 693 F. Supp. at 49 (granting preliminary injunction "[g]iven the company's
troubled financial state" and its past questionable dealings); Fleet Nat'l Bank v. Rapid Processing
Co., 643 F. Supp. 1065, 1066 (D. Mass. 1986) (granting preliminary injunction in light of
plaintiffs' "claim that [defendants] are insolvent and their assets in danger of dissipation" and
contested proof regarding the defendants' financial status); Atlantic Wool Combing Co. v. Fibre
Corp., 306 F. Supp. 69, 71 (D.R.I. 1969) (granting preliminary injunction in light of proof"that
the defendant is insolvent and that the plaintiff may be unable to recover damages from it if this
Court should issue a final decree in its favor").
127. See, e.g., Fechter v. HMW Indus., Inc., 879 F.2d 1111, 1121 (3d Cir. 1989) (granting
preliminary injunction in light of proof that assets in issue had already been "advanced" to the
company's parent corporation, and that the parent could not "trace the funds to a single account
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land, where preliminary injunctions of this type are more readily
available, 128 courts consider evidence regarding the defendant's char-
acter, often gleaned from facts about the defendant's business, its dom-
icile, the location of its known assets, and the circumstances in which
the underlying dispute arose.129
If, on the basis of such evidence, the court concludes that the
defendant is likely to dissipate assets, it must then inquire into the
nature of the harm the plaintiff will suffer as a result of this dissipa-
tion. If the harm would be compensable with money at the conclusion
of the trial or could be prevented by a final remedy, the court need not
"run the risk of making an erroneous decision based on less than full
information at a preliminary hearing."' 30 Only if the plaintiff's injury
would be "irreparable"-only if it is "of a peculiar nature, so that
compensation in money cannot atone for it"' 3 '-should the court run
the risk of an erroneous interim decision and grant preliminary injunc-
tive relief.132
or demonstrate the continued existence of the surplus"); Teradyne, Inc. v. Mostek Corp., 797
F.2d 43, 52 (1st Cir. 1986) (affirming grant of preliminary injunction, given findings that
defendant "was in the process of winding down after selling the bulk of its assets, that it had
failed to provide adequate assurances to alleviate [plaintiff's] concerns, and that it could at any
time make itselfjudgment proof"); In re Uranium Antitrust Litig., 617 F.2d 1248, 1259 (7th Cir.
1980) (affirming preliminary injunction enjoining defendants against whom a default judgment
had been rendered from transferring assets outside the country; one defendant already had
"instructed its American subsidiaries to transfer their assets to Canada"); Taxpayers Against
Fraud, 722 F. Supp. at 1255 (noting that "Singer's current management has engaged in a
calculated and drastic process of depletion of the corporation's assets, and has evinced no
intention to maintain the corporation as an ongoing business enterprise"); In re Poole, 15 B.R.
422, 433 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1981) (granting preliminary injunction on showing that principal
asset was the subject of an option to purchase, and that if sold, the proceeds might be dissipated);
Michael-Curry Cos. v. Knutson Shareholders Liquidating Trust, 423 N.W.2d 407, 409 (Minn.
App. 1988) (reversing denial of preliminary injunction on showing that "[i]f the trustees
distribute assets, pursuant to the express trust purpose of liquidation, any judgment against the
Trust would be impossible to collect").
128. See infra part V.B.
129. See infra notes 372-74 and accompanying text.
130. Wasserman, supra note 10, at 638 (citing John Leubsdorf, The Standard for Preliminary
Injunctions, 91 HARV. L. Rlv. 525, 551-52 (1978)); accord Laycock, supra note 119, at 691-92
(stating that "denying relief at the preliminary stage protects defendant's right to a full hearing,
and a stringent variation of the irreparable injury rule lets the court openly balance the risks to
each side").
131. A.O. Smith Corp. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 530 F.2d 515, 525 (3d Cir. 1976) (quoting
Gause v. Perkins, 3 Jones Eq. 177, 69 Am. Dec. 728 (1857)); accord, eg., Tri-State Generation &
Transmission Ass'n v. Shoshone River Power, Inc., 805 F.2d 351, 355 (10th Cir. 1986) (stating
that "injury is generally not irreparable if compensatory relief would be adequate"); Enterprise
Int'l, Inc. v. Corporacion Estatal Petrolera Ecuatoriana, 762 F.2d 464, 472 (5th Cir. 1985)
(noting that "an injury is 'irreparable' only if it cannot be undone through monetary remedies").
132. See Laycock, supra note 119, at 728-31 (noting that "[the] court . . . awarding
preliminary relief.., must act without a full trial, sometimes with only sketchy motion papers
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The question, then, is whether active tertiary harm, or the harm the
plaintiff will suffer as a result of actions that will frustrate her ability to
collect immediately on her judgment,133 would be compensable at the
conclusion of the trial or whether it is irreparable. This Article will
address the irreparability of permanent tertiary harm first, and then
temporary tertiary harm.
Depending upon the peculiar facts of the cases, courts will have dif-
fering degrees of difficulty in determining, at the time the preliminary
relief is sought, whether the threatened tertiary harm will be perma-
nent or temporary. Assume, for example, that a defendant benignly
announces an intention to seek a stay of any judgment against her
pending appeal. In anticipation of both entry of a judgment and the
defendant's application for a stay pending appeal, the plaintiff theoret-
ically could seek a preliminary injunction to enjoin -the defendant from
seeking a stay, which would cause her tertiary harm. Although this
example is highly improbable, it illustrates the ease with which a court
could characterize the anticipated tertiary harm as temporary: the
plaintiff would suffer harm during the pendency of the appeal in that
she would not be able to collect immediately on her judgment,"3 but
would probably be able to recover eventually (assuming her judgment
is affirmed). 135
If, on the other hand, the defendant is about to transfer substantial
assets to a third party without adequate consideration, the characteri-
zation of the harm will be less obvious. It will be difficult to tell at that
time whether the defendant will retake possession of the assets at a
later date, will acquire other assets subject to levy to satisfy the judg-
and affidavits to guide its decision.... Acting without a full presentation from either side and
without time for reflection, the court is more likely to err"; thus, at the preliminary injunction
stage, "the only injury that counts is injury that cannot be prevented after a more complete
hearing at the next stage of the litigation"; even injury that would be considered "irreparable" if
plaintiff were seeking permanent relief may not be deemed "severe enough to justify a
preliminary injunction in light of the costs to defendants and the uncertain probability of success
on the merits").
133. See supra note 30.
134. In considering requests for stays of judgments pending appeal, appellate courts typically
consider the harm the stay will cause to the appellee. See, eg., United States v. Baylor Univ.
Medical Ctr., 711 F.2d 38, 39 (5th Cir. 1983) (stating that in determining whether to stay a
district court order pending appeal, the appellate court should consider "whether the granting of
the stay would substantially harm the other parties"), cert denied, 469 U.S. 1189 (1985);
Washington Metro. Area Transit Comm'n v. Holiday Tours, Inc., 559 F.2d 841, 843 (D.C. Cir.
1977) (stating that a court considering an application for a stay pending appeal should consider
whether "the issuance of a stay [would] substantially harm other parties interested in the
proceedings").
135. Courts may condition the grant of the stay upon the posting of a supersedeas bond,
which protects the plaintiff from tertiary harm. See supra note 31.
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ment, or will remain judgment-proof for an indefinite period. Given
that the nature and duration of the tertiary harm will be within the
knowledge and control of the defendant, it would seem reasonable in
these cases for a court to adopt a rebuttable presumption of permanent
tertiary harm once the plaintiff establishes that the defendant is about
to take action that threatens active, potentially permanent, tertiary
harm.136 Such a presumption (and the proof it elicits from defend-
ants) should aid courts in differentiating between permanent and tem-
porary tertiary harm and enable them to consider the question of
irreparability.
Permanent tertiary harm is, by definition, irreparable: regardless of
whether the plaintiff desperately needs the money for subsistence or
not, no remedy, at law or equity, will ever compensate her for the
permanent loss of her right to recover. 137 Thus, in actions by the gov-
ernment to collect back taxes where the government feared the defend-
ant would dissipate its assets unless restrained; 138 in actions to enjoin
governmental conduct, where later suits for money damages caused by
such conduct would be barred by sovereign immunity;139 in an action
136. See Edward W. Cleary, Presuming and Pleading: An Essay on Juristic Immaturity, 12
STAN. L. REv. 5, 12 (1959) (discussing "fairness" as a consideration in allocating burdens of
proof).
137. Accord Laycock, supra note 119, at 716 (noting that "[d]amages are no remedy at all if
they cannot be collected, and most courts sensibly conclude that a damage judgment against an
insolvent defendant is an inadequate remedy"); Rules of the Supreme Court 1965 (0.29, r.l),
note 29/1/3 in 1 SUPREME COURT PRACrICE (1991) (Eng.) (stating that "damages will seldom
be a sufficient remedy if the wrongdoer is unlikely to be able to pay them").
138. United States v. Ross, 302 F.2d 831, 833-34 (2d Cir. 1962) (in action by government to
collect back taxes, upholding district court order enjoining transfer of property and appointing
receiver); United States v. Omar, S.A., 210 F. Supp. 773, 774-75 (S.D.N.Y. 1962) (in action by
government to collect back taxes, the government claimed that "disposition of the... assets
might make its lawful rights therein unenforceable and that it would be irreparably injured by
removal of any such assets outside the power of the court"; holding that "[sluch injury clearly
authorizes the court to exercise its equitable power", the court granted a preliminary injunction
to enjoin garnishee banks and brokerage firms from transferring defendant's property pendente
lite), rev'd sub nom. United States v. First Nat'l City Bank, 321 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1963) and 325
F.2d 1020 (2d Cir. 1964) (en banc) (per curiam), rev'd, 379 U.S. 378 (1965). See infra part
IV.A.3.
139. Ohio Oil Co. v. Conway, 279 U.S. 813, 815 (1929) (per curiam) (holding that plaintiff,
who sought preliminary injunction to enjoin enforcement of tax statute, demonstrated irreparable
harm where no remedy existed for plaintiff to recoup taxes paid if statute were later declared
invalid); Ramirez de Arellano v. Weinberger, 745 F.2d 1500, 1527 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en bane)
(holding that a plaintiff who states a claim for money damages against the government but who
may not be able to collect because of governmental immunity or who might receive inadequate
compensation under the Tucker Act is entitled to injunctive relief; stating that "the gross
inadequacy of money damages could justify injunctive relief when money alone would not
constitute just compensation"), vacated mem., 471 U.S. 1113 (1985), on remand, 788 F.2d 762
(D.C. Cir. 1986) (per curiam); Placid Oil Co. v. United States Dep't of the Interior, 491 F. Supp.
895, 906 (N.D. Tex. 1980) (noting that costs plaintiffs would have to incur to comply with
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under ERISA against a profit-sharing plan that was in the process of
distributing all its assets;' 4° in an action against a cooperative that,
unless restrained, would distribute all its assets to its members; 41 and
in other actions in which the plaintiff established a genuine risk that
the defendant would dissipate its assets in an effcrt to frustrate the
judgment or otherwise would be unable to satisfy the plaintiff's judg-
ment,142 the courts have held that the permanent loss of money is
challenged agency directive, which required them to recalculate royalties and submit amounts
owed under new formula, would not be recoverable if plaintiffs prevailed; "[a]lthough an
adequate remedy exists for the recovery of royalty payments made to Interior, there is no
provision for the recovery of costs that will necessarily be incurred by Plaintiffs in order to
comply... "; thus, "plaintiffs will incur irreparable injury"); see also Laycock, supra note 119, at
718 (noting that "[t]he nonexistent damage remedy against an immune [governmental] defendant
is plainly inadequate, and the cases so hold. The immune defendant is just like an insolvent
defendant.").
140. Foltz v. U.S. News & World Report, 760 F.2d 1300 (D.C. Cir. 1985). In an action by
former employees against a profit-sharing plan and others, where the plan intended to distribute
all its assets to current employees, the D.C. Circuit held that:
[I]t is clear beyond cavil that any cause of action under ERISA against the Plan... would
forever be lost. Irrevocable loss of a cause of action created by Congress for the remedial
and humane purpose of protecting beneficiaries and participants of ERISA-covered plans
could, in our judgment, well work irreparable injury warranting the fashioning of equitable
relief under the well-settled standards articulated by this court.
Id. at 1308.
141. Tri-State Generation & Transmission Ass'n v. Shoshone Rivzr Power, Inc., 805 F.2d
351, 355 (10th Cir. 1986) (in action by cooperative to enjoin sale by member of its assets to a
private utility, noting that unless preliminary injunction issued to prevent sale, defendant would
distribute proceeds of sale to its members and would have no assets with which to satisfy a
money judgment; stating that "[d]ifliculty in collecting a damage judgment may support a claim
of irreparable injury"); see also Teradyne, Inc. v. Mostek Corp., 797 F.2d 43, 52-53 (1st Cir.
1986) (concluding that plaintiff had established irreparable harm by demonstrating that
defendant was "winding down" its affairs and distributing its assets, and that "no assurances
were given that (defendant] would be able to pay a ... judgment"); Michael-Curry Cos. v.
Knutson Shareholders Liquidating Trust, 423 N.W.2d 407, 409-10 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988)
(noting that "inability to satisfy a monetary judgment has been recognized as irreparable harm
sufficient to justify injunctive relief" and that "difficulty in collecting a judgment is sufficient to
establish irreparable injury"; reversing denial of preliminary injunction to enjoin trust from
distributing its assets to beneficiaries where trust would have no remaining assets with which to
satisfy any judgment plaintiff might obtain against it for indemnity).
142. Deckert v. Independence Shares Corp., 311 U.S. 282, 290 (1940) (in action in which
defendant "was insolvent and its assets in danger of dissipation or depletion," holding that the
remedy against it, without preliminary relief to secure assets, would be "inadequate"); Hoxworth
v. Blinder, Robinson & Co., 903 F.2d 186, 206 (3d Cir. 1990) (concluding that "the
unsatisfiability of a money judgment can constitute irreparable injury"); Fechter v. HMW Indus.,
Inc., 879 F.2d 1111, 1121 (3d Cir. 1989) (concluding that plaintiff employees, who sought to
recover surplus benefits of terminated pension plan under ERISA, faced irreparable harm where
employer's parent company, to whom surplus had been advanced by employer, could not "trace
the funds to a single account or demonstrate the continued existence of the surplus"); In re Feit
& Drexler, Inc., 760 F.2d 406, 416 (2d Cir. 1985) (noting that "even where the ultimate relief
sought is money damages, federal courts have found preliminary injunctions appropriate where it
has been shown that the defendant 'intended to frustrate any judgment on the merits' by
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irreparable. Thus, in cases in which the plaintiff sues to collect money
damages and can demonstrate that the defendant is about to dissipate
her assets to frustrate the potential money judgment, the plaintiff's
active permanent tertiary harm should be considered irreparable.' 43
The irreparability of temporary tertiary harm is a more difficult
question because it requires consideration of two variables: the time
lag between judgment and satisfaction (a guesstimate ex ante), and the
severity of the plaintiff's need. Assuming that temporary tertiary
'transfer[ring its assets] out of the jurisdiction' "; affirming grant of preliminary injunction in
action by trustee in bankruptcy against person to whom party in bankruptcy allegedly had made
improper payments); Roland Mach. Co. v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 749 F.2d 380, 386 (7th Cir.
1984) (noting that a damages remedy may be inadequate and plaintiff may face irreparable harm
if "damages [are] unobtainable from the defendant because he may become insolvent before a
final judgment can be entered and collected"); Itek Corp. v. First Nat'l Bank, 730 F.2d 19, 22-23
(1st Cir. 1984) (granting a preliminary injunction to enjoin payment on a letter of credit to the
Iranian government because plaintiff's only remedy to recover the money-to sue in Iranian
courts-would be inadequate; holding that inability to recover the money paid constituted
irreparable harm).
143. Not all courts have agreed. Some courts have taken the position that the adequacy of
the money judgment sought is gauged not by the likelihood of its satisfiability, but by its mere
availability. As long as a money judgment is theoretically available, no irreparable harm exists
and no injunctive relief can issue. See, e.g,, Enterprise Int'l, Inc. v. Corporacion Estatal Petrolera
Ecuatoriana, 762 F.2d 464, 474-75 (5th Cir. 1985) (reversing order that granted preliminary
injunction to enjoin party from demanding payment on a letter of credit and to prohibit bank
from honoring demand; notwithstanding the district court's finding that "Ecuador is not an
impartial forum and that [plaintiff] would 'encounter significant resistance to a recovery of
judgment against the Ecuadorian national oil company,'" concluding that plaintiff had an
adequate remedy at law because it could sue in Ecuador to recover payments made on letter of
credit); Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Gleave, 540 F. Supp. 81, 86 (W.D.N.Y. 1982) (stating that "[i]t is
questionable whether the sort of harm plaintiff points to-frustration of enforcement of a money
judgment-can ever constitute irreparable harm for purposes of preliminary injunctive relief";
declining to preliminarily enjoin defendants in civil RICO action from dissipating assets); Oxford
Int'l Bank & Trust, Ltd. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Penner & Smith, Inc., 374 So. 2d 54, 56 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1979) (rejecting plaintiff's argument that "it had no adequate remedy at law
because the monies allegedly owed to it could not from a practical standpoint be recovered unless
the funds were impounded .... [Tihis confuses the question of the ability to obtain a judgment
with the question of the ability to satisfy a judgment."), cert. dismissed, 383 So. 2d 1199 (Fla.
1980); Stewart v. Manget, 181 So. 370 (Fla. 1938), stating that:
Mhe inadequacy of a remedy at law to produce money is not the test of the applicability of
the rule. All remedies, whether at law or in equity, frequently fail to do that; and to make
that the test of equity jurisdiction would be substituting the result of a proceeding for the
proceeding which is invoked to produce the result. The true test is, could a judgment be
obtained in a proceeding at law, and not, would the judgment procure pecuniary
compensation.
Id. at 374.
If the plaintiff can prove that the defendant is about to dissipate assets to render herself judg-
ment-proof, it is difficult to see how the potential money judgment will be an adequate remedy
for the plaintiff. The author believes the decisions cited above are incorrect to the extent they
hold that a money judgment is an adequate remedy regardless of whether the defendant is
engaged in conduct designed to render the judgment unenforceable.
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harm will be compensable by an award of post-judgment interest,"4 if
the time lag between judgment and satisfaction is expected to be short
and the plaintiff's need is minimal, then post-judgment interest may
well be sufficient and the harm should not be considered irreparable.
The court should not enjoin the defendant from engaging in conduct
on less than full information if failure to do so would result in only
minimal harm to the plaintiff, which could be compensated for after
the fact.
If, on the other hand, the time lag is expected to be substantial or
the plaintiff's need is great, an award of post-judgment interest will
not protect against temporary tertiary harm. Thus, even a wealthy
plaintiff will suffer increasingly serious temporary tertiary harm as the
time lag lengthens if she could obtain a higher rate of return on the
money than the statutory rate of post-judgment interest.1 45 More
important, if the plaintiff's health or well-being turns on her ability to
collect immediately on the judgment-if delay translates into exacer-
bation of personal injuries, eviction, mortgage foreclosure, or other
losses not readily compensable by money 146-- actions that cause even a
short delay in collection will result in irreparable tertiary harm.
Because courts have deemed such harm irreparable on motions for
preliminary injunctions in cases in which plaintiffs have sought perma-
nent injunctions as their final remedy, 147 courts should treat the identi-
cal harm as irreparable in actions for money damages when it arises as
tertiary harm.
144. Post-judgment interest is available in federal court from the date of entry of the
judgment. 28 U.S.C. § 1961(a) (Supp. 1991); FED. R. App. P. 37; Sup. Cr. R. 42(.1). See
generally Susan M. Payor, Comment, Post-Judgment Interest in Federal Courts, 37 EMORY L.J.
495 (1988) (considering how federal statutes and rules of procedure should be applied to
determine availability and amount of post-judgment interest in a variety of circumstances);
Darrell E. Warner, Recent Developments, Remedies-Federal Courts-Accrual of Postjudgment
Interest Under 28 US.C. Section 1961, 56 TENN. L. REv. 483 (1989) (considering how post-
judgment interest should be calculated in cases in which the judgment is modified on appeal).
Prior to 1982, section 1961 provided for post-judgment interest "at the rate allowed by State
law." 28 U.S.C. § 1961 (1982).
"Judgment interest is granted routinely under [state] statutes." DOBBS, supra note 7, § 3.5.
See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 685.010(a), 685.020(a) (West Supp. 1991); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 55.03 (West Supp. 1991); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, paras. 2-1303, 12-109 (Smith-Hurd 1990 &
Supp. 1991); N.Y. CIV. PRAC. L. & R. §§ 5003, 5004 (McKinney Supp. 1991); 42 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 8101 (1982); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 41, § 202 (Supp. 1991).
145. Even if the plaintiff could immediately assign her judgment to a collection agency, she
would not receive the full value of the judgment and would suffer some uncompensable tertiary
harm. See supra notes 24 and 26.
146. The nature of the plaintiff's secondary and tertiary harms are likely to be similar. See
supra notes 21-22, 26 and accompanying text.
147. See Wasserman, supra note 10, at 639-42 (citing cases to support the argument that
threats to health and inability to meet one's daily needs constitute irreparable harm).
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Although the initial characterization of the threatened harm as tem-
porary or permanent may be difficult, and the later effort to gauge the
irreparability of temporary tertiary harm may be trying, these deci-
sions should be no more difficult than the decisions courts routinely
make in ruling on applications for preliminary injunctions in cases in
which the plaintiff seeks permanent injunctive or other equitable relief.
Thus, in the case three class of cases described in the Introduction,
where a plaintiff brings an equitable action seeking to recover a specific
fund of money in the hands of the defendant, courts must assess the
likelihood that the defendant will irretrievably dispose of the assets
unless restrained. If courts are able to make that assessment in the
case three setting, they should be able to make similar assessments in
the case four setting. 48 The ultimate conclusion-that the inability to
collect money threatens irreparable harm-should not turn on the
nature of the final relief sought.
C. Balance of Hardships
Courts recognize that a preliminary injunction that directs the
defendant to take action or restrains the defendant from taking action
will most likely harm the defendant. 149 Thus, courts must consider
whether the risk of irreparable harm to the plaintiff if the preliminary
injunction does not issue exceeds the risk of harm to the defendant if it
does issue. If this "balance of hardships" tips in the plaintiff's favor
and the other requirements for preliminary injunctive relief are met,
the court should issue the interim relief notwithstanding the effect it
will have on the defendant.
148. Some courts have attempted to distinguish between the tertiary harm a plaintiff will
suffer if the defendant dissipates her assets and the secondary harm a plaintiff will suffer if the
defendant continues to engage in additional primary conduct, which results in the disposition of
assets. See, eg., Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Gleave, 540 F. Supp. 81, 86 (W.D.N.Y. 1982) (stating that
"[i]n the instant case the primary illegality involved has ceased and plaintiff seeks only to recover
damages for the injury therefrom to itself"). In other words, they have concluded that a
preliminary injunction may issue in the case three class of cases, in which the defendant is
dissipating assets to which the plaintiff has an equitable claim, but not in the case four class of
cases, in which the defendant is dissipating assets that she will need to satisfy the plaintiff's
money damages claim. In my view, where the conduct is identical (i.e., the defendant is
dissipating assets) and the result will be the same (i.e., the plaintiff will not be able to collect on
her judgment), the relief should be the same.
149. See, eg., Tri-State Generation & Transmission Ass'n v. Shoshone River Power, Inc., 805
F.2d 351, 356-57 (10th Cir. 1986) (noting that plaintiff "must ... show that the injury to it if the
injunction does not issue outweighs the injury to [defendants] if it does"); Fleet Nat'l Bank v.
Rapid Processing Co., 643 F. Supp. 1065, 1067 (D. Mass. 1986) (concluding that "plaintiffs have
established that injury to the plaintiffs if the injunction is not granted outweighs any harm which
granting injunctive relief would inflict on the defendants").
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A defendant who is restrained from transferring or disposing of
assets loses the use of property that is concededly hers until judgment
is rendered against her. To the extent a corporate defendant needs the
assets to conduct or expand its business, the business may suffer dur-
ing the pendency of the action. If an individual defendant needs the
assets to cover daily living expenses or to pay attorneys' fees, the harm
will be even greater. 150 But it is not this potentially boundless harm
that gets balanced against the irreparable harm to the plaintiff; courts
consider only the harm that remains after they act to lessen the impact
of the injunction on the defendant.
Courts have two primary tools for reducing the risk of harm to the
defendant. They can require plaintiffs seeking preliminary injunctions
to post a bond "for the payment of such costs and damages as may be
incurred or suffered by any party who is found to have been wrong-
fully enjoined or restrained." '151 Although courts occasionally waive
the bond requirement in actions brought by poor plaintiffs or public
interest plaintiffs,152 they more typically require a bond to ensure that
the defendant will be compensated for any loss suffered as result of an
erroneously issued preliminary injunction. 53
Such compensation may come too late, however, if the defendant
needs the assets for subsistence or attorneys' fees. In these cases,
courts can use a second method to prevent harm -to the defendant by
limiting the scope of the preliminary injunction that issues in the first
place. Thus, rather than barring the defendant from making any
transfers whatsoever, the court can preliminarily enjoin the defendant
150. See, eg., Connecticut v. Doehr, Il S. Ct. 2105, 2113 (1991), discussed supra note 101;
In re Feit & Drexler, Inc., 760 F.2d 406, 412 (2d Cir. 1985) (concluding that preliminary
injunction, which prohibited defendant from transferring or disposing of any of her property,
wherever located, caused "serious and irreparable consequences," which merited immediate
review on appeal); West v. Zurhorst, 425 F.2d 919, 920 (2d Cir. 1970) (noting that
"[m]aintenance of a lien upon property is not a negligible deprivation"); Commodity Futures
Trading Comm'n v. Morgan, Harris & Scott, Ltd., 484 F. Supp. 669, 678 (S.D.N.Y. 1979)
(noting that "[flor a corporate defendant, freezing assets might cause disruption of defendants'
business affairs and, accordingly, threatens the very assets to be available for victims of the illegal
actions. For an individual defendant, freezing assets might cause serious personal hardship.").
151. FED. R. Civ. P. 65(c). As of 1974, all states except Massachusetts required an
injunction bond. Dobbs, supra note 30, at 1096-97.
152. See Charles L. Blood, Injunction Bonds: Equal Protection for the Indigent, 11 S. TEx.
L.J. 16, 16-19 (1969); Wasserman, supra note 10, at 646 n.75 (citing cases); Reina Calderon,
Note, Bond Requirements Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(c): An Emerging Equitable
Exemption for Public Interest Litigants, 13 B.C. ENVrL. AFF. L. Rav. 125, 133-34 (1986).
153. See, e.g., Dobbs, supra note 30, at 1093 (noting that "bonds are commonly required by
statutes whenever a plaintiff seeks a provisional remedy, whether at law or equity"); Calderon,
supra note 152, at 132 (noting that "in theory, in federal courts and virtually all state courts
applicants for preliminary injunctions who have successfully established all the required elements
for equitable relief will nevertheless be denied it if they do not post bonds").
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only from making transfers outside the ordinary course of business."'
Or the court can freeze all assets except those needed for ordinary
living expenses or attorneys' fees. 5 Or it can modify or vacate the
injunction if the defendant posts a bond to ensure satisfaction of the
plaintiff's expected money judgment. 56 Exercising this equitable dis-
154. See, e.g., Fechter v. HMW Indus., Inc., 879 F.2d 1111, 1115 (3d Cir. 1989) (noting that
the district court preliminarily enjoined transfers, conveyances and sales of property "except as
necessary in the ordinary course of business").
155. See, e.g., Federal Say. & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Dixon, 835 F.2d 554, 565, 566 n.2 (5th Cir.
1987) (concluding that "some kind of an allowance must be made to permit each defendant to
pay reasonable attorneys' fees if he is able to show that he cannot pay them from new or exempt
assets" and commenting that "allowing a defendant to lose legitimate assets he currently and
legitimately possesses [a house] potentially conflicts with the avowed rationale of preliminary
injunctions, that is, to preserve the status quo"); Securities & Exch. Comm'n v. Scott, Gorman
Muns., Inc., 407 F. Supp. 1383, 1388 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (preliminarily enjoining defendants from
transferring, liquidating or disposing of any personal assets "except for ordinary living
expenses").
In the criminal context, federal forfeiture provisions authorize a district court, prior to
conviction, to restrain defendants from dissipating assets in their possession allegedly
"constituting, or derived from, any proceeds the person obtained, directly or indirectly, as the
result of[a] violation" of specified criminal provisions. See 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 853(a), 853(e) (West
Supp. 1991) (authorizing pre-conviction restraining orders to preserve forfeitable property in
continuing criminal enterprise (CCE) drug-related prosecutions); 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1963(a),
1963(d) (West Supp. 1991) (authorizing same in racketeering prosecutions). The Supreme Court
has interpreted the CCE forfeiture provisions as authorizing pre-conviction restraining orders
even if the defendant needs the assets to pay attorneys' fees, and has upheld the constitutionality
of such restraining orders against fifth and sixth amendment challenges. See United States v.
Monsanto, 491 U.S. 600 (1989); Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617
(1989). Relying on the "categorical" language of the forfeiture provisions, the Monsanto Court
rejected the argument that the provisions should be interpreted as authorizing a "district court to
employ 'traditional principles of equity' before restraining a defendant's use of forfeitable assets"
and to balance the hardships, including the hardship to the defendant if assets needed to retain an
attorney were restrained. Monsanto, 491 U.S. at 612-13; accord Caplin & Drysdale, 491 U.S. at
622-23. But see id at 636-43 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (arguing that the constitutional issue
could have been avoided if the Court had interpreted the forfeiture provisions as excluding assets
needed to retain counsel).
This Supreme Court precedent does not undercut the suggestion that district courts issuing
preliminary injunctions to freeze assets in civil cases should exclude assets needed by defendants
to retain counsel. First, in criminal cases, where the right to counsel is of constitutional
dimension, a defendant unable to pay an attorney will be provided a court-appointed attorney.
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). In civil cases, on the other hand, a defendant who
lacks resources to pay an attorney will go unrepresented (unless she is eligible for Legal Services
assistance). Thus, the need to assure the defendant a meaningful opportunity to retain an
attorney militates in favor of limiting the scope of preliminary injunctions in the civil context.
Second, because the preliminary injunctions in civil cases are the product of equitable balancing
and not statutory mandate, the court is not required by statute to freeze all property in the
defendant's possession, but may craft an injunction that balances the hardships to both plaintiff
and defendant. Third, in criminal cases, the assets subject to forfeiture are the product of alleged
criminal wrongdoing; in civil cases, they are often the product of legitimate efforts by the
defendant. Thus, the equities in the two situations are quite different.
156. See, e.g., Dixon, 835 F.2d at 566 (stating that "[i]f the defendants properly seek
modifications, we have suggested the following limitations on the preliminary injunction:.., the
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cretion, courts can accommodate the defendant's basic needs without
risking irreparable tertiary harm to the plaintiff. I[n weighing the bal-
ance of hardships, then, courts should balance against the plaintiff's
tertiary harm only the residual, temporary harm to the defendant that
remains after limiting the scope of the preliminary injunction and
requiring the plaintiff to post a bond.
Where the court finds that the plaintiff's tertiary harm will be per-
manent, the balance of hardships will always tip in her favor. The risk
that the plaintiff will obtain a judgment in a specified amount and
never be able to collect on it means that she will lose the amount of the
judgment plus interest for each year that she is unable to collect. The
defendant may be restrained from using the amount of the judgment,
but this loss will be both temporary and compensable: the defendant
will regain the use of her funds at the conclusion of the action if she
prevails on the merits, and will be compensated for her interim loss
out of the injunction bond. Assuming that the court does not enjoin
the defendant from using funds needed for subsistence, the balance of
hardships will always tip in the plaintiff's favor when she faces a risk
of permanent tertiary harm.
Where the plaintiff's tertiary harm is expected to be temporary, the
balance of hardships will be less susceptible to general rules. Just as
the court will have to consider the estimated time lag between judg-
ment and satisfaction and the degree of the plairtiff's need in deter-
mining whether the plaintiff's harm will be "irreparable," the court
will have to gauge the time lag and the defendant's need in determin-
ing the balance of hardships. In cases where the estimated time lag is
short and the parties have relatively comparable needs, the court may
conclude that the balance of hardships rests in or near equipoise, and
should decline to grant the preliminary injunction.157 If, on the other
hand, the time lag is expected to be great and the plaintiff is substan-
tially needier than the defendant, the court should have little difficulty
defendants must have the opportunity to post bond for the entire amounts subject to the freeze");
Canal Auth. v. Callaway, 489 F.2d 567, 578 (5th Cir. 1974) (noting that "the district court has
continuing jurisdiction over a preliminary injunction .... In the exercise of that jurisdiction, the
court is authorized to make any changes in the injunction that are equitable in light of
subsequent changes in the facts or the law, or for any other good reasan"); N.Y. Civ. PPAc. L. &
R. § 6314 (McKinney 1980) (stating that "as a condition to granting an order vacating or
modifying a preliminary injunction . . .. a court may require the defendant . . . to give an
undertaking.., that the defendant shall pay to the plaintiff any loss sustained by reason of the
vacating or modifying order").
157. In these cases, the court may also conclude that the plaintiff's risk of harm is not
irreparable. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
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concluding that the balance of hardships tips decidedly in the plain-
tiff's favor.
Again, these will not be easy determinations. But the calculus is not
very different from the one courts routinely use in deciding whether or
not to preliminarily enjoin termination of a distributorship,15 8 to man-
date temporary reinstatement of an employee, 159 or otherwise to grant
preliminary injunctive relief in actions in which permanent injunctive
relief is sought. That the case four parties are fighting over money
does not render the balance of hardships any more difficult to weigh; it
may actually make it somewhat easier. Thus, in cases in which the
plaintiff can establish a risk of permanent tertiary harm or can show
that the expected delay between judgment and satisfaction is great and
her financial situation is more precarious than the defendant's, the bal-
ance of hardships should tip in her favor and the court should grant a
preliminary injunction to freeze the defendant's assets pending trial if
the other requirements for such relief are met.
D. The Public Interest
"Sometimes an order granting or denying a preliminary injunction
will have consequences beyond the immediate parties. If so, those
interests-the 'public interest' if you will-must be reckoned into the
weighing process .... ." If a plaintiff obtains a preliminary injunc-
tion to freeze the defendant's assets, the public interest is served in at
least six ways. First and most obvious, the preliminary injunction pro-
tects the integrity of the judicial process. By reducing the likelihood
that the plaintiff's judgment will be rendered meaningless by the
defendant's efforts to make herself judgment-proof, the preliminary
injunction protects the judicial process from fraud and other deceptive
behavior. The absence of such a remedy may contribute to public cyn-
icism about the efficacy of the system and enhance the risk that the
system will squander its scarce resources trying cases that will never
provide compensation to a meritorious plaintiff.
Second, a preliminary injunction to freeze assets reduces whatever
incentive the defendant otherwise would have to delay the litigation.
If prejudgment interest is not available or is inadequate and no interim
relief issues, a defendant has every incentive to delay the litigation
because she retains the full use of her property during the pendency of
158. See, eg., Roso-Lino Beverage Distribs., Inc. v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 749 F.2d 124 (2d
Cir. 1984).
159. Chalk v. United States Dist. Court, 840 F.2d 701 (9th Cir. 1988).
160. Roland Mach. Co. v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 749 F.2d 380, 389 (7th Cir. 1984).
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the litigation. A preliminary injunction to freeze assets reduces that
incentive by limiting some of the uses to which the defendant may put
her money. Although it may be less effective in this regard than an
award of prejudgment interest or an attachment order, it does give the
defendant some incentive to resolve the case expeditiously, thereby
increasing judicial economy and efficiency.
Third, to the extent the preliminary injunction issues in lieu of an
attachment, it may diminish the "leverage" that the plaintiff otherwise
would have over the defendant. Put another way, although the pre-
liminary injunction reduces the defendant's ino.ntive for delay, in
many circumstances it does not have as much coercive power as an
attachment order. Because a defendant actually loses possession of,
and concomitantly many uses of, her property if it is attached,161 a
plaintiff who obtains an attachment order acquires substantially
increased bargaining power vis-a-vis the defendant.1 62 So empowered,
the plaintiff may be able to coerce the defendant into an unfair settle-
ment-a settlement for more than the ordinary present value of the
claim. 163
A preliminary injunction to freeze assets interferes less with the
defendant's enjoyment of her property during the pendency of the
action.16 Although such an injunction typically will enjoin the
defendant from transferring, hypothecating, or selling her property-
and therefore will deprive her of significant property interests-it will
not deprive her of the possession and use of her personal property nor
affect her title to real estate.1 65  Nor will it bar her from incurring
ordinary living expenses, paying attorneys' fees, or making transfers in
161. See supra notes 97-101 and accompanying text.
162. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
163. See supra note 102 and accompanying text; cf Wasserman, supra note 10, at 624 n.8 and
accompanying text.
164. Where the property in issue is a bank account, an attachment of the account and a
preliminary injunction barring the defendant from drawing on the account would be equally
intrusive.
165. See, eg., The Tuyuti, [1984] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 51, 56 (Sheen, J.) (noting that there are
"many fundamental differences between an injunction, which is an order directed to the owners
and master of the ship not to take a ship out of the jurisdiction and an arrest by which the
Admiralty Marshal takes custody of the ship"); GIoster, supra note 102, at 1245-46 (noting that
California offers an alternative to attachment, the temporary protective order, which "merely
prohibits transfer of the asset and involvesfar less severe limitations on the debtor's ability to use
the asset") (emphasis added); see also United States v. Musson, 8C2 F.2d 384, 387 (10th Cir.
1986) (concluding that a restraining order issued in a criminal case, which "prohibited transfers
or dispositions of the subject property without notice and permission of the court. . . is far less
intrusive than a physical seizure of the subject property").
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the ordinary course of business. 166 Thus, a preliminary injunction that
issues in lieu of an attachment order may minimize the reallocation of
bargaining power and reduce the likelihood of a coerced or unfair set-
tlement, thereby furthering the public interest in the just resolution of
private disputes.
Fourth, a preliminary injunction to freeze assets reduces the likeli-
hood that other creditors of the defendant will rush to file claims
against her or even force her into involuntary bankruptcy. Again, this
public benefit inures not so much from the issuance of the preliminary
injunction per se, but from the forbearance in awarding attachment.
If the only avenue the plaintiff has to prevent the defendant from di§-
sipating assets is to obtain an attachment order, the plaintiff may well
do so, thereby acquiring a lien on the property so attached. 6 7 Other
creditors of the defendant, who may now start to worry that all of the
other creditors will likewise seek to attach property to obtain some
kind of priority, will themselves feel constrained to file suit and attach
property, or force the defendant into bankruptcy in an effort to defeat
the prior claims of the attaching creditors.168
The preliminary injunction acts in personam and bars the defendant
from disposing of assets, but it does not bind the defendant's property
in any way. The injunction does not give the plaintiff a security inter-
est in the defendant's assets, and does not affect the priority of the
plaintiff's claim against the defendant vis-i-vis the claims of other
creditors.'69 To the extent it affects these other creditors at all, it may
166. See, eg., cases cited supra note 155; see also supra part III.C. These measures will not
eliminate all of the "intrusiveness" of a preliminary injunction. For example, the mere
involvement of a court in deciding what expenses constitute "ordinary living expenses" will
interfere with the plaintiff's privacy and autonomy. See, ag., In re McDaniel, 126 B.R. 782(Bankr. D. Minn. 1991) (refusing to confirm debtors' proposed plan of reorganization because
the proposed tithe to their church of $540 per month was not a "reasonably necessary" expense;
suggesting that a reduced amount would be permitted); In re Packham, 126 B.R. 603, 608(Bankr. D. Utah 1991) (concluding that "the tithe proposed by the debtors to the LDS [Latter
Day Saints] Church is not reasonably necessary for the maintenance and support of the debtors
or their dependents"). Furthermore, a preliminary injunction barring a defendant from selling a
valuable piece of real estate in a falling market may be no less "coercive" than an attachment, but
at least the court will have the flexibility to permit the defendant to sell the property if she agrees
to pay the proceeds into court or post a bond to ensure satisfaction of the plaintiff's potential
judgment. See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
167. See supra notes 103 and 106 and accompanying text.
168. See supra notes 110-11 and accompanying text.
169. See, eg., Delaware Trust Co. v. Partial, 517 A.2d 259, 261 (Del. Ch. 1986) (noting that
"issuance of the writ requested [injunction] would, presumably, not itself create a lien on the
property subject to the order, as would a garnishment"); Derby & Co. v. Weldon, [1988] 2
W.L.R. 412, 419 (C.A.) (noting that it is not the purpose of the Mareva injunction "to place the
plaintiff in the position of a secured creditor"); 3(1) HALSBURY'S LAWVS OF ENGLAND § 329 (4th
ed. reissue 1989) (noting that "the purpose of the [Mareva injunction] is not to improve the
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actually help them by preventing the debtor from dissipating assets. 170
Thus, to the extent that a preliminary injunction to restrain the dis-
sipation of assets issues in lieu of an attachment order, it reduces the
volume of litigation brought by other creditors and may actually spare
the defendant from involuntary bankruptcy. 17 1
Fifth, a preliminary injunction to restrain assets is far less likely to
affect the rights of innocent third parties who may be in possession of
the defendant's property than a garnishment in aid of prejudgment
attachment. When courts employ prejudgment garnishment proce-
dures, they often compel such persons to join the lawsuit to protect
their property, and conduct separate hearings to determine the merits
of the defendant's claims against the garnishees. 172  A preliminary
injunction, on the other hand, restrains only defendants, their privies,
and those in concert with them to defeat the plaintiff's claim. 173 Since
no "innocent" persons are restrained, no additional hearings are
needed to ensure protection of their rights. Thus, to the extent a pre-
liminary injunction issues in lieu of prejudgment garnishment, it not
position of the plaintiff in an insolvency; a Mareva injunction is not a form of pre-trial
attachment, but a relief in personam which prohibits certain acts in relation to the assets in
question"); cf CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 486.110 (West Supp. 1991) (providing that service of
temporary protective order creates a lien, but it is not valid as against bona fide purchasers; the
lien automatically terminates upon expiration of the order unless perfected by attachment),
discussed in Gloster, supra note 102, at 1246 n.216 and accompanying text. Compare the
attachment without seizure remedy proposed in Zaretsky, supra note 102, at 844 (noting that a
"creditor will obtain a nonpossessory lien on the debtor's property specified in the writ of
attachment").
170. See Laycock, supra note 119, at 716-17 (distinguishing between preliminary orders that
require insolvent defendants to perform contracts, which prefer the plaintiff over other creditors
of the defendant, and preliminary injunctions that bar "an insolvent (from] inflict[ing] harm for
which he can never pay. An insolvent can obey an order not to commit a threatened tort, and
such an injunction will not prefer plaintiff over other creditors.").
171. This argument makes assumptions about how other creditors will respond if the first
creditor obtains an attachment order as opposed to a preliminary injunction to freeze assets.
These assumptions may be wrong. It is possible, for example, that once the first creditor attaches
the defendant's property and obtains a lien therein, the other creditors will realize the reduced
likelihood that they will ever collect against the defendant and will not bother to file claims
against her. Likewise, it is possible that if the first creditor obtains a preliminary injunction
freezing the defendant's assets in lieu of the attachment order, the other creditors will then
realize that they may be able to collect against the defendant, but only if they beat the first
creditor to judgment, so they will have incentives to bring their actions promptly. Although the
author believes the assumptions made in the text are more probably correct, she concedes that
the creditors' behavior is an empirical question that is not resolved in this Article.
172. See supra notes 112-13 and accompanying text.
173. "Every order granting an injunction and every restraining order.., is binding only upon
the parties to the action, and their officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys, and upon
those persons in active concert or participation with them who receive actual notice of the order
by personal service or otherwise." FED. R. Civ. P. 65(d).
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only limits the effect on innocent third parties, but also reduces the
complexity of the litigation.174
Finally, a preliminary injunction eliminates the need for duplicative
actions in multiple states to protect the plaintiff from tertiary harm.
Because the geographic scope of an attachment order is limited to the
territory of the state, 175 the plaintiff may have to initiate multiple pro-
ceedings in the several states in which the defendant has property to
attach all of it. 176 Unlike attachment, a preliminary injunction
174. Cf David W. Shenton, Attachments and Other Interim Remedies in Support of
Arbitration: The English Courts, 1984 INT'L Bus. LAW. 101, 104. Shenton notes that
disobedience to the [Mareva] Order [discussed infra part V.B] involves a committal
procedure for contempt of Court under which heavy sanctions, including imprisonment,
fines and, in the case of corporations, sequestration of assets, can be imposed upon the
contemnor for his disobedience. The procedure has the advantage that third parties within
the jurisdiction, having been given notice of the terms of the Order can also be punished for
contempt if they act in respect of the Defendant's assets in a manner inconsistent with the
Injunction. As the third parties having notice of such Orders are almost invariably
respectable corporations, such as banks, brokers or commercial undertakings, they find it
more convenient to insure scrupulous observation of the Court's Orders regarding
customer's assets in their custody, than to risk what may prove to be expensive legal
procedures and possibly draconian punishments for ignoring Court Orders made against
their customer.
175. See supra notes 85-94 and accompanying text.
176. See, eg., EBSCO Indus., Inc. v. Lilly, 840 F.2d 333, 336 (6th Cir.) (finding attachment
remedy inadequate because it could not reach assets located outside state and plaintiff would
have to initiate attachment proceedings in several states), cert denied, 488 U.S. 825 (1988); Clark
Equip. Co. v. Armstrong Equip. Co., 431 F.2d 54, 57 (5th Cir. 1970) (upholding preliminary
injunction to require defendant to assemble and make available to plaintiff collateral, which was
located in five states; noting that "no one possessory action would provide an adequate remedy"),
cert. denied, 402 U.S. 909 (1971); Wilkerson v. Sullivan, 727 F. Supp. 925, 936 (E.D. Pa. 1989)
(stating that "a legal remedy is normally considered inadequate if it would result in a multiplicity
of lawsuits"); Northeast Women's Ctr., Inc. v. McMonagle, 665 F. Supp. 1147, 1153 (E.D. Pa.
1987) (in granting permanent injunction, stating that "[tihe legal remedy is inadequate if the
plaintiff's injury is a continuing one, where the best available remedy at law would relegate the
plaintiff to filing a separate claim for damages each time it is injured anew"); Howell Pipeline Co.
v. Terra Resources, Inc., 454 So. 2d 1353, 1357 (Ala. 1984) (affirming grant of preliminary
injunction to enjoin defendant from failing to honor contract because in absence of injunction,
plaintiff would have to sue monthly for damages); State ex rel Missouri Highway & Transp.
Comm'n v. Marcum Oil Co., 697 S.W.2d 580, 581 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985) (stating that "where an
injury committed by one against another is continuous or is being constantly repeated, so that
plaintiff's remedy at law requires the bringing of successive actions, that remedy is inadequate").
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operates on the person. Both state177 and federal1 78 courts have held
that they have authority to enjoin a person from taking, or to require a
person to take, action outside the state or district so long as they have
personal jurisdiction over the person.179 Thus, a court can prelim-
inarily enjoin a defendant from dissipating, transferring or hypothecat-
ing assets beyond the territory of the court, 1 0 and can require the
177. See, e.g., Pines v. Tomson, 206 Cal. Rptr. 866, 885 (Ct. App. 1984) (upholding
permanent injunction that required defendants to accept advertising for Christian Yellow Pages
from non-Christians, where injunction purported to apply to defendants' publications both inside
and outside California; holding that "a court having jurisdiction of the parties may grant and
enforce an injunction, although the subject matter affected is beyond its territorial jurisdiction, or
require defendant to do or refrain from doing anything beyond its territorial jurisdiction which it
could require... within the jurisdiction"); District Attorney v. McAuliffe, 493 N.Y.S.2d 406,
412 (Sup. Ct. 1985) (stating that in a forfeiture action, "the Court would have the power on a
motion for preliminary injunction to issue a decree that restrains or orders the commission of
acts or affects property outside the state, as a provisional remedy"); Mercury Records Prods. v.
Economic Consultants, Inc., 283 N.W.2d 613, 622 (Wis. Ct. App. 1979) (upholding temporary
injunction that prohibited defendants from advertising sale of pirated tapes, even outside the
state; noting that "[w]here a state court has personal jurisdiction over the parties, it may order
the parties to do or to refrain from doing a thing although the order may have an extraterritorial
effect").
178. See eg., United States v. First Nat'l City Bank, 379 U.S. 378, 384 (1965) (holding that
"once personal jurisdiction of a party is obtained, the District Court has authority to order it to
'freeze' property under its control, whether the property be within or without the United
States"); Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280, 289 (1952) (holding that "the District Court
in exercising its equity powers may command persons properly before it to cease or perform acts
outside its territorial jurisdiction"; holding that district court has jurisdiction to enjoin
trademark infringement consummated in a foreign country by a United States citizen); Ramirez
de Arellano v. Weinberger, 745 F.2d 1500, 1529 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc) (holding that "courts
in equity do not hesitate to order the defendants, who are present before the court, to do or
refrain from doing something directly involving foreign property"; reversing trial court order
dismissing plaintiff's complaint, which sought injunctive relief against governmental taking of
private property in Honduras), vacated mem., 471 U.S. 1113 (1985), on remand, 788 F.2d 762
(D.C. Cir. 1986) (per curiam).
179. See generally I1 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 116, § 2945 (noting that "there is no
doubt that if the court has personal jurisdiction over the parties, it has the power to order each of
them to act in any fashion or in any place"); Israel S. Gomborov, Note, Extra-Territorial
Jurisdiction in Equity, 7 TEMP. L.Q. 468, 481 (1933). Gomborov cncludes that
where... the rem is indirectly affected, and the purpose of the bill in equity is to compel the
defendant, over whom the court has jurisdiction, to do or refrain from doing a certain act
.... and the decree can be enforced by contempt proceedings, a court of equity.., will have
jurisdiction, no matter where the res may be situated.
See also Note, The Power of a Court of Equity to Order a Nonresident Defendant to Do a Positive
Act in Another State, 35 HARV. L. REv. 610 (1922) (arguing that plaintiff, upon showing an
"extreme" case, should be able to obtain an injunction requiring performance in another state,
unless the decree would interfere with the sovereignty of the other state or would be impossible
to enforce).
180. See, eg., First Nat'! City Bank, 379 U.S. at 384 (holding that district court had authority
to preliminarily enjoin bank from transferring any property or rights held for the account of
defendant in its Montevideo branch); In re Feit & Drexler, Inc., 760 F.2d 406, 414 (2d Cir. 1985)
(upholding preliminary injunction that required defendant to deliver her property, wherever
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defendant to return assets previously transferred outside the state or
country. 181 To the extent, then, that a single preliminary injunction
issues in lieu of multiple attachment orders, it reduces the need for
multiple proceedings in multiple states, thereby reducing judicial
costs.
Taken together, these four requirements impose a stringent stan-
dard for preliminary injunctive relief. The standard will not be easily
met, nor does this Article suggest that it should be. The preliminary
injunction will restrain the defendant from dealing in her own prop-
erty prior to a final judicial determination that she is liable to the
plaintiff. Such relief is extraordinary, and should issue only in cases in
which the plaintiff's claim on the merits is strong, the risk of dissipa-
tion is real, the harm to the plaintiff is likely to be irreparable, and the
risk to the defendant is likely to be less severe. In such cases, however,
this Article does advocate the use of such injunctions because they can
be better-tailored than a writ of attachment to reduce the risk of active
tertiary harm to the plaintiff, without unnecessarily intruding on the
rights of the defendant or the interests of innocent third parties.1 82
located, to escrow agent and enjoined her from transferring or disposing of any of her property,
wherever located); United States v. Ross, 302 F.2d 831, 834 (2d Cir. 1962) (upholding
preliminary injunction directing defendant to turn over stock certificates, located in the
Bahamas, to a receiver; stating that "[p]ersonal jurisdiction gave the court power to order
[defendant] to transfer property whether that property was within or without the limits of the
court's territorial jurisdiction").
181. See, eg., Hoxworth v. Blinder, Robinson & Co., 903 F.2d 186, 194, 208 (3d Cir. 1990)
(reviewing preliminary injunction, which ordered defendant to "repatriate all funds he had
transferred overseas"; vacating injunction as overbroad, but stating that "the district court is free
to reimpose some sort of preliminary injunction"); Feit, 760 F.2d at 414 (concluding that district
court had power to enter a mandatory preliminary injunction requiring the defendant to "deliver
her property from outside the court's territorial jurisdiction"); Inter-Regional Fin. Group, Inc. v.
Hashemi, 562 F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1977) (affirming grant of preliminary injunction, which required
defendant to bring securities into state and to surrender them to clerk of court, so they could be
attached); Fleming v. Gray Mfg. Co., 352 F. Supp. 724 (D. Conn. 1973) (granting a mandatory
preliminary injunction to require the defendants to deposit with the court corporate securities
located outside the state, so they could be attached). See generally 11 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra
note 116, § 2948 at 465-66 (noting that "there are cases in which it is necessary to require the
defendant to disturb the status quo by undoing acts completed before the injunction issues, or by
acting affirmatively, in order to preserve the power of the court to render a meaningful
decision"). Such an injunction will be most helpful in cases in which the defendant has already
moved assets to a foreign country that would not enforce a United States judgment. See Bruce,
et al., supra note 32; Chambers, supra note 32. If the assets already have been placed in the
possession of third parties, it may be necessary to invoke fraudulent conveyance law to set aside
these transfers and to join the transferees as parties to the action, or to commence separate
actions against them if they are not subject to the jurisdiction of the court. See supra note 33.
182. The availability of pre-conviction forfeiture orders in the criminal context, see supra note
155, suggests that the relief proposed here is well within the mainstream of American judicial
thought on prejudgment restraints. Although the policies underlying such restraints may be
much stronger in the criminal context than in the civil one, see, eg., Caplin & Drysdale,
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IV. REASONS WHY COURTS HAVE REFRAINED FROM
ISSUING PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIONS TO
SECURE POTENTIAL MONEY JUDGMENTS
Many courts have hesitated or refused to grant preliminary injunc-
tions to freeze a defendant's assets in actions in which the plaintiff
sought only money damages, even though she may have met the tradi-
tional requirements for preliminary injunctive relief. '83 These courts
have offered a variety of reasons to support their ultimate conclusion
that a preliminary injunction should not issue to prevent tertiary
harm.
Some courts have felt constrained by precedent to deny relief, 
1 4
relying upon one or both of two Supreme Court decisions,185 which
considered the availability of a preliminary injunction to freeze a pool
of assets. But, as subpart A will demonstrate, neither opinion directly
addressed the question of whether a preliminary injunction may issue
to secure assets with which a money judgment for damages could be
paid and, therefore, neither opinion should dissuade courts from
granting such relief. In fact, a third Supreme Court decision actually
supports the issuance of preliminary injunctions to freeze assets. 186
Other courts that have refused to grant preliminary injunctions to
freeze assets have invoked the principle that an equitable remedy-a
preliminary injunction-should not issue when an adequate remedy at
Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 629-30 (1989) (noting the government's interests in
"separating a criminal from his ill-gotten gains," and in "Iessen[ing] the economic power of
organized crime and drug enterprises," among others), the arguments against such restraints are
also much stronger in the criminal setting, and notwithstanding these arguments, the relief is
routinely granted and has been upheld as constitutional. See supra note 155. Thus, a criminal
defendant may be compelled to forfeit assets prior to conviction notwithstanding the
constitutionally required "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard of proof and the presumption of
innocence, see In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970), and notwithstanding the enormous stigma
associated with pre-conviction forfeiture under either RICO (whith brands the defendant a
racketeer) or CCE (which brands her a drug dealer).
183. See, eg., In re Fredeman Litig., 843 F.2d 821, 822, 824 (5th Cir. 1988); Federal Say. &
Loan Ins. Corp. v. Dixon, 835 F.2d 554, 560 (5th Cir. 1987); Baxter '. United Forest Prods. Co.,
406 F.2d 1120, 1127 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 1018 (1969); L.G. Balfour Co. v. Drake,
703 F. Supp. 530, 532 (S.D. Miss.' 1988); Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Gleave, 540 F. Supp. 81, 82-83
(W.D.N.Y. 1982); Daley v. Ort, 98 F. Supp. 151, 152 (D. Mass. 1951).
184. See, eg., Fredeman, 843 F.2d at 824-27 (relying on De Beeir for the general rule "that a
court may not reach a defendant's assets unrelated to the underlying itigation and freeze them so
that they may be preserved to satisfy a potential money judgment"); LG. Balfour Co., 703 F.
Supp. at 521-32.
185. De Beers Consol. Mines, Ltd. v. United States, 325 U.S. 212 (1945); Deckert v.
Independence Shares Corp., 311 U.S. 282 (1940).
186. United States v. First Nat'l City Bank, 379 U.S. 378 (1965).
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law exists.' 8 7 Some of these courts have held that the potential money
judgment itself will be an adequate remedy at law, even if the plaintiff
has offered proof that the defendant is dissipating assets and the judg-
ment will therefore be unenforceable.' These cases fail to recognize,
however, that the plaintiff in such cases may well face irreparable
harm and that the money judgment will therefore not be an adequate
remedy.18 9
Still other courts have conceded that the money judgment itself may
not be adequate, but nevertheless deny equitable relief because another
legal remedy, prejudgment attachment, is considered adequate."9
This Article has already identified some of the inadequacies of attach-
ment. But even if prejudgment attachment were adequate, courts
should have the freedom to issue preliminary injunctive relief unless
the reasons for preferring legal remedies over equitable remedies
obtain in this context. As will be seen, they do not.
Finally, some courts maintain that prejudgment attachment is the
exclusive means for preventing tertiary harm in money damages cases.
These courts have refused to permit plaintiffs to evade the statutory
requirements of attachment by seeking preliminary injunctive relief;
they have denied relief even in cases in which attachment was unavail-
able, on the theory that the legislature had limited the circumstances
in which the defendant could be deprived of property prior to judg-
187. Fechter v. HMW Indus., Inc., 879 F.2d 1111, 1119 (3d Cir. 1989); Barbouti v.
Lysandrou, 559 So. 2d 648, 650 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990); Hiles v. Auto Balm Fed'n, Inc., 498
So. 2d 997, 998 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986); St. Lawrence Co. v. Alkow Realty, Inc., 453 So. 2d
514, 514 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984); Carriage Way Apartments v. Pojman, 527 N.E.2d 89, 97 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1988); Michael-Curry Cos. v. Knutson Shareholders Liquidating Trust, 423 N.W.2d
407, 410 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988).
188. See, eg., Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Gleave, 540 F. Supp. 81, 86 (W.D.N.Y. 1982) (stating that
"[i]t is questionable whether the sort of harm plaintiff points to--frustration of enforcement of a
money judgment--can ever constitute irreparable harm for purposes of preliminary injunctive
relief"); Hiles, 498 So. 2d at 999 (stating that "[tihe possibility that a money judgment, once
obtained, will not be collectible is irrelevant under the test of inadequacy of remedy at law");
Alkow Realty, 453 So. 2d at 514 (stating that "[Ithe test of the inadequacy of a remedy at law is
whether a judgment could be obtained, not whether, once obtained it will be collectible").
189. See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
190. See, eg., Taunton Mun. Lighting Plant v. Department of Energy, 472 F. Supp. 1231,
1233 (D. Mass. 1979) (stating that plaintiff's "proper course to preserve the fund is to seek
attachment .... Thus it appears if any remedy is warranted, it would be one governed... by
Rule 64."); Allstate Sales & Leasing Co. v. Geis, 412 N.W.2d 30, 33 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987)
(stating that plaintiff "has the burden of showing the attachment statute would not have afforded
it adequate relief, and it has not met that burden"); Fair Sky Inc. v. International Cable Ride
Corp., 257 N.Y.S.2d 351, 353 (App. Div. 1965) (noting that "the defendant ... is a foreign
corporation and a transfer of the cable car business may leave it without assets in the State, but
the plaintiff has already had the benefit of an attachment order .... An 'attachment is the more
appropriate remedy to prevent a removal or disposition of property.' ").
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ment and that the courts should not undermine that legislative pol-
icy."' Respect for legislative policy, however, does not mandate a
blanket refusal to issue preliminary injunctions to freeze assets.
A. Supreme Court Precedent
1. Deckert v. Independence Shares Corporation
Within two years of the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, the Supreme Court decided Deckert v. Independence Shares Cor-
poration. 192  In that case, plaintiffs purchased securities known as
"savings plan contract certificates" from Independence Shares Corpo-
ration, a trust and investment company.19 3 The c!rtificates required
the holders to make monthly installment payments for ten years to
The Pennsylvania Company for Insurances on Lives and Granting
Annuities, a banking corporation that served as the trustee for the
installment investment plan. After deducting trustee fees and other
charges, The Pennsylvania Company used the net installment pay-
ments to purchase Independence Trust Shares from Independence for
the account of each certificate holder. The shares were interests in an
installment investment trust for which The Pennsylvania Company
was the trustee and Independence was the issuer, sponsor and deposi-
tor. A second set of trustee fees, commissions and other charges were
deducted upon purchase of the shares. 194 The prospectus used in con-
191. See, e.g., Dorfmann v. Boozer, 414 F.2d 1168, 1172 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (reversing grant of
preliminary injunction, which required a credit union to pay into caurt funds on deposit in
defendants' name, which funds would then be released by the court to the plaintiff; noting that
plaintiffs "now attempt.., not only to get around the attachment statute, but actually to obtain
relief (the use of the funds) which they could not get under that statute"); Baxter v. United
Forest Prods. Co., 406 F.2d 1120, 1127 (8th Cir. 1969) (stating that "provisional remedies of
attachment before judgment were not recognized at common law. They are statutory remedies in
derogation of the common law and strict compliance with the statutory requirements is therefore
necessary."); Delaware Trust Co. v. Partial, 517 A.2d 259, 262 (Del. Ch. 1986) (noting that the
plaintiff sought a preliminary injunction to restrain a bank from permitting the defendant to
withdraw amounts held on deposit because under Delaware law, garnishment was not available
against banks; holding that the "policy of the legislature with respect to the seizure or
garnishment of funds held by Delaware banks... may [not] be ignored by the simple expedient
of denominating the writ sought as one of injunction rather than one of garnishment"); Alkow
Realty, 453 So. 2d at 515 (holding in an action at law that "either prejudgment attachment or
garnishment, with attendant safeguards, may be available . . . under these circumstances;
injunctive relief is not") (emphasis added).
192. 311 U.S. 282 (1940).
193. Plaintiffs actually purchased the certificates from Capital Savings Plan, Inc., then the
parent corporation of Independence. Deckert v. Independence Shares Corp., 27 F. Supp. 763,
764 (E.D. Pa.), rev'd, 108 F.2d 51 (3d Cir. 1939). In 1938, prior to commencement of the action,
Capital was merged into Independence. Id. Capital and Independence both will be referred to as
Independence.
194. 27 F. Supp. at 764-65.
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nection with the sale of the savings plan contract certificates misstated
these charges and made other material misrepresentations.1 95
Plaintiffs brought a class action against Independence, its officers
and directors, and The Pennsylvania Company in the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, alleging that
they bought the certificates from Independence in reliance on misrep-
resentations and fraudulent misstatements. 196 Plaintiffs sought relief
under section 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933, which permits an
aggrieved purchaser "to recover the consideration paid for [the] secur-
ity with interest thereon, less the amount of any income received
thereon, upon the tender of such security." 197 Alleging that "Indepen-
dence [was] insolvent and threatened with many law suits, that its
business [was] virtually at a standstill because of unfavorable publicity,
that preferences to creditors [were] probable, and that its assets [were]
in danger of dissipation and depletion," 19 plaintiffs also sought the
appointment of a receiver for Independence with authority to take
possession of the trust assets held by The Pennsylvania Company. 199
Federal jurisdiction was invoked under section 22(a) of the Securities
Act2" and the court's "general equitable and receivership powers."2 °1
After rejecting defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction, the district court proceeded to consider Indepen-
dence's motion to dismiss for lack of equity jurisdiction because plain-
tiffs "were unsecured simple contract creditors who had not reduced
their claims to judgment and failed to realize upon execution pro-
cess."20 2 Although conceding that "as a general rule unsecured simple
contract creditors who have not obtained judgments upon their claims
have not the status to appeal to equity for relief,""2 3 the district court
concluded that the plaintiffs were the beneficiaries of a trust-cestuis
195. Id. at 774-75.
196. In addition to the parties discussed in the text, plaintiffs sued two affiliated companies,
but the claims against them were dismissed prior to review by the Supreme Court. Deckert, 311
U.S. at 285.
The Securities and Exchange Commission previously had commenced an action against
Capital and Independence, alleging that the defendants had engaged in acts and practices that
constituted violations of § 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933 (currently codified at 15 U.S.C.
§ 77q (1988)). The SEC action was resolved by consent decree, which restrained the defendants
from engaging in the practices complained of by the SEC. 27 F. Supp. at 767.
197. Section 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933 (currently codified at 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1988)).
198. 311 U.S. at 285.
199. Id.
200. Section 22(a) ofthe Securities Act of 1933 (currently codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77t (1988)).
201. 27 F. Supp. at 764.
202. Id. at 768.
203. Id. at 769-70.
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que trustent-and therefore properly had sought relief in equity.2 °4
The district court then noted that even though The Pennsylvania
Company was not charged with misconduct, neglect or mismanage-
ment, it was not itself an equity receiver responsible to the court, and
therefore, such a receiver might have to be appointed to preserve and
distribute the trust assets in The Pennsylvania Company's hands.2
0 5
Finally, the district court appointed a special master to take testimony
to determine whether or not Independence was solvent.2°  Approxi-
mately two weeks after issuing its opinion, the district court enjoined
The Pennsylvania Company from paying to Independence a sum of
money owed to Independence or otherwise disposing of the sum dur-
ing the pendency of the suit.2 7
Both Independence and The Pennsylvania Company appealed to
the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.20 8 Charac-
terizing the relief sought under section 12(2) of the Securities Act as
"a money judgment or... a money decree payabe to the individual
who has been defrauded"' 2 9-that is, as legal rather than equitable
relief-the Third Circuit held that the injunction against The Penn-
sylvania Company could "not be maintained."'21 In fact, because no
cause of action had been stated against The Pennsylvania Company,
the Third Circuit held that it was not a proper party to the suit.211 It
also concluded that the district court erred in appointing a receiver for
Independence on the ground that it was insolvent or its assets were
being dissipated.212
The Supreme Court unanimously reversed.213 While recognizing
that "any suit to establish the civil liability imposed by the [Securities]
Act must ultimately seek recovery of the consideration paid less
income received or damages if the claimant no longer owns the secur-
204. Id. at 770.
205. Id. at 771.
206. Id. at 776.
207. Independence Shares Corp. v. Deckert, 108 F.2d 51, 53 (3d Cir. 1939), rev'd, 311 U.S.
282 (1940). In its opinion, the Supreme Court noted that plaintiffs sought "an injunction
restraining Pennsylvania from transferring or disposing of any of the assets of the corporations or
of the trust." 311 U.S. at 285.
208. "The Circuit Court of Appeals did not expressly consider whether the appeals were
premature." Deckert, 311 U.S. at 286.
209. 108 F.2d at 54.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id. The court left open the possibility that plaintiffs "upon a proper showing might...
obtain injnctive relief against Independence... in aid of the remedy supplied to them by Section
12(2) of the Act ...." Id. at 55.
213. Justice Douglas did not participate in the consideration or decision of the case.
310
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ity"2 14 -just money-the Court noted that the Act did not "purport
to state the form of action or procedure the claimant is to employ. 215
In fact, the Court concluded that the judicial power "to enforce any
liability or duty created" by the Act216 "implie[d] the power to make
effective the right of recovery afforded by the Act, ' 217 which itself
implied "the power to utilize any of the procedures or actions nor-
mally available to the litigant according to the exigencies of the partic-
ular case."' 218  In concluding that the complaint stated a cause of
action for equitable relief, the Court relied upon plaintiffs' allegations
of Independence's insolvency, possible preferences to creditors, and
other threats to defendants' assets, as well as the proposition that "a
suit to rescind a contract induced by fraud and to recover the consid-
eration paid may be maintained in equity, at least where there are cir-
cumstances making the legal remedy inadequate ... ."219
Once the Court concluded that plaintiffs stated a claim entitling
them to "some equitable relief, 22 0 it followed inexorably that the dis-
trict court properly "consider[ed] whether injunctive relief should be
given in aid of the recovery sought by the bill. 2z21 Because of the risks
of insolvency and depletion or dissipation of assets, "the legal remedy
against Independence, without recourse to the fund in the hands of
Pennsylvania, would be inadequate." '22 Therefore, the preliminary
injunction restraining the transfer of specified assets from The Penn-
sylvania Company to Independence was "a reasonable measure to pre-
serve the status quo pending final determination of the questions
raised by the bill."'2 23
Reduced to its essence, Deckert stands for the proposition that a
preliminary equitable remedy will issue to protect a final equitable
remedy of restitution or constructive trust. Thus, it speaks to the
availability of a preliminary injunction only in cases in which plaintiffs
have an equitable claim to assets in the hands of defendants; it simply
214. Independence Shares Corp. v. Deckert, 311 U.S. 282, 288 (1940).
215. Id.
216. Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 77v (1936)) (emphasis in original).
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 288-89.
220. Id. at 289.
221. Id. at 289; accord Federal Say. & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Dixon, 835 F.2d 554, 561 (5th Cir.
1987) (holding that "an asset freeze by preliminary injunction is an appropriate method to assure
the meaningful, final equitable relief sought"); Federal Trade Comm'n v. H.N. Singer, Inc., 668
F.2d 1107, 1112 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding that preliminary injunction to freeze assets would issue
to protect final equitable remedy of rescission).
222. 311 U.S. at 290.
223. Id.
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does not speak to the case of a plaintiff seeking money damages only as
her final remedy. 224 Courts finding that Deckert either precludes pre-
liminary injunctive relief in such cases or authorizes it read more into
the opinion than it contains.
2. De Beers Consolidated Mines, Ltd. v. United States
Only five years after it decided Deckert, the Supreme Court again
grappled with the question of the availability of a preliminary injunc-
tion to freeze assets. In De Beers Consolidated Mines, Ltd. v. United
States, 225 the United States commenced an action against several for-
eign corporations and individuals, alleging that they had "engaged in a
conspiracy to restrain and monopolize the commerce of the United
States with foreign nations in gem and industrial diamonds" in viola-
tion of the Sherman Act and the Wilson Tariff Act.226 The ultimate
relief sought was a permanent injunction preventing and restraining
future violations of federal law. Upon commencement of the action,
the government sought a preliminary injunction to restrain the corpo-
rate defendants from "withdrawing from the country any property
located in the United States, and from selling, transferring or dispos-
ing of any property in the United States 'until such time as [the trial
court] shall have determined the issues of this case and defendant cor-
porations shall have complied with its orders.' "227 The government
was concerned that the defendants, whose principal places of business
were abroad, would flout the court's final order and would remove
their assets from the United States so as to make a proceeding for civil
contempt fines futile or impracticable; the government thus alleged
irreparable injury. 228 A temporary restraining order without notice
was issued and served on several banks that held some of the defend-
ants' assets, and a preliminary injunction was "continued in force"
after a hearing on affidavits and oral argument. 29 The defendants
applied directly to the Supreme Court for review under section 262 of
the Judiciary Code.230
224. At most, the Court may have implied that if the complaint had not stated a claim for
final equitable relief, a preliminary injunction could not have issued. This implication is rejected
in United States v. First Nat'l City Bank, 379 U.S. 378 (1965) (discussed infra in part IV.A.3).
225. 325 U.S. 212 (1945).
226. Id. at 215.
227. Id. (quoting the government's motion).
228. Id.
229. Id. at 216.
230. Section 262 authorized the Supreme Court and the district courts to issue writs of scire
facias, and authorized the Supreme Court, the courts of appeals, and the district courts to issue
"all writs not specifically provided for by statute, which may be necessary for the exercise of their
312
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In holding that it had jurisdiction under section 262 to review the
issuance of the preliminary injunction,231 the Supreme Court made
some preliminary comments about the nature of the temporary and
final relief sought by the United States: "[T]he order in question was
not made to grant interlocutory relief such as could be afforded by any
final injunction, but [was] one respecting a matter lying wholly outside
the issues in the case ... ."232 Because the nature of the preliminary
equitable relief granted was different than the final equitable relief
sought, an appeal from a final injunction prohibiting anticompetitive
activity would not provide an occasion for review of the propriety of
the preliminary injunction freezing defendants' domestic assets. Thus,
review under section 262 was the only avenue for determining whether
the district court "ha[d] ... power to do what it purport[ed] to do." '233
In arguing to the Supreme Court that the district court had author-
ity to issue the preliminary injunction, the United States relied on
neither Rule 64234 nor Rule 70235 of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure; instead, it invoked section 4 of the Sherman Act236 and section
respective jurisdictions, and agreeable to the usages and principles of the law." Act of March 3,
1911, ch. 231, § 262; 36 Stat. 1162 (1911) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 377 (1940)) (currently codified
at 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (1966)). Rule 81(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure abolished the
writ of scire facias so the recodification of § 262 omits the sentence authorizing such writs. See
28 U.S.C. § 1651 (1988).
231. Only five justices believed that review by the Supreme Court was appropriate in the
circumstances of the case. The majority opinion stated:
If the preliminary injunction here granted, unless set aside, will stand throughout the course
of the trial and for an indefinite period after its termination, and if the order was beyond the
powers conferred upon the court, it is plain... that the petitions present an appropriate case
for the exercise of our jurisdiction under § 262.
325 U.S. at 217. In a strongly-worded dissent, Justice Douglas concluded that the Court did not
have jurisdiction to entertain the appeal from this interlocutory order, and that to do so would
"open the flood gates ...." Id. at 225 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
232. Id. at 217.
233. Id.
234. The Supreme Court noted that no applicable federal statute authorized attachment, and
that under the law of the state in which the district court sat, New York, an attachment could
issue only "in an action seeking a money judgment" and not "in an equity suit such as the instant
one." Id. at 218. For a discussion of Rule 64, see infra part IV.B.2.e.
235. The Court stated:
Although the Government based its motion upon the theory that the entry of the requested
injunction would amount to a sequestration of the defendants' assets, and so argued in the
court below, it has abandoned that position, because Rule 70..., which permits the issue of
a writ of attachment or sequestration against the property of a disobedient party to compel
satisfaction of a judgment, is operative only after a judgment is entered.
325 U.S. at 218.
236. 15 U.S.C. § 4 (1940) (granting the district courts "jurisdiction to prevent and restrain
violations" of the title; authorizing the United States Attorneys to "institute proceedings in
equity to prevent and restrain such violations"; authorizing the courts, prior to final decree, to
"make such temporary restraining order or prohibition as shall be deemed just in the premises").
Washington Law Review
262 of the Judicial Code.237 Because the Court found that neither of
those sections granted any "new or different power than those tradi-
tionally exercised by courts of equity," '238 the Court was remitted to an
examination of traditional equity practice.
In concluding that traditional equity practice would not counte-
nance the preliminary injunction entered by the district court, the
Supreme Court noted that the courts lacked power under the relevant
federal laws to enter a money judgment; the only remedy authorized
was an injunction against "future continuance of actions or conduct
intended to monopolize or restrain commerce. 2 39 Because the court
had power to enter a permanent injunction, it also had power to enter
a preliminary injunction "of the same character" as that which might
have been granted finally.2' Thus, a preliminary injunction
restraining violations of the Acts during the pendency of the action
would have been authorized. But the preliminary injunction at issue
did no such thing. "[I]t deal[t] with a matter lying wholly outside the
issues in the suit. It deal[t] with property which in no circumstances
[could] be dealt with in any final injunction that [might] be
entered. ' 24 1 If an injunction could issue under these circumstances,
then:
every suitor who resorts to chancery for any sort of relief by injunction
may, on a mere statement of belief that the defendant can easily make
away with or transport his money or goods, impose an injunction on
him, indefinite in duration, disabling him to use so much of his funds or
property as the court deems necessary for security or compliance with
its possible decree.242
And in case these prospects were not frightening enough, the Court
continued down the slippery slope: "[I]t is difficult to see why a plain-
tiff in any action for a personal judgment in tort cr contract may not,
also, apply to the chancellor for a so-called injunction sequestrating
his opponent's assets pending recovery and satisfaction of a judgment
237. Act of March 3, 1911, ch. 231, § 262; 36 Stat. 1162 (1911) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 377
(1940)) (currently codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (1966)). See supra note 230 and accompanying
text.
238. 325 U.S. at 219. In discussing § 4 of the Sherman Act, the Court noted that the
jurisdiction it granted "to prevent and restrain violations" of the Act had "to be exercised
according to the general principles which govern the granting of equitable relief." Id. at 218-19.
Likewise, § 262 of the Judicial Code required an "inquiry as to what is the usage, and what are
the principles of equity applicable in such a case." Id. at 219.
239. Id. at 219-20.
240. Id. at 220 (emphasis added).
241. Id.
242. Id. at 222.
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in such a law action. '243 No citation was necessary for the ultimate
conclusion that "no relief of this character has been thought justified
in the long history of equity jurisprudence." 2'
Although some courts have read De Beers as barring the use of pre-
liminary injunctions to freeze assets in all money damages cases,24 5 the
Third Circuit's more limited reading of De Beers's holding is fairer: it
"simply held that a defendant's money may not be encumbered by a
preliminary injunction when the final merits judgment sought by
plaintiffs cannot involve a transfer of money from defendants to plain-
tiffs. In short, De Beers is simply inapplicable to cases in which a liti-
gant seeks money damages."' 46 Although De Beers's dicta also may
be read as counseling against all preliminary injunctions to freeze
assets, again a more careful parsing suggests otherwise:
[T]he government's evidence [of irreparable injury] consisted only of one
conclusory affidavit submitted by the government accusing De Beers of
secreting assets-in other words, "a mere statement of belief that the
defendant can easily make away with or transport his money or goods."
Against this background, the passage from De Beers... can be under-
stood more sensibly. De Beers was concerned that not just "any action
for personal judgment" should result, "on a mere statement" by a plain-
tiff, in burdensome encumbrances imposed on the assets of a defendant
as yet found liable to no one. A case in which recovery is especially
likely is not just "any action," however, and a case in which asset secre-
tion has been proven involves more than just "a mere statement" of
irreparable injury."
243. Id. at 222-23. According to United States ex rel Taxpayers Against Fraud v. Link
Flight Simulation Corp., 722 F. Supp. 1248 (D. Md. 1989):
This was simply dicta, superfluous to the Court's holding .... Secondly, this passage,
particularly the fourth sentence, read in the context of the Court's decision as a whole, refers
to situations such as the one there presented where the principal relief sought is a permanent
injunction restraining conduct and the motion for preliminary injunction seeks to restrain
property to secure compliance with that principal relief. Finally, the last two sentences set
forth a generalized "parade of horribles" which does not account for cases founded on fraud
where there is a realistic threat of insolvency, as in Deckert ....
Id. at 1254.
244. 325 U.S. at 223.
245. See, eg., In re Fredeman Litig., 843 F.2d 821, 824 (5th Cir. 1988) (citing De Beers for
the "general federal rule of equity" that "a court may not reach a defendant's assets unrelated to
the underlying litigation and freeze them so that they may be preserved to satisfy a potential
money judgment"); Federal Say. & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Dixon, 835 F.2d 554, 560 (5th Cir. 1987)
(citing De Beers for the "general rule" that "such an injunction is not permissible to secure post-
judgment legal relief in the form of damages").
246. Hoxworth v. Blinder, Robinson & Co., 903 F.2d 186, 197 (3d Cir. 1990).
247. Id. (citation omitted).
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Thus, neither the holding nor the dicta of De Beers, properly read,
precludes the availability of preliminary injunctive relief to freeze
assets in cases in which the plaintiff seeks money damages and in
which she can -demonstrate a genuine risk of irreparable injury.
3. United States v. First National City Bank
A third case, decided by the Supreme Court in 1965, actually casts
more light on the availability of preliminary injunctive relief in money
damages cases than either Deckert or De Beers, but oddly is cited less
frequently. In United States v. First National City Bank 248 the Court
reviewed a preliminary injunction granted by the district court in an
action by the United States against Omar, S.A., a Uruguayan corpora-
tion, for taxes due.24 9 The government had sought a preliminary
injunction against several banks and brokerage fi.ms to restrain them
from "selling, transferring, pledging, encumbering, disposing of or dis-
tributing any property or rights to property of defendant taxpayer
Omar, S.A."250 The government claimed that Omar's "principal
assets" were in the hands of the banks and brokerage firms, and that
"disposition of the . . . assets might make its lawful rights therein
unenforceable and that it would be irreparably injured by removal of
any such assets outside the power of the court." '251 By affidavit, the
government demonstrated that Omar had, in fact, been liquidating its
accounts in the United States and transferring the proceeds abroad.25 2
Concluding that it had "power, under Rule 65 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, to grant a preliminary injunction ... to prevent
irreparable injury pending the determination of an action, ' 25 and
finding that the government "will be needlessly injured if recovery is
prevented by further removal of defendant's assets from the jurisdic-
tion of the court," '254 the district court then considered the bank's
argument that the court lacked power to affect property held outside
the country. Noting that an "injunction does not operate in rem, "255
the district court concluded that it could compel parties over whom it
had personal jurisdiction to perform "acts with respect to property
248. 379 U.S. 378 (1965).
249. Id. at 379-80.
250. United States v. Omar, S.A., 210 F. Supp. 773, 774 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), rev'd sub nom.
United States v. First Nat'l City Bank, 321 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1963), cdhered to en banc, 325 F.2d
1020 (2d Cir. 1964) (per curiam), rev'd, 379 U.S. 378 (1965).
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Id. at 774-75.
254. Id. at 775.
255. Id.
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located within or without its jurisdiction. 25 6 On the basis of the fore-
going, the district court granted the preliminary injunction enjoining
the banks and brokerage firms from transferring or distributing any of
Omar's property.25 7
The First National City Bank of New York appealed and the Sec-
ond Circuit reversed.25 8 The "crucial factor"'259 was jurisdiction over
Omar, the taxpayer: because the district court lacked in personam
jurisdiction over Omar, it had to acquire quasi-in-rem jurisdiction by
attaching its property, or the bank's debt to it. But under New York
law, "accounts in a foreign branch bank are not subject to attachment
or execution by the process of a New York court served in New York
on- a main office, branch or agency of the bank.' ' 2 ° Thus, because the
court lacked even quasi-in-rem jurisdiction over Omar, the "injunction
issued by the district court was beyond its jurisdiction as to deposits
held abroad that are collectible only outside the United States." '26 1
The Second Circuit sitting en banc agreed with the panel.262
This time the government appealed, and the Supreme Court
reversed. Noting the recent passage of a New York long-arm statute,
which afforded personal jurisdiction over non-domiciliaries who trans-
acted business in the state, the Court concluded that Omar could be
served thereunder and that, accordingly, the temporary injunction
would be judged "as of now and in light of the present remedy" that
the long-arm statute provided.263
Whether or not the Montevideo branch of the bank was a "separate
entity" for purposes of attachment under New York law was no longer
germane because it was "not a separate entity in the sense that it [was]
insulated from [the main branch's] managerial prerogatives. ' '261 An in
personam order against the main branch in New York could reach the
branch bank's affairs. Thus, the Court concluded:
once personal jurisdiction of a party [the bank] is obtained, the District
Court has authority to order it to 'freeze' property under its control,
whether the property be within or without the United States .... The
256. Id.
257. Id. at 776.
258. United States v. First Nat'l City Bank, 321 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1963), adhered to en banc,
325 F.2d 1020 (2d Cir. 1964) (per curiam), rev'd, 379 U.S. 378 (1965).
259. Id. at 23.
260. Id. at 19.
261. Id. at 24.
262. 325 F.2d 1020 (2d Cir. 1964) (en banc) (per curiam).
263. United States v. First Nat'l City Bank, 379 U.S. 378, 382-83 (1965).
264. Id. at 384.
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temporary injunction issued by the District Court seems to us to be emi-
nently appropriate to prevent further dissipation of assets.
2 65
In the last paragraph of the opinion, almost as an afterthought, the
Court distinguished De Beers and analogized Deckert:
Unlike De Beers .... there is here property which would be 'the subject
of the provisions of any final decree in the cause' [quoting De Beers]. We
conclude that this temporary injunction is 'a reasonable measure to pre-
serve the status quo' [quoting Deckert] pending service of process on
Omar and an adjudication of the merits.2 66
Thus, the Court specifically upheld a preliminary injunction to freeze
assets to secure a future money judgment.2 67
Read together, these cases confirm the availability of a preliminary
injunction to freeze assets that may be the subject of an equitable
decree at the conclusion of the litigation (Deckert) and strongly sug-
gest the availability of such an injunction to freeze assets that may be
levied upon to satisfy a future money judgment (First National).26 8
Not even De Beers undermines the argument in favor of such relief.
But if the precedent supports the issuance of the preliminary injunc-
tions advocated here, why have the courts been so leery about granting
them?
B. The "No Adequate Remedy at Law" Requirement
Courts often begin discussions regarding the availability of a prelim-
inary injunction by noting that equitable relief is unavailable if an ade-
quate remedy at law exists.2 69 As this section of the Article will
demonstrate, not only do the historical and revisionist rationales for
the "no adequate remedy at law" requirement fail to justify a blanket
preference for prejudgment attachment over preliminary injunction,
265. Id. at 384-85.
266. Id. at 385.
267. Although First Nat'l City Bank provides strong support for the availability of
preliminary injunctions to freeze assets, it is distinguishable froa the ordinary case in two
relevant respects: first, the party seeking the injunction was the government, and the Court noted
that "courts of equity may, and frequently do, go much farther both to give and withhold relief
in furtherance of the public interest than they are accustomed to go when only private interests
are involved," id. at 383 (quoting Virginia Ry. Co. v. Federation, 300 U.S. 515, 552 (1937));
second, a statute specifically authorized the district court to grant injunctions "necessary or
appropriate for the enforcement of the internal revenue laws." Id. at 380 (quoting 26 U.S.C.
§ 7402(a)).
268. Cf supra note 267.
269. See, eg., EBSCO Indus., Inc. v. Lilly, 840 F.2d 333 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 825
(1988); Roland Mach. Co. v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 749 F.2d 380, 386 (7th Cir. 1984); Itek Corp.
v. First Nat'l Bank of Boston, 730 F.2d 19, 22 (1st Cir. 1984); Barbcuti v. Lysandrou, 559 So. 2d
648, 650 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
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but the continued adherence to the rule without good cause has detri-
mental effects on judicial economy and efficiency.
1. Historical Rationale
The "no adequate remedy at law" requirement was adopted by the
Chancellor not because he believed that the damages remedy at law
was inherently superior to equitable relief, but because he wanted to
reduce the tension that plagued the relationship between the Chancery
and the common law courts during the seventeenth century 270 By
voluntarily refraining from assuming jurisdiction over cases that could
be handled adequately by the law courts, the Chancellor acted to neu-
tralize the friction between the two systems. With the merger of law
and equity into a unitary system,271 this historical reason for prefer-
ring legal remedies to equitable ones disappeared. Thus, unless other
reasons justify judicial restraint in granting equitable relief, courts
should not hesitate to grant preliminary injunctions to freeze assets
even if prejudgment attachment is considered adequate.
2. Revisionist Rationales
Even with the merger of law and equity, courts continue to prefer
legal remedies over equitable ones, and offer modem reasons to sup-
port the "no adequate remedy at law" requirement. None of these
revisionist rationales justifies the judiciary's general preference for pre-
judgment attachment over preliminary injunctions to freeze assets.
a. Due Process Concerns
Courts refrain from granting preliminary injunctive relief out of fear
that they may cause the defendant harm by enjoining her conduct
without the benefit of a fully developed record. 272 This fear is legiti-
mate. But, if anything, it counsels in favor of preliminary injunctions
to freeze assets over prejudgment attachment orders. Over the course
of the last twenty years, the Supreme Court has struck down as viola-
tive of due process several state statutes that authorized prejudgment
attachment, garnishment, or replevin.27 These statutes were held
270. 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 49, at *442; F. W. MAITLAND, EQUITY: A COURSE OF
LECTURES 6-7 (2d ed. 1936); E. Allan Farnsworth, Legal Remedies for Breach of Contract, 70
COLUM. L. REv. 1145, 1154 (1970).
271. See FED. R. CIv. P. I (stating that "these rules govern the procedure in ... all suits of a
civil nature whether cognizable as cases at law or in equity").
272. See supra notes 130-32 and accompanying text; Wasserman, supra note 10, at 660-63.
273. See North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975) (holding
Georgia's prejudgment garnishment statute unconstitutional); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67
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unconstitutional because they permitted the seizure of the defendant's
property without prior notice to the defendant,2 74 without any judicial
involvement,275 without any evidentiary showing on the merits of the
plaintiff's claim,27 6  and without a sufficient showing of exigent
circumstances.277
These problems are largely avoided in the preliminary injunction
context. A judge, not a clerk, hears the request for a preliminary
injunction or a temporary restraining order.2 78 To obtain a prelimi-
nary injunction, the plaintiff must establish, by affidavit or oral testi-
mony, the likelihood of the success of her claim oil the merits; merely
conclusory statements will not do.279 Moreover, the plaintiff must
(1972) (holding Florida's and Pennsylvania's prejudgment replevin statutes unconstitutional);
Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969) (holding Wisconsin's prejudgment
garnishment statute unconstitutional). Most recently, the Supreme Court held unconstitutional,
as applied, the Connecticut statute that authorized prejudgment attachment of real property. See
Connecticut v. Doehr, 111 S. Ct. 2105, 2113 (1991). But see Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416
U.S. 600 (1974) (upholding constitutionality of Louisiana's prejudgment sequestration statute).
274. See Doehr, 111 S. Ct. at 2109 (prejudgment attachment authorized "without affording
prior notice or the opportunity for a prior hearing"); North Georgia Finishing, 419 U.S. at 606
(account impounded "without notice or opportunity for an early hearing"); Fuentes, 407 U.S. at
75 (defendant "is provided no prior notice and allowed no opportunity whatever to challenge the
issuance of the writ"); Sniadach, 395 U.S. at 338 ("notice and an opportunity to be heard are not
given before the in rem seizure of the wages").
275. See North Georgia Finishing, 419 U.S. at 606 (writ of garnshment "issued by a court
clerk.., without participation by a judicial officer"); Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 74 (noting that "court
clerk" is authorized "to issue the writ summarily"); Sniadach, 395 U.S. at 338-39 (noting that
"the clerk of the court issues the summons at the request of the creditor's lawyer; and it is the
latter who by serving the garnishee sets in motion the machinery whereby the wages are frozen").
276. See Doehr, 111 S. Ct. at 2114 ("statute demands inquiry into the sufficiency of the
complaint, or, still less, the plaintiff's good-faith belief that the complaint is sufficient"); North
Georgia Finishing, 419 U.S. at 607 (writ of garnishment issues "on the affidavit of the creditor or
his attorney, and the latter need not have personal knowledge of the facts .... The affidavit...
need contain only conclusory allegations."); Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 74 (noting that applicant need
only recite "in conclusory fashion that he is 'lawfully entitled to the possession' of the property").
277. See Doehr, 11 S. Ct. at 2115 (stating that "there was no showing that [defendant] was
about to transfer or encumber his real estate"); North Georgia Finishing, 419 U.S. at 612 (noting
that garnishment statute required only an "unrevealing assertion of apprehension of loss")
(Powell, J., concurring in judgment); Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 93 (noting that replevin statutes did
not require "a showing of immediate danger that a debtor will destroy or conceal disputed
goods"); Sniadach, 395 U.S. at 339 (stating that "no situation requiring special protection to a
state or creditor interest is presented by the facts").
278. FED. R. Civ. P. 65(b).
279. See, eg., Hoxworth v. Blinder, Robinson, & Co., 903 F.2d 186, 191 (3d Cir. 1990)
(noting that district court "conducted a four-day evidentiary hearing on the preliminary
injunction motion" and based its conclusion regarding likelihood of success on merits on the
evidence adduced at the hearing); Federal Say. & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Dixon, 835 F.2d 554, 558
(5th Cir. 1987) (noting that district court had based its findings in support of preliminary
injunction "on extensive evidence in the form of affidavits, several thousand pages of documents,
business records of earnings, sworn statements, admissions of defendants and their answers to the
complaint, and defendants' apparent efforts to block discovery"); In re DeLorean Motor Co., 755
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demonstrate that she will suffer irreparable harm in the absence of
preliminary relief; the mere desire to obtain security for her judgment
is insufficient.28 Once she has met these requirements for preliminary
injunctive relief, she must post a bond.281
The most serious process problem, of course, is that a temporary
restraining order may issue without any prior notice to the defend-
ant.282 Two responses to this problem can be made, one flip, one not.
The flip answer is that a temporary restraining order is no more viola-
tive of the defendant's due process rights than an ex parte attachment
order, both of which temporarily deprive the defendant of the use of
her property without prior notice. Thus, the due process concerns,
although legitimate, do not justify a blanket preference for attachment
over injunctive relief because they underlie both prejudgment
remedies.
The more compelling answer is that courts will grant temporary
restraining orders without notice only if "it clearly appears from spe-
cific facts shown by affidavit or by the verified complaint that immedi-
ate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to the applicant
before the adverse party or that party's attorney can be heard in oppo-
sition. '2 3 Moreover, the temporary restraining order will expire by
its own terms within a specified period of time not to exceed ten
F.2d 1223, 1230 (6th Cir. 1985) (in concluding that likelihood of success on the merits was
established, appellate court cited testimony establishing that there was a "reasonable possibility"
that property in issue was part of the estate); Hiles v. Auto Bahn Federation, Inc., 498 So. 2d
997, 998 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986) (stating that moving party must "allegeI] and provefi facts
entitling it to relief"); cf Doehr, 111 S. Ct. at 2114 (disparaging the utility of the "skeletal
affidavit" that would satisfy Connecticut's prejudgment attachment statute).
280. See, eg., Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61, 88 (1974) (questioning district court finding
of irreparable harm where "the record... indicates that no witnesses were heard on the issue of
irreparable injury, that respondent's complaint was not verified, and that the affidavit she
submitted ... did not touch in any way upon considerations relevant to irreparable injury");
Hoxworth, 903 F.2d 186, 205 (stating that "'establishing a risk of irreparable harm is not
enough. A plaintiff has the burden of proving a "clear showing of immediate irreparable
injury '" ; reviewing evidence to support district court's finding of irreparable harm) (citations
omitted); In re Marriage of Schmidt, 455 N.E.2d 123, 126 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983) (concluding that
"the allegations that respondent could hide his interests and that petitioner believe[d] that he
would dissipate his assets [were] mere conclusions"; suggesting that a verified petition made only
upon information and belief was insufficient to support a preliminary injunction); Bisca v. Bisca,
437 N.Y.S.2d 258, 262 (Sup. Ct. 1981) (declining to grant preliminary injunction when "there
seems here to be no substantial evidence that defendant ... is about to make transfers which
would impair plaintiff's ability to obtain proper relief").
281. See supra notes 151-52 and accompanying text.
282. See, eg., FED. R. Civ. P. 65(b) (authorizing temporary restraining order "without
written or oral notice to the adverse party or that party's attorney" in limited circumstances).
283. Id.
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days,2 84 and the defendant may appear and move to dissolve the
restraining order expeditiously.28 Although the Supreme Court has
recently reaffirmed that even a temporary deprivation of property is
within the purview of the due process clause,2 6 it likewise noted that
"a properly supported claim [of fraudulent transfer or dissipation of
assets] would be an exigent circumstance permitting postponing any
notice or hearing until after the attachment is effected. 287 Thus, a
properly supported application for a temporary restraining order,
replete with evidence of irreparable tertiary harm, should pass due
process muster, and certainly should create no greater problems in this
regard than prejudgment attachment. Due process concerns, then, do
not justify the continued preference of prejudgment attachment over
preliminary injunctions to freeze assets.
b. Right to Jury Trial
Another modem rationale for preferring legal remedies over equita-
ble ones is that a jury will decide claims seeking the former, while a
judge will hear those seeking the latter.288 Judicial respect for the
right to a jury trial-a right of constitutional dim.ension28 9 -counsels
in favor of legal remedies over equitable ones.
Again, this revisionist rationale for the "no adequate remedy at
law" requirement fails to obtain in the context of preliminary injunc-
tions to freeze assets. A judge (or clerk) rather than a jury will hear
the request for a prejudgment attachment290 as well as the preliminary
injunction, so respect for the right to a jury trial can play no role in
284. Ia
285. Id.
286. Connecticut v. Doehr, 111 S. Ct. 2105, 2115 (1991) (stating that "'the Fourteenth
Amendment draws no bright lines around three-day, 10-day or 50-day deprivations of property.
Any significant taking of property by the State is within the purview of the Due Process
Clause.' ") (quoting Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 86 (1972)).
287. Id. (citing Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 609 (1974); Fuentes, 407 U.S. at
90-92; Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 339 (1969)); see also United States v.
Musson, 802 F.2d 384, 386-87 (10th Cir. 1986) (upholding agairst due process challenge a
restraining order in aid of forfeiture under criminal law issued without a hearing after
indictment); United States v. Keller, 730 F. Supp. 151, 162-63 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (same).
288. Wasserman, supra note 10, at 658.
289. The Seventh Amendment preserves the right to a jury trial "[i]n Suits at common law."
U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
290. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 484.090 (a) (West Supp. 1991) ("the court ... shall
issue a right to attach order"); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-278e (West 1991) ("the court or a
judge... may allow the prejudgment remedy to be issued by an attorney without hearing"); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 76.03 (West 1987) ("attachments shall be issued by a judge of the court"); ILL.
STAT. ANN. ch. 100, 4-104 (Smith-Hurd 1983) ("the court . . . shall enter an order for
attachment").
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deciding between prejudgment attachment and preliminary injunction.
Moreover, the ultimate merits of the plaintiff's claim against the
defendant will be resolved by a jury even if a preliminary injunction
issues,29 and the findings made at the preliminary injunction stage
will not bind this jury.292 Thus, as the Supreme Court has stated, the
right to a jury trial "does not ... interfere with the District Court's
power to grant temporary relief pending a final adjudication on the
merits," '293 and therefore should not influence the choice between a
prejudgment attachment and preliminary injunction.
c. Intrusiveness of Injunctions
Courts typically view equitable remedies as more intrusive than
legal remedies both because the former may command the defendant
to engage in affirmative conduct,294 and because they are enforceable
by contempt proceedings, which threaten imprisonment.295 These
rationales for preferring legal remedies fail in the context of prelimi-
nary relief to prevent tertiary harm because preliminary injunctions to
freeze assets are not very intrusive, and because the legal remedy,
attachment, is far more intrusive.29 6
The preliminary injunction to freeze assets will typically be a pro-
hibitory injunction rather than a mandatory one; it will bar the
291. Wasserman, supra note 10, at 659 (citing Friends For All Children, Inc. v. Lockheed
Aircraft Corp., 746 F.2d 816, 831-32 (D.C. Cir. 1984)).
292. a L at 659 n.137 (citing University of Tex. v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 395 (1981);
Technical Publishing Co. v. Lebhar-Friedman, Inc., 729 F.2d 1136, 1139 (7th Cir. 1984); 11
WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 116, § 2943).
293. Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 479 n.20 (1962) (dicta).
294. Redgrave v. Boston Symphony Orchestra, Inc., 855 F.2d 888, 905 (Ist Cir. 1988)
(noting, in dicta, "the law's typical reluctance to force private citizens to act"), cert denied, 488
U.S. 1043 (1989); Lumley v. Wagner, 42 Eng. Rep. 687, 693 (1852) (stating that "beyond all
doubt this Court could not interfere to enforce the specific performance of the whole of this
contract," which bound defendant to sing at plaintiff's theatre for three months).
295. See Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561, 600 n.5 (1984)
(Blacknun, J., dissenting) (noting that "[a]n enjoined party is required to obey an injunction
issued by a federal court.., even if the injunction turns out.., to have been erroneous, and
failure to obey such an injunction is punishable by contempt"); Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S.
682, 705 (1979) (stating that the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare's duty to comply
with injunctions is enforceable by contempt); Laycock, supra note 119, at 698-99 (noting that
courts "will not enforce money judgments with the contempt power" because of "our aversion to
imprisonment for debt; the adequacy of the legal remedy is irrelevant"); Doug Rendleman, The
Inadequate Remedy at Law Prerequisite for an Injunction, 33 U. FLA. L. REv. 346, 357 (1981)
(noting that "resort to coercive imprisonment may amount to incarceration for a civil debt"); cf.
In re Feit & Drexler, Inc., 760 F.2d 406, 414 (2d Cir. 1985) (noting that defendant had been cited
for civil contempt and imprisoned to coerce compliance with a preliminary injunction that
required her to deliver all of her deliverable property to her attorney as escrow agent).
296. See supra part II.C.3.
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defendant from dissipating her assets. To the extent it requires the
defendant to undertake any affirmative action at all-it may order the
defendant to return to the state property already removed-the pre-
liminary injunction to freeze assets will not require the defendant to
engage in any conduct that could be perceived as offensive or repug-
nant. Thus, while the preliminary injunction will act in personam, it
will not place "substantively unacceptable limitations on [the defend-
ant's] personal freedom. 297
Although a defendant who violates a preliminary injunction may be
held in contempt and subject to imprisonment, the sanction will not be
available merely for failing to satisfy the final money judgment; it will
not be akin to imprisonment for debt. Rather, the defendant will be
sanctioned for violating a court order that barred her from dissipating
assets the court had already determined were not needed for subsis-
tence.298 Weighing the intrusiveness of imprisonment in these circum-
stances, which would be felt only by defendants who intentionally
flouted preliminary injunctions to freeze assets, against the inevitable
intrusiveness of attachment,29 9 which would be felt by all defendants
deprived of the possession and use of their property, it is difficult to see
why the legal remedy should be automatically preferred.
d. Administrability
Especially when considering the availability of structural injunc-
tions, courts hesitate to grant equitable relief because they fear that
they will be overwhelmed by administrative tasks and oversight
responsibilities. 3" These concerns have no place in the choice
between preliminary injunctions to freeze assets and attachment
orders, however. In both situations, the court will have to consider
first whether preliminary relief should issue at all, and, if so, what
property of the defendant's will be attached or frozen."' 1 In the
attachment setting, the judicial machinery will then have to be
deployed to seize the goods and safely keep them.3"2 In the prelimi-
297. Anthony T. Kronman, Specific Performance, 45 U. Cm. L. REv. 351, 372 (1978).
298. See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
299. See supra part II.C.3.
300. Wasserman, supra note 10, at 656 (citing cases and 11 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note
116, § 2944 (noting "the belief that awards of equitable remedies potentially are more
burdensome on the courts than damage remedies because of difficulties in drafting, administering
and enforcing them")).
301. The availability of preliminary injunctive relief to freeze assets should not increase the
demand for interim relief, as the showing required to obtain an injunction will be more rigorous
than that presently required to obtain an attachment order. See supra parts I.A and III.
302. See supra notes 97-98 and accompanying text.
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nary injunction context, on the other hand, no judicial effort will be
required to implement the injunction.
Of course, judicial resources may be needed to enforce the injunc-
tion, but they should not be great. The plaintiff will have every incen-
tive to police the defendant's behavior and to report noncompliance to
the court. The plaintiff may actually reduce the likelihood of violation
by notifying banks and securities firms with which the defendant has
accounts that an injunction has been entered against the defendant.3"3
Although the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not appear to
authorize the plaintiff to discover "facts about a defendant's financial
status ... prior to judgment with execution unsatisfied," 3" arguably
such matters are "relevant to the subject matter involved in the pend-
ing action"30 5 once the court has issued a preliminary injunction
against dissipation of assets. Even if such discovery is not technically
authorized by the rules, the court should have authority under the All
Writs Act to order discovery (to be taken by the plaintiff) reasonably
tailored to ensure compliance with the preliminary injunction.30 6 If
303. This procedure has enhanced compliance with Mareva injunctions issued in England.
See supra note 174.
304. FED. R. Civ. P. 26 advisory committee notes to 1970 amendments. Compare Ranney-
Brown Distribs., Inc. v. E.T. Barwick Indus., Inc., 75 F.R.D. 3, 5 (S.D. Ohio 1977) (stating that
"[o]rdinarily, Rule 26 will not permit the discovery of facts concerning a defendant's financial
status, or ability to satisfy a judgment, since such matters are not relevant, and cannot lead to the
discovery of admissible evidence") and Gangemi v. Moor, 268 F. Supp. 19, 21-22 (D. Del. 1967)
(denying discovery of defendant's assets prior to judgment) with Miller v. Doctor's Gen.
Hospital, 76 F.R.D. 136, 140 (W.D. Okla. 1977) (stating that "where punitive damages are
claimed, it has been generally held that the Defendant's financial condition is relevant to the
subject matter of the action and is thus a proper subject of pretrial discovery") and Holliman v.
Redman Development Corp., 61 F.R.D. 488, 490-91 (D.S.C. 1973) (holding that a defendant's
pecuniary condition is relevant on the issue of punitive damages). Cf FED. R. Civ. P. 69(a)
(stating that "in aid of the judgment or execution, the judgment creditor . . . may obtain
discovery from any person, including the judgment debtor, in the manner provided in these rules
or in the manner provided by the practice of the state in which the district court is held").
305. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b).
306. See 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (1988) (providing that federal courts "may issue all writs
necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and
principles of law"); Kemp v. Peterson, 940 F.2d 110, 113 (4th Cir. 1991) (affirming district court
order that required defendants to submit biweekly or monthly reports itemizing their business
and personal expenses so the magistrate could monitor their compliance with a preliminary
injunction freezing their assets; stating that "a court is authorized to issue all orders necessary to
enforce orders it has previously issued in the exercise of its jurisdiction"); Federal Sav. & Loan
Ins. Corp. v. Dixon, 835 F.2d 554, 557 (5th Cir. 1987) (upholding preliminary injuction that
required "the defendants ... to maintain itemized monthly accountings of their expenditures");
New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 763 F.2d 49, 53 (2d Cir. 1985) (upholding district court order
granting discovery in aid of a permanent injunction, regardless of whether such discovery was
authorized by FED. R. CIv. P. 69; relying on § 1651 for the proposition that "the District Court
had ample authority to issue all orders necessary for the enforcement of its [injunction]"); see
also infra notes 393-96 and accompanying text (discussing the availability of discovery in
Washington Law Review
discovery is permitted, the plaintiff will be well-situated to police com-
pliance with the injunction.
In the event the plaintiff alleges that the defendant has violated the
preliminary injunction, the court will have to hold a contempt hearing
and may have to impose sanctions. But these burdens, which will be
borne only in instances of noncompliance, probably do not outweigh
the burdens routinely borne in attachment proceedings, which require
the seizure and maintenance of the defendant's property in all cases.
Thus, administrability concerns do not justify a blanket preference of
prejudgment attachment over preliminary injunctions to freeze assets.
e. Jurisdiction and Federalism
The "no adequate remedy at law" requirement "is often invoked to
serve its original purpose of allocating jurisdiction among deci-
sionmakers."' a 7 Within the state system, where the choice is between
attachment under state statute and a preliminary injunction governed
by state equitable principles, jurisdictional concerns should not matter
so long as the courts are careful not to use equity to evade legislatively
crafted limitations on the attachment remedy. 08
In the federal system, on the other hand, the choice is between
attachment under state law pursuant to Rule 64309 and preliminary
injunctive relief governed by federal equitable principles pursuant to
Rule 65 .310 Here, jurisdictional/federalism issues can crop up, but are
masked by the "no adequate remedy at law" requirement.
England in aid of the Mareva injunction); United States v. Regan, 858 F.2d 115, 121 (2d Cir.
1988) (upholding district court order in criminal RICO action, which directed a partnership
formed by defendants to allow a government-appointed monitor to review at least twice monthly
the partnership's books and records to ensure compliance with a pre-conviction restraining
order).
307. Laycock, supra note 119, at 732.
308. See supra part II.C.1 and infra part IV.C.
309. Rule 64 (which has not been amended since it was originally adopted in 1938, 11
WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 116, § 2931; 7 JAMES WM. MOORE & Jo DESHA LucAs,
MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 64.01[l] (1991)) provides that
at the commencement of and during the course of an action, all remedies providing for
seizure of person or property for the purpose of securing satisfaction of the judgment
ultimately to be entered in the action are available under the circumstances and in the
manner provided by the law of the state in which the district court is held, existing at the
time the remedy is sought.
FED. R. CIV. P. 64.
310. Prior to the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, equity jurisdiction in the
federal courts was drawn from English equity procedure and was governed by the federal courts'
own Equity Rules. See 2 MOORE & LucAs, supra note 309, 2.03; 11 WRIGHT & MILLER,
supra note 116, § 2941; Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. Rv. 909, 931 (1987). The
Supreme Court promulgated the first set of federal equity rules in 1822, and a second set in 1843.
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The issue should not be whether legal or equitable remedies are
preferable, but rather, whether state or federal law should govern the
availability of preliminary relief in federal court. Professors Wright
and Miller conclude that:
[A federal] plaintiff should be able to obtain a temporary restraining
order or a preliminary injunction to preserve the status quo even though
he is suing to enforce a state right and those devices are not provided for
by the forum's law or are available only upon a different showing than is
required under Rule 65.311
Professors Moore and Lucas, on the other hand, suggest that under
Erie:
[T]he parties [in a diversity case] are entitled to the same substantial
treatment they would get in the same court. If, for example, the Dela-
ware state court will not give the coercive relief of an injunction but will
award damages then the plaintiff in the federal court across the street is
entitled only to damages, and the defendant should not be subjected to
312an injunction.
Resolution of this question requires consideration of the "relations
between state and federal courts," not of "relations between law and
2 MOORE & LucAs, supra note 309, 2.03 (citing 7 Wheat. v (1822) and 17 Pet. lxi (1842)). The
citation to 17 Pet. is incorrect, as the second set of equity rules were published at 42 U.S. (1
How.) lxi (1843).
Largely taken from Equity Rule 73 and sections of the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 738, 28 U.S.C.
§§ 381-383 (1940), superseded by FED. R. Civ. P. 65, repealed by Judicial Code Revision Act of
1948, Rule 65 restates the former federal practice in injunction actions. 7 MooRE & LucAs,
supra note 309, 64.03; 11 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 116, § 2941.
311. 11 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 116, § 2943 at 390-91 (relying on Hanna v. Plumer,
380 U.S. 460 (1965), and the proposition that "the application of the federal rule to requests for
preliminary injunctions or temporary restraining orders would not impair state interests in any
substantial way").
312. 2 MOORE & LucAs, supra note 309, 2.09; accord 7 MOORE & LucAs, supra note 309,
64.04[3], at 64-21, 65.18[1], at 65-170.
In all events, a preliminary injunction to freeze assets in a diversity action is not a "remed[y]
providing for seizure of person or property for the purpose of securing satisfaction of the
judgment ultimately to be entered in the action," and therefore is not within the purview of Rule
64. 7 MOORE & LucAs, supra note 309, 64.0413], at 64-19 to 64-21 (concluding that "the
equitable injunctive remedy is not a 'corresponding' or 'equivalent' remedy within the
intendment of Rule 64"; noting that the "statutory predecessor of Rule 64 dealt only with
provisional remedies available in actions at law"); id, 65.02[2] (stating that "Rule 64 does not
deal with the equitable remedy of injunction. Therefore, state law is not applicable to the
equitable injunctive remedy by virtue of Rule 64."). But see In re Feit & Drexler, Inc., 760 F.2d
406, 415 n.2 (2d Cir. 1985) (raising the possibility that a preliminary injunction to freeze assets
could be construed as a "remed[y] providing for seizure of person or property for the purpose of
securing satisfaction of the judgment ultimately to be entered in the action," in which case the
federal court arguably should apply the state law standard for determining whether or not such
an injunction is available in the circumstances of the case).
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equity." '313 The "no adequate remedy at law" requirement has no
place in this inquiry, and only confuses the proper question regarding
the equitable powers of federal courts in diversity cases.3 t4
3. Judicial Economy and Efficiency
Given the number of published opinions that consider the issue, it
appears that courts take the "no adequate remedy at law" requirement
seriously and therefore spend enormous amounts of time considering
whether they even have authority in money damages actions to issue
preliminary injunctions to freeze assets.315 In many of these cases, the
plaintiff can make a strong showing that some interim relief is needed
to prevent active tertiary harm. In cases where an attachment order is
the most likely alternative, a defendant's opposition to preliminary
injunctive relief is understandable only to delay the grant of relief, to
force the plaintiff to expend additional resources to obtain necessary
relief, or to obfuscate the issue sufficiently to avoid the grant of relief
altogether. In cases where the plaintiff can make a strong showing on
all four requirements for preliminary injunctive relief, it is difficult to
understand "why we have a rule that encourages the parties to liti-
gate" '316 the question of authority to issue equitable relief.
Judicial resources are expended not only on the primary question of
whether courts have authority to issue preliminary injunctions in
money damages cases, but also by appellate courts on the secondary
question of appealability. Again, based on the number of published
opinions that address the issue, appellate courts apparently spend sub-
stantial amounts of time first characterizing the relief in issue as an
attachment or a preliminary injunction,317 and then, depending upon
313. Laycock, supra note 119, at 736.
314. A sixth revisionist rationale for the "no adequate remedy at law requirement" will be
addressed separately in part IV.C. because it has been specifically relied upon by courts that have
denied preliminary injunctions to freeze assets.
315. See, eg., supra notes 187, 188, and 190 (citing cases).
316. Laycock, supra note 119, at 723.
317. See, eg., General Motors Corp. v. Gibson Chem. & Oil Corp., 786 F.2d 105, 108 (2d
Cir. 1986) (declining to decide whether an order confirming an ex part! order authorizing the
seizure of goods, which allegedly infringed plaintiff's trademark, wvas "equivalent" to a
preliminary injunction or an order of attachment because there was no showing that the order
might have a "serious, perhaps irreparable, consequence" and could be "effectually challenged"
only by immediate appeal; holding that seizure order was not reviewable under collateral order
doctrine); Teradyne, Inc. v. Mostek Corp., 797 F.2d 43, 45-47 (1st Cir. 1986) (characterizing an
order, which enjoined defendant from disposing of or encumbering $4 million of its assets and
directing it to set aside that amount in an interest-bearing account, as a preliminary injunction
appealable under § 1292(a)(1) because it created a "significant constraint," it had been treated by
district court and parties as an injunction, and it ordered defendant to refrain from certain
conduct and to affirmatively take certain conduct); In re Feit & Drexler, Inc., 760 F.2d 406, 412
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the classification, deciding whether or not an interlocutory appeal may
be taken from the grant, denial, or vacatur of the order.31 8 It is unfor-
(2d Cir. 1985) (characterizing an order, which continued prior orders that "prohibited a party
from transferring or disposing of any of her property, wherever located, and which ordered her
to deliver all of her deliverable property, wherever located, to her attorney in New York as
escrow agent," as an appealable preliminary injunction); Inter-Regional Fin. Group, Inc. v.
Hashemi, 562 F.2d 152, 154 (2d Cir. 1977) (holding that district court order, which required
defendant to bring stock certificates into the state from their locations in other states and
countries so that they could be attached, was an injunction and therefore appealable), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1046 (1978); Rosenfeldt v. Comprehensive Accounting Serv. Corp., 514 F.2d
607, 610-11 (7th Cir. 1975) (holding that portions of district court order, which restrained
counterclaim-defendants from soliciting and collecting fees from specified clients and required
them to deliver accounts to counterclaim-plaintitf, were the "functional equivalents" of a writ of
attachment or replevin, and therefore were not appealable; but portion that restrained
counterclaim-defendants from instituting an action in bankruptcy court was an appealable
preliminary injunction); United States v. Estate of Pearce, 498 F.2d 847, 850 (3d Cir. 1974)
(Gibbons, J., dissenting) (concluding that denial of motion to quash prejudgment sequestration
was appealable under § 1292(a)(1) because "it is functionally identical with an injunction against
transfer or the appointment of a pendente lite receiver").
318. Although both state and federal appellate courts have routinely permitted parties to
appeal from the grants, denials or vacaturs of preliminary injunctions that enjoin parties from
dissipating assets, see, eg., Illinois ex reL Hartigan v. Peters, 861 F.2d 164 (7th Cir. 1988); Felt,
760 F.2d at 411-12; Ettridge v. TSI Group, Inc., 548 A.2d 813, 817 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1988);
Federal Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n v. O'Donnell, 446 So. 2d 395, 399 (La. Ct. App. 1984), some
federal courts have first grappled with the question whether the movant must establish that
deferring appellate review would cause irreparable injury. See, eg., Holmes v. Fisher, 854 F.2d
229, 231 (7th Cir. 1988); Gibson, 786 F.2d at 108.
Federal courts have generally held that district court orders denying a prejudgment
attachment (or vacating an attachment) are appealable as final "collateral orders" within the
meaning of Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949), see, eg., Interpool
Ltd. v. Char Yigh Marine (Panama) S.A., 890 F.2d 1453 (9th Cir. 1989); American Oil Co. v.
McMullin, 433 F.2d 1091, 1096 (10th Cir. 1970); Chilean Line, Inc. v. United States, 344 F.2d
757, 759 (2d Cir. 1965); see also 11 WRIGrr & MILLER, supra note 116, § 2936, but that district
court orders granting an attachment (or refusing to vacate one) are not appealable. See, eg.,
Perpetual Am. Bank v. Terrestrial Sys., Inc., 811 F.2d 504, 505-06 (9th Cir. 1987) (per curiam);
Inter-Regional Fin. Group, Inc. v. Hashemi, 562 F.2d 152, 154 (2d Cir. 1977), cerL denied, 434
U.S. 1046 (1978); W.T. Grant Co. v. Haines, 531 F.2d 671, 678 (2d Cir. 1976); see also 11
WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 116, § 2936.
State court rulings on the appealability of attachment orders are even more difficult to
categorize. See M.L. Schellenger, Annotation, Appealability, Prior to Final Judgment, of Order
Discharging or Vacating Attachment or Refusing to Do So, 19 A.L.R.2D 640 (1951 & Later Case
Service 1982 & Supp. 1991) (reviewing and attempting to categorize state court decisions
regarding appealability of orders regarding prejudgment attachment). Some states permit an
immediate appeal from the grant, denial, confirmation or vacatur of an attachment order, either
by characterizing such judicial action as "final," see, eg., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-2781
(West Supp. 1991), or by authorizing an appeal irrespective of finality. See, e.g., N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 42-9-34 (Michie 1978); N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. § 5701(a)(2)(i) (McKinney 1978); OHIO
REv. CODE ANN. § 2715.46 (Anderson Supp. 1990); PA. R. App. P. 311(a)(2). Other states, in
deciding questions of appealability, distinguish between orders granting or confirming or refusing
to vacate attachments, on the one hand, and orders denying or vacating attachments, on the
other. See, eg., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 904.1(e) (West Supp. 1991); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 639.65 (West 1950); International Typographical Union Negotiated Pension Plan v. Ad
Compositors, Inc., 191 Cal. Rptr. 227, 228 n.1 (Cal Ct. App. 1983); Hamilton v. Hanks, 309 So.
329
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tunate that the confusion regarding the availability of preliminary
injunctions to freeze assets has forced both trial and appellate courts to
"squander[ ] on jurisdictional matters time needed to decide the case
on the merits."31 9 When a plaintiff seeking interim relief from active
tertiary harm can satisfy all of the requirements for preliminary
injunctive relief and the reasons for preferring legal remedies over
equitable ones fail to obtain, this expenditure of scarce judicial
resources on "jurisdictional matters" is difficult to justify.
C. Exclusivity and Evasion
"Litigants sometimes appeal to a court's general equity powers to
evade more particular rules of law."32 In fact, several courts have
denied preliminary injunctions to freeze assets because they concluded
that the plaintiff was seeking injunctive relief in an effort to circumvent
particular statutory requirements contained in the prejudgment
attachment statute, or because the plaintiff was attempting to evade
the statute altogether by seeking relief that was not authorized
thereby. Concluding that the attachment statute offers exclusive relief
from tertiary harm, some courts have declined to grant preliminary
injunctions to freeze assets.321
In some states, concern that the legislature intended attachment to
be an exclusive remedy will be easily allayed by reference to other stat-
utes enacted by the same legislature, which permit courts to grant pre-
liminary injunctions to prevent the dissipation of assets. 322 Where
2d 229 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975); Stahlman Lumber Co. v. Ferrill, 320 So. 2d 331, 333 (La. Ct.
App. 1975); Casco N. Bank, N.A. v. Moore, 583 A.2d 697, 698-99 (Me. 1990); McQuade v. E.D.
Sys. Corp., 570 S.W.2d 33, 34-35 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978); Bowden v. W.H. Hunt, 571 S.W.2d 550,
550-51 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978).
319. Holmes v. Fisher, 854 F.2d 229, 231 (7th Cir. 1988) (refusing to read into § 1292(a)(1) a
requirement that appellant show that denial of immediate review would cause irreparable injury
when the order under review unambiguously denied an injunction). If trial courts were free to
issue preliminary injunctions to freeze assets without regard to the adequacy of the legal remedy,
they might be more willing to characterize the relief they grant as a preliminary injunction. If
they were, appellate courts would waste less time on the preliminary question of appealability
since the availability of an interlocutory appeal from the grant or denial of a preliminary
injunction is relatively well-established. See supra note 318.
320. Laycock, supra note 119, at 752. Laycock argues, and this author agrees that "the real
question in these cases is whether the more particular law controls," not "whether the less
particular theory is legal or equitable." Id. at 752, 754.
321. See, e.g., supra note 191 (citing cases).
322. See, eg., ARiz. Rv. STAT. ANN. § 12-1801 (1982) (authorizing injunction "when,
pending litigation, it appears that a party... threatens or is about to do some act.., in violation
of the rights of the applicant, which would tend to render the judgment ineffectual"); CAL. CIV.
PROC. CODE §§ 486.030, 486.050, 486.070 (1979) (permitting court to grant a temporary
protective order in lieu of writ of attachment if it "would be in the interest of justice and equity to
the parties"; such order may prohibit transfer by defendant only ef her property in the state
330
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express statutory authority exists for the grant of a preliminary injunc-
tion to prevent active tertiary harm, courts err in concluding that
attachment is the exclusive prejudgment remedy.
Nevertheless, concerns about evasion of legislatively enacted policy
may justify the denial of preliminary injunctive relief in particular
cases. If, for example, a plaintiff seeks a preliminary injunction to
freeze assets rather than attachment in an effort to enjoin the defend-
ant's use of her wages (which would be exempt from attachment), a
court could legitimately decline to "undermine[ ] a policy that the
court or legislature is committed to preserving, ' 323 and refuse to grant
the preliminary injunction.324  In enacting the wage exemption, the
legislature intended to shield some of the defendant's assets from pre-
judgment orders, and courts should honor that legislative policy.
Likewise, if a plaintiff seeks a preliminary injunction under a rule
that permits the court to waive the bond requirement, and if the
attachment statute requires a bond in an amount equal to twice the
value of the property attached, a court might legitimately refrain from
granting the injunction (or at least from waiving the bond require-
ment). In enacting the double bond requirement for attachment, the
legislature intended to protect defendants from any harm they might
suffer as a result of an erroneous attachment and perhaps to deter
plaintiffs from seeking prejudgment attachment. To permit the plain-
tiff to obtain protection from tertiary harm without complying with
any bond requirement would undermine this legislative policy.
If, on the other hand, a plaintiff seeks to freeze property that the
defendant has already taken overseas with the intent to defraud credi-
tors, prejudgment attachment will be ineffective because it cannot
reach property outside the state. In providing that the sheriff can
subject to levy on writ of attachment); IDAHO R. Civ. P. 65(e)(4) (preliminary injunction may be
granted "[w]hen it appears, by affidavit, that the defendant during the pendency of the action,
threatens, or is about to remove, or to dispose of his property with intent to defraud the
plaintiff"); MiNN. STAT. ANN. §§ 570.026, 571.932 (West 1988 & Supp. 1991) (ifcourt finds that
plaintiff has made requisite showing for attachment or garnishment but declines to issue order
because harm to defendant might outweigh harm to plaintiff without attachment, or for other
reason, court may restrain defendant from selling, disposing, or otherwise encumbering the
property); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-06-02 (1976) (authorizing temporary injunction "[w]hen,
during the pendency of an action, it shall appear by affidavit that the defendant threatens, or is
about to remove or dispose of his property, with intent to defraud his creditors").
323. Laycock, supra note 119, at 754.
324. See, eg., Allstate Sales & Leasing Co. v. Geis, 412 N.W.2d 30, 33 (Minn. App. 1987)
("By obtaining injunctive relief rather than proceeding under the [attachment] statute, Allstate
was able, in effect, to attach appellants' assets without making the showing required by the
statute or affording appellants the statute's protections. Such injunctive relief frustrates the
intent of the legislature.").
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attach only property within the county or state, the legislature most
probably was cognizant of the limited authority of the sheriff and the
enforcement difficulties that would result if the statute purported to
authorize extraterritorial attachment. It is less likely that the legisla-
ture intended to shield property fraudulently taken overseas from any
prejudgment remedy. In such a case, then, the plaintiff's invocation of
equity would "fill[ ] a gap or correct[] an injustice that the court is
empowered to correct .... This is indeed a traditional function of
substantive equity." '325 Thus, even though attachment could not reach
the assets removed from the state, a mandatory preliminary injunction
to require the defendant to bring the assets back would not undercut
any state policy or circumvent any procedural protection. It would,
however, provide the plaintiff with protection against active tertiary
harm that would not be available using the prejudgment attachment
remedy. On these facts, the preliminary injunction probably should
issue.
Concerns about evasion or circumvention of legislative policy will
not justify an automatic preference in all cases fbr the legal remedy,
prejudgment attachment. Courts will have to "focus directly on the
... substantive policies" '326 embodied in the attachment statutes, and
ask whether issuance of a preliminary injunction in lieu of an attach-
ment order would undercut those policies. Only in cases where the
risk of evasion is real should courts refuse to grant preliminary injunc-
tions out of respect for the attachment statutes.
V. USE OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIONS TO SECURE
MONEY JUDGMENTS IN OTHER CONTEXTS
The use of preliminary injunctions to avoid terfiary harm is not
unprecedented. In cases in which the plaintiff's underlying claim is an
equitable one-where she asserts a preexisting interest in the property
subject to dispute, for example-American courts have routinely
issued preliminary injunctions to freeze the assets to secure a future
equitable decree. 27 Likewise, courts in matrimonial litigation have
issued preliminary injunctions to prevent a spouse from dissipating
assets during the pendency of a divorce proceeding. Finally, even in
actions at law for money damages only, courts in England are author-
ized to issue preliminary injunctions called Mareva injunctions, which
325. Laycock, supra note 119, at 754.
326. Id.
327. See supra note 8.
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bar the dissipation of assets pending trial. These three classes of cases
demonstrate the efficacy of preliminary injunctions to freeze assets.
A. The American Experience With Preliminary Injunctions to
Freeze Assets
1. Preliminary Injunctions in Equitable Actions Seeking the Return
of Money
Courts have often issued preliminary injunctions to freeze assets in
actions in which the plaintiff stated a claim for final equitable relief
and alleged irreparable tertiary harm. 28 In declining to issue a pre-
liminary injunction to freeze assets in a case in which the plaintiff
sought a remedy at law, money damages, the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals distinguished the equity cases:
The cases cited by the plaintiffs and the district court upholding prelimi-
nary injunctions freezing assets fall into categories none of which is
applicable here. First, as the Court stated in De Beers, an injunction
may issue to protect assets that are the subject of the dispute or to enjoin
conduct that might be enjoined under a final order.3 29
In a number of other cases, most of which the district court cited, this
court and others have upheld preliminary injunctions to preserve the
particular assets in dispute in actions that were essentially in rem.330
328. See supra note 8.
329. In re Fredeman Litig., 843 F.2d 821, 827 (5th Cir. 1988) (citing Productos Carnic, S.A.
v. Central Am. Beef& Seafood Trading Co., 621 F.2d 683, 686 (5th Cir. 1980) (affirming grant of
preliminary injunction to enjoin movement of goods even if plaintiff's ultimate remedy were
limited to damages for breach of contract because unless goods could be levied upon, money
judgment would be unenforceable; but holding that plaintiff had remedies other than damages
available, including replevin); USACO Coal Co. v. Carbomin Energy, Inc., 689 F.2d 94, 97-98
(6th Cir. 1982) (upholding preliminary injunction that froze defendant's assets because it secured
plaintiffs' claim for restitution and a constructive trust, not treble damages under RICO; citing
Deckert for the proposition that "the power of the district court to preserve a fund or property
which may be the subject of a final decree is well established")); see also, eg., Republic of
Philippines v. Marcos, 862 F.2d 1355, 1361, 1364 (9th Cir. 1988) (en banc), cert. denied, 490 U.S.
1035 (1989); Federal Say. & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Dixon, 835 F.2d 554, 562 (5th Cir. 1987);
Republic of Philippines v. Marcos, 806 F.2d 344, 355-56 (2d Cir. 1986); In re De Lorean Motor
Co., 755 F.2d 1223, 1227 (6th Cir. 1985); Federal Trade Comm'n v. H.N. Singer, Inc., 668 F.2d
1107, 1112 (9th Cir. 1982); Taxpayers Against Fraud v. Link Flight Simulation Corp., 722 F.
Supp. 1248, 1255 (D. Md. 1989); Korn v. Ambassador Homes, Inc., 546 So. 2d 756, 757 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (per curiam); Levitt v. Maryland Deposit Ins. Fund Corp., 505 A.2d 140,
147 (Md. App. 1986).
330. Fredeman, 843 F.2d at 827 (citing Treasure Salvors, Inc. v. Unidentified Wrecked &
Abandoned Sailing Vessel, 640 F.2d 560 (5th Cir. 1981) (an admiralty action, modifying and
affirming preliminary injunction that enjoined individuals from interfering with plaintiff's search
and salvage operations of 1622 Spanish sailing vessel); Meis v. Sanitas Serv. Corp., 511 F.2d 655,
658 (5th Cir. 1975) (an action to rescind a corporate merger agreement allegedly induced by
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Although issuance of a preliminary injunction in these cases secures
the final equitable relief sought-restitution, rescission or constructive
trust-often the plaintiffs in these equitable actions seek nothing more
than the return of a fund of money. Although a plaintiff's claim to
money that was originally hers is theoretically different from a claim
to money as damages only, the harm the plaintiff suffers in the two
actions as a practical matter is identical if the defendant dissipates the
fund: she suffers irreparable tertiary harm because she can never col-
lect on her judgment or enforce her decree. Thus, the interim equita-
ble measures used to prevent tertiary harm to the plaintiff seeking final
equitable relief should serve as models for the preliminary injunctions
to freeze assets in money damages cases advocated here.
2. Preliminary Injunctions in Divorce Actions
Courts in matrimonial actions have commonly issued preliminary
injunctions to freeze assets, and thus prevent spouses from transferring
or encumbering their property during the pendency of the divorce liti-
gation.3 31 Although many states authorize such preliminary relief by
misrepresentations, affirming grant of preliminary injunction that enjoined defendant purchaser
from "removing any of the assets, books and records from the corporation which belonged to it
immediately prior to the merger... [and] in any way handling corporate assets except as may be
reasonably necessary in the ordinary course of business and in accordance with good corporate
business practices"); Foltz v. U.S. News & World Rep., 760 F.2d 1300, 1309 (D.C. Cir. 1985)
(directing the district court to reconsider request for preliminary injunction to restrain profit-
sharing plan from distributing all its assets pending litigation of claim against plan; stating that
"an equitable remedy designed to freeze the status quo, as opposed to creating a pool of resources
from which members of the plaintiff class could draw prior to a determination of liability and the
extent... of damages, would be entirely in keeping with the principles that undergird equity
jurisprudence"), on remand, 613 F. Supp. 634 (D.D.C. 1985) (granting preliminary injunction
against distribution of plan assets in an amount equal to the amount plaintiffs realistically could
recover from the plan plus 6% prejudgment interest); Tri-State Generation & Transmission
Ass'n v. Shoshone River Power, Inc., 805 F.2d 351 (10th Cir. 1986) (reversing denial of
preliminary injunction to enjoin sale by member cooperative of its assets in action for permanent
injunction barring sale)); see also People v. Superior Court, 264 Cal. Rptr. 28, 29 (Cal. Ct. App.
1989) (directing trial court to reconsider request for preliminary injunction to enjoin defense
attorneys from disposing of monies paid to them by clients with "drug money"; noting that "the
forfeiture action is not a suit for money damages, but an action for the return of property which,
in this case, happens to be money").
331. 2 HOMER H. CLARK, THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES
§ 15.6 (2d ed. 1987); JOANNE Ross WILDER et al., PENNSYLVANIA FAMILY LAW PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE HANDBOOK § 12-2 (2d ed. 1989) (noting that "the court may issue injunctions
and may attach property to prevent the disposition, alienation or encumbrance of property in
order to defeat equitable distribution, alimony pendente lite, alimony, child and spousal support
or similar award"). Courts in matrimonial actions also have authority to make awards of
temporary alimony, 2 CLARK, supra, § 17.2, which, like preliminary injunctions that enjoin
conduct, "prevent additional primary conduct that threatens secondary harm (i.e., cutting off
support of the dependent spouse)." Wasserman, supra note 10, at 668.
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statute,332 courts have granted it without statutory authority, invoking
"the inherent power of equity courts to give whatever incidental relief
may be necessary to make their decrees effective. 333
To obtain such preliminary relief, the dependent spouse must
demonstrate that the supporting spouse intends to transfer the prop-
erty and that the transfer would prejudice the dependent spouse's
claim to the property either because the dependent spouse "had an
interest in the property as such, or because it would disable the [sup-
porting spouse] from making payments for alimony or support. '3 34
Thus, even where the dependent spouse does not claim a property
interest in the assets, he or she may obtain a preliminary injunction to
enjoin the supporting spouse from dissipating assets if they would be
needed to satisfy the pending claim for alimony or support.335 To the
extent, then, that claims for alimony and money damages are analo-
332. 2 CLARK, supra note 331, § 15.6, at 92 n.2; see, eg., CAL. Civ. CODE § 4359 (West
Supp. 1991) (authorizing issuance of ex parte orders to restrain transfer, encumbrance,
hypothecation, concealment or disposition of property except in usual course of business or for
necessities of life, and to require party to account for all extraordinary expenditures); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 40, 501(2) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1991) (authorizing issuance of temporary restraining
order or preliminary injunction only if motion is "accompanied by affidavit showing a factual
basis" for the relief sought); N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 234 (McKinney 1986) (interpreted as
permitting court to restrain a party from hiding or disposing of assets during pendency of
matrimonial litigation; party seeking relief need not seek preliminary injunction per se, but must
demonstrate that party to be restrained has done, or is threatening to do, an act that would
prejudice movant's equitable distribution claim); UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT
§ 304, 9A U.L.A. 201 (1987) (authorizing issuance of temporary injunction to restrain transfer,
encumbrance, concealment or disposition of property except in usual course of business or for
necessities of life and to require notification of any proposed extraordinary expenditures).
333. 2 CLARK, supra note 331, § 15.6 at 92-93 (citing National Automobile & Casualty Ins.
Co. v. Queck, 405 P.2d 905 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1965); McRae v. McRae, 52 So. 2d 908 (Fla. 1951);
Klajbor v. Klajbor, 75 N.E.2d 353 (Il1. 1947)); see also Pennington v. Fourth Nat'l Bank, 243
U.S. 269 (1917) (upholding preliminary injunction enjoining bank from paying out balance in
account to husband pending determination of wife's suit for alimony; quasi-in-rem jurisdiction
obtained by attaching defendant's property via preliminary injunction against bank).
334. 2 CLARK, supra note 331, § 15.6, at 94 (footnotes omitted); see also WILDER et al., supra
note 331, § 12-3, at 117 (stating that "the standard for the grant or denial of requests for
equitable relief under the [Pennsylvania] Divorce Code follows the law respecting equitable relief
generally").
335. See, ag., Sandstrom v. Sandstrom, 565 So. 2d 914, 914 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (per
curiam) (stating that wife may "seek to enjoin the husband's removal, concealment or fraudulent
conveyance of his assets which may be part of her alimony award in the plan of equitable
distribution"); Lupo v. Lupo, 366 So. 2d 932, 934 (La. Ct. App. 1978) (affirming grant of
preliminary injunction that barred husband from alienating property even though there was "a
dispute as to the separate or community nature of a portion of these funds"); Hempel v. Hempel,
30 N.W.2d 594, 599 (Minn. 1948) (stating that "in a divorce case, the court may issue a
temporary injunction restraining the husband from disposing of his property and income during
the pendency of the case, where it appears that contemplated transfers thereof would defeat the
wife's claims to alimony"); Petrus v. Petrus, 199 N.E.2d 579, 581 (Ohio 1964) (stating that court
has "full power and authority in domestic relations cases to preserve the status quo... until such
335
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gous, 336 the preliminary injunctions to freeze assets that issue in
divorce cases provide additional support for preliminary injunctions to
freeze assets in money damages cases.
B. The English Experience with Mareva Injunctions337
Like American courts, English courts hesitated to grant any form of
preliminary equitable relief in actions in which the plaintiff sought a
money judgment as her final remedy. 3 In fact, no legal restraint
whatsoever existed to inhibit concealment or dissipation of assets or
time as the court can dispose of the alimony or support problems or a division of property")
(emphasis added).
In states that "permit the courts in divorce cases to divide all the property owned by either
spouse, regardless of when or how acquired," 2 CLARK, supra note 331, § 16.1, this issue will not
arise. See also UNIFORM MARITAL PROP. ACT § 4(b), 9A U.L.A. 108 (1987) (stating that "all
property of spouses is presumed to be marital property").
336. The claims are analogous in that each seeks a transfer of money from one party to
another without the transferee alleging any pre-existing interest in the money sought to be
transferred. To the extent that "alimony can also serve as compensation to the [spouse] for
faithful service during marriage," 2 CLARK, supra note 331, § 17.5, at 255, a claim for alimony is
analogous to a claim seeking money damages for breach of contract.
337. For a thorough discussion of Mareva injunctions, see MARION HETHERINGTON,
MAREVA INJUNCTIONS (1983); RICHARD N. OUGH, THE MAREVA INJUNCTION AND THE
ANTON PILLER ORDER: PRACTICE AND PRECEDENTS (1987). For a discussion of Mareva
injunctions in the arbitration context, see Shenton, supra note 174; David L. Zicherman, Note,
The Use of Pre-Judgment Attachments and Temporary Injunctions in International Commercial
Arbitration Proceedings: A Comparative Analysis of the British and American Approaches, 50 U.
PrrT. L. REV. 667 (1989).
Mareva injunctions have been granted in most common law jurisdictions that follow English
law, including Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Malaysia, Hong Kong and Singapore. OUGH,
supra, §§ 8.0-8.6, at 93-94.
338. HETHERINGTON, supra note 337, at 3 ("before 1975 the zourts would not grant an
injunction to restrain a defendant from disposing of his assets pendente lite merely because the
plaintiff feared that by the time he obtained judgment the defendant would have no assets against
which execution could be levied"); Nippon Yusen Kaisha v. Karageorgis, [1975] 3 All Eng. Rep.
282, 283 (C.A.) (noting that "[i]t has never been the practice of the English courts to seize assets
of a defendant in advance of judgment, or to restrain the disposal of them"); see, e.g., Mills v.
Northern Ry. of Buenos Ayres, 5 L.R.-Ch. 621, 628 (Ch. App. 1870) (Eng.) (noting that "[i]t is
wholly unprecedented for a mere creditor to say, '. . I may keep the assets in a proper state of
security for the payment of my debt whensoever the time arrives for its payment' "); Newton v.
Newton, 11 P.D. 11, 13 (1885) (Eng.) (in matrimonial action, denying wife's application for a
preliminary injunction to enjoin husband from removing his property from the country; holding
that "it is not competent for a Court, merely quia timet, to restrain a respondent from dealing
with his property"); Lister & Co. v. Stubbs, 45 Ch. D. 1, 13 (C.A. 1890) (Eng.) (declining to
grant interlocutory injunction to restrain defendant from dealing with the real estate purchased
with monies allegedly received as kickbacks for placing orders on behalf of plaintiffs' business;
injunction declined because the monies sought by plaintiffs as their final remedy never belonged
to them; Cotton, L.J., stating that "I know of no case where, because it was highly probable that
if the action were brought to a hearing the plaintiff could establish that a debt was due to him
from the defendant, the defendant has been ordered to give security until that has been
established by the judgment or decree").
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other methods of "judgment evasion" '39 between 1881, when foreign
attachment fell into disuse,' 4° and 1975, when the Court of Appeal
decided Mareva Compania Naviera S.A. v. Int'l Bulkcarriers S.A. 341
and revolutionized English practice.3 42
In Mareva, plaintiff shipowners let their vessel, Mareva, to foreign
defendants on a time charter3 43 for $3850 per day payable half-
339. HETHERINGTON, supra note 337, at v; accord Shenton, supra note 174, at 104.
340. Prior to 1867, attachment was available even in cases in which the plaintiff's claim
against the defendant did not arise in London and the garnishee was only transiently present
there. In such cases, the plaintiff and the garnishee could collude to deprive the defendant of his
property without notice. PULLING, supra note 60, at 192; Levy, supra note 53, at 420. To reduce
this risk of fraud, the House of Lords limited the availability of foreign attachment to cases in
which the defendant accrued the debt in London, the garnishee resided in London, and the
defendant received prior notice and an opportunity to contest the debt. MILLAR, supra note 48,
at 484; Levy, supra note 53, at 422 (citing The Mayor and Aldermen of the City of London v.
Cox, L.R. 2 E.&I. App. 239 (H.L. 1867)). Shortly thereafter, in an 1881 decision, the House of
Lords held that garnishment did not lie against a corporation. Because only a payment under
compulsion discharged the garnishee vis-a-vis the defendant and because a corporation's "body"
could not be arrested pursuant to a capias ad satisfaciendum, any payment a corporate garnishee
made would have been deemed voluntary. Thus, foreign attachment could not lie against
corporate garnishees because they could not be protected against multiple claims. MILLAR,
supra note 48, at 485 (citing The Mayor and Aldermen of the City of London v. The
Shareholders of the London Joint Stock Bank, 6 App. Cas. 393 (H.L. 1881)); Levy, supra note
53, at 414 (citing same). Given these restrictions on the use of foreign attachment, the procedure
fell into disuse in or about 1881. 25 HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND 572 n.(r) (3d ed. 1958);
MILLAR, supra note 48, at 485; Levy, supra note 53, at 424.
341. [1980] 1 All E.R. 213 (C.A. 1975). The Mareva case actually was the second case in
which the Court of Appeal granted a preliminary injunction to freeze assets to which plaintiff
had no pre-existing claim. The first case was Nippon Yusen Kaisha v. Karageorgis, [1975] 1
W.L.R. 1093, 1094 (C.A.) (continuing a preliminary injunction, which had been granted ex parte
two days earlier, to enjoin defendants "from disposing or removing any of their assets which are
in this jurisdiction outside it"). In concluding that such an injunction was appropriate on the
facts of the case, the Nippon Court found that plaintiff had established "a strong prima facie
case" and that "[i]f an injunction is not granted, these moneys [defendants' accounts with a
London bank] may be removed out of the jurisdiction and [plaintiffs] will have the greatest
difficulty in recovering anything." I at 1095. Like the Mareva Court, see infra text
accompanying note 346, the Nippon Court invoked authority under section 45 of the Supreme
Court of Judicature (Consolidation) Act.
342. One exception to this blanket statement exists. Just as American courts issue
preliminary injunctions to freeze assets more freely in matrimonial litigation than in other kinds
of cases, supra part V.A.2, the English courts were authorized to "grant injunctions to stop
transactions intended to prevent or reduce financial relief in matrimonial proceedings" before
Mareva was decided. Derby & Co. v. Weldon, [1989] 2 W.L.R. 412, 431 (C.A.) (citing
Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, § 37(2), 27 HALSBURY'S STATUTEs 751 (4th ed. 1987)) (Neill,
L.J.).
343. A time charter is
a specific and express contract by which the owner lets a vessel or some particular part
thereof to another person for a specified time or use; the owner continues to operate the
vessel, contracting to render services by his master and crew to carry goods loaded on the
vessel, and the master and crew remain servants of the owner.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1483 (6th ed. 1991).
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monthly in advance. Defendants paid the first two installments, but
failed to make the third when due. While the vessel was still on its
voyage to India, plaintiffs commenced suit to collect the unpaid hire
($30,800) and damages for repudiation, an action the court character-
ized as one at law for debt." Concerned, however, that "there [was]
a grave danger that [defendants'] moneys in the bank in London
[would] disappear," plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction "to
restrain the disposal of those moneys. 345
Relying on section 45 of the Supreme Court of Judicature (Consoli-
dation) Act 1925, which provided that "an injunction may be granted
... by an interlocutory order of the court in all cases in which it shall
appear to the court to be just and convenient, ' 346 the Court of Appeal
concluded that it had unlimited power to grant injunctive relief
"'where it would be right or just to do so,' ,3 so long as the plaintiff
had some underlying legal or equitable right. It held: "If it appears
that the debt is due and owing, and there is a danger that the debtor
may dispose of his assets so as to defeat it before judgment, the court
has jurisdiction in a proper case to grant an interlocutory judgment so
as to prevent him from disposing of those assets." '348
The Court of Appeal deemed the instant case a proper one for the
assertion of the power, even on an ex parte application, because
defendants could, at any time, withdraw their funds from the London
bank and remove them outside of the country, thereby undercutting
plaintiffs' ability to collect the money owed them.34 9 Thus, the court
granted "an injunction to restrain the charterers [and their agents and
servants]350 from disposing of these moneys now in the bank in
London until the trial or judgment in this action."35 Parliament rec-
344. Mareva, [1980] 1 All E.R. at 214-15 (Denning, M.R.).
345. Id at 214.
346. 15 & 16 Geo. 5, ch, 49, § 45(1). This provision was reenacted with modifications as
section 37(1) of the Supreme Court Act 1981, 11 HALSBURY'S STATUTES 792 (4th ed. 1985).
Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (authorizing the Supreme Court and "all courts established by
Congress... [to] issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions
and agreeable to usages and principles of law").
347. Mareva, [1980] 1 All E.R. at 214 (Denning, M.R.) (quoting Beddow v. Beddow, 9 Ch.
D. 89, 93 (1878)).
348. Id. at 215.
349. Id.
350. Id. In colloquay with counsel for plaintiffs, Lord Denning, Master of the Roll, agreed to
extend the injunction to bar "defendants, their agents or servants or otherwise from disposing of
the assets or moving them out of the jurisdiction." [1980] 1 All E.R. 213 (C.A. 1975), [1975] 2
Lloyd's Rep. 509, 512 (C.A.) (Colloquay found only in Lloyd's Reports).
351. Mareva, [1980] 1 All E.R. at 215. Writing separately, Lord Justice Roskill agreed that
the preliminary injunction should issue in the particular circumstances of the case, but did not
endorse a general departure from past practice, which "consistently refused" such relief. Id.
338
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ognized and approved of the Mareva injunction in 1981 with the
enactment of the Supreme Court Act.3 52
Referred to as everything from the "greatest piece of judicial law
reform" of Lord Denning's time353 to "the nuclear weapon[] of the
law,' 3 4 the Mareva injunction's effect on English practice has been
remarkable. Since 1975, the English courts have awarded Mareva
injunctions to freeze assets in an ever-increasing set of circumstances
both within and beyond the commercial setting35 to an ever-
expanding number of plaintiffs. 356 As the demand for Mareva injunc-
tions has grown, the Court of Appeal has defined more precisely the
circumstances in which such injunctions may issue. For present pur-
poses, seven refinements in the law governing Mareva injunctions are
worthy of discussion.
First, although English courts initially granted Mareva injunctions
only against foreign defendants on the theory that only they were
likely to transfer their assets outside the country,357 by 1980 the courts
352. The Supreme Court Act 1981 § 37(3), 11 HALSBURY'S STATUTES 792 (4th ed. 1985),
authorizes the High Court to:
grant an interlocutory injunction restraining a party to any proceedings from removing from
the jurisdiction of the High Court, or otherwise dealing with, assets located within that
jurisdiction ... in cases where that party is, as well as in cases where he is not, domiciled,
resident or present within that jurisdiction.
Parliament extended the power to issue such injunctions to the county court in the County
Courts Act 1984 § 38, 11 HALSBURY'S STATUTES 441 (4th ed. 1985).
Order 29, Part I of the Rules of the Supreme Court authorizes the issuance of interlocutory
injunctions and orders for the interim preservation of property. Rules of the Supreme Court
1965 (0.29, r.1), in 1 THE SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 497-524 (1991).
353. ALFRED T. DENNING, THE DUE PRocEss OF LAW 134 (1980), quoted in Marion
Hetherington, History and Development of the Mareva Jurisdiction in the United Kingdom and
Australasia, in HETHERINGTON, supra note 337, at 2.
354. OUGH, supra note 337, at vii.
355. By 1982, the Mareva injunction was being "employed generally against foreign and
domestic defendants alike and in respect of matrimonial, personal injuries and Fatal Injuries Act
cases as well as in commercial matters like the shipping cases where it originated."
Hetherington, supra note 353, at 2; accord Z Ltd. v. A-Z and AA-LL, [1982] 1 Q.B. 558, 584.
356. Shenton, supra note 174, at 104 (noting that "there are now [i.e., 1984] a steady flow of
such applications to our Courts which have been estimated to exceed one thousand per month");
Hetherington, supra note 353, at 2 (noting that "by early 1979 the Mareva injunction had become
a commonplace... remedy, with applications being made in the Commercial Court at the rate of
about 20 per month"); Ninemia Maritime Corp. v. Trave Schiffahrtsgesellschaft m.b.H. & Co
KG (The Niedersachsen), [1984] 1 All E.R. 398, 401 (Q.B.D. 1983) (recognizing "a rapid and
sustained increase in the number of applications for Mareva relief"), appeal dismissed, [1984] 1
All E.R. 413 (C.A. 1983). Professor Juenger has commented that forum-shoppers find the
Mareva injunction an "especially attractive" feature of English law. Freidrich K. Juenger,
Forum Shopping, Domestic and International, 63 TUL. L. REv. 553, 565 (1989).
357. Devlin, supra note 1, at 1589 n.65; Hetherington, supra note 353, at 5 n.40. See Rasu
Maritima S.A. v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi Negara (Pertamina), [1978]
1 Q.B. 644, 659 (C.A. 1977) (distinguishing cases "where a defendant is out of the jurisdiction
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had extended the reach of the remedy to domestic defendants as
well.3 51 Parliament confirmed the broader reach in the Supreme
Court Act 1981, which granted the High Court the power to issue
Mareva injunctions "in cases where that party is, as well as in cases
where he is not, domiciled, resident or present within that jurisdic-
tion. '3 59 Like a preliminary injunction available in the United States,
then, the Mareva injunction may issue against both residents and non-
residents who are subject to the court's jurisdiction.
Second, the Court of Appeal has clarified the strength of the claim
that the plaintiff must establish to obtain a Mareva injunction. Origi-
nally the courts reserved the Mareva injunction for cases "founded on
a debt which was undisputed or indisputable," 3" in which summary
judgment under Rules of the Supreme Court Order 14361 would have
been appropriate.362 As early as 1977, however, the Court of Appeal
but has assets in this country"; but dismissing appeal from discharge of preliminary injunction on
facts of case) (Denning, M.R.). The Rasu Maratima court noted that:
so far as concerns defendants who are within the jurisdiction of the court and have assets
here, it is well established that the court should not, in advance of any order or judgment,
allow the creditor to seize any of the money or goods of the debtor or to use any legal
process to do so.
See also Gebr Van Weelde Scheepvaart Kantoor B.V. v. Homeric Marine Services Ltd., [1979] 2
Lloyd's Rep. 117, 120 (C.A. 1978) (holding that a Mareva injunction could not issue against a
resident defendant) (Lloyd, J.).
358. Hetherington, supra note 353, at 2 n.13; see, e.g., Chartered Bank v. Daklouche [1980] 1
W.L.R. 107, 113 (C.A. 1979) (affirming grant of a Mareva injunctior against a defendant who
was personally served in England and had a home there, but who was a Lebanese citizen and
"said that she intended to live here permanently") (Denning, M.R.); Barclay-Johnson v. Yuill,
[1980] 1 W.L.R. 1259, 1265 (Ch. D.) (holding that "it is no bar to the grant of a Mareva
injunction that the defendant is not a foreigner, or is not foreign-based, in any sense of those
terms") (Megarry, V.-C.); Rahman (Prince Abdul) Bin Turki Al Sudairy v. Abu-Taha, [1980] 1
W.L.R. 1268, 1273 (C.A.) (holding that "a Mareva injunction can be granted against a man even
though he is based in this country if the circumstances are such that there is a danger ... that the
plaintiff, if he gets judgment, will not be able to get it satisfied") (Denning, M.R.).
359. Supreme Court Act 1981, § 37(3), 11 HALSBURY'S STATUTES 792 (4th ed. 1985).
360. Ninemia Maritime Corp. v. Trave Schiffahrtsgesellschaft m.b.H. & Co. K.G. (The
Niedersachsen), [1984] 1 All E.R. 398, 401 (Q.B.D. 1983), appeal dismissed, [1984] 1 All E.R.
413 (C.A. 1983).
361. Order 14 of the Rules of the Supreme Court authorizes summary judgment if the
defendant "has no defence to a claim.., or to a particular part of such a claim, or has no defence
to such claim or part except as to the amount of any damages claimed." Rules of the Supreme
Court 1965 (0.14, r.1), in 1 THE SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 140 (1991). See generally id. at
140-71.
362. Rasu Maritima SA v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi Negara
(Pertamina), [1978] 1 Q.B. 644, 661 (C.A. 1977) (noting that the earlier cases in which Mareva
injunctions had been granted "were ones in which summary judgment would have been given
under Order 14"); Third Chandris Shipping Corp. v. Unimarine S.A., [1979] 1 Q.B. 645, 649
(noting that early Mareva cases involved a creditor with "a claim against a foreign debtor which
was not disputed or was not capable of serious dispute") (Mustill, J.), appeal dismissed, [1979] 1
Q.B. 655 (C.A.).
Preliminary Injunctions
held that a Mareva injunction could issue to secure the assets of
defendants in an action in which summary judgment was not appro-
priate so long as "the plaintiff can show that he has a 'good arguable
case.' "363 Lord Denning, Master of the Roll, seemed willing to ease
even this requirement in a 1979 case, 3 4 but the Court of Appeal later
reiterated that it must "appear[ ] likely that the plaintiff will recover
judgment against the defendant for a certain or approximate sum. 3 65
Although this statement of the standard might appear to bar Mareva
injunctions in contract claims for unliquidated damages and tort
actions, it has not been so employed. In such cases, the Court of
Appeal has resorted to the "good arguable case" standard.366 Thus,
the requisite showing on the merits to obtain a Mareva injunction is
comparable to our "likelihood of success on the merits" criterion.367
Third, the plaintiff must demonstrate that she will suffer harm if the
Mareva injunction is not granted. Originally, the courts reasoned that
the sole purpose of the Mareva injunction was to insure that assets
363. Rasu Maratima, [1978] 1 Q.B. at 661 (Denning, M.R.). In adopting the "good arguable
case" test, Lord Denning borrowed the test used in determining whether or not a defendant
beyond the court's jurisdiction can be served extraterritorially. Id. (citing Vitkovice Horni a
Hutni Tezirstvo v. Korner, [1951] App. Cas. 869 (appeal taken from Eng. C.A.)). Lord Denning
justified the borrowing because, like extraterritorial service, the Mareva injunction "is
appropriate when defendants are out of the jurisdiction." Id. He also noted that the "good
arguable case" test was "also in conformity with the test as to the granting of injunctions
whenever it is just and convenient as laid down by the House of Lords in American Cyanamid
Co. v. Ethicon Ltd." Id. (citing American Cyanamid Co. v. Ethicon Ltd., [1975] App. Cas. 396
(appeal taken from Eng. C.A.) (holding that in considering whether an interlocutory injunction
should issue, court must conclude that the plaintiff's "claim is not frivolous or vexatious; in other
words, that there is a serious question to be tried") (Lord Diplock)).
364. Third Chandris, [1979] 1 Q.B. at 668 (suggesting that the plaintiff need only "give
particulars of his claim against the defendant, stating the ground of his claim and the amount
thereof, and fairly stating the points made against it by the defendant") (Denning, M.R.).
365. Z Ltd. v. A-Z and AA-LL, [1982] 1 Q.B. 558, 585 (C.A. 1981) (Kerr, L.J.); see also The
Niedersachsen, [1984] 1 All Eng. Rep. at 401 (reaffirming that "a 'good arguable case' is no doubt
the minimum which the plaintiff must show in order to cross what the judge rightly described as
the 'threshold' for the exercise of the jurisdiction") (Kerr, L.J.); Hetherington, supra note 353, at
5 n.39.
366. F.D. Rose, The Mareva Injunction-Attachment in Personam-Part 1, 1981 LLOYD'S
MAR. & COM. L.Q. 1, 8 (noting that "the injunction is ... available in support of unliquidated
claims"); see, eg., Allen v. Jambo Holdings Ltd., [1980] 1 W.L.R. 1252, 1255 (C.A. 1977) (in
wrongful death action in which issues of comparative negligence existed but in which plaintiffs
made a "good, arguable case," reinstating Mareva injunction to enjoin defendants from removing
an aircraft from England) (Denning, M.R.); Dellborg v. Corix Properties (C.A. 1980) (LEXIS,
Enggen library, Cases file) (granting Mareva injunction in actions for nuisance) (Lawton, L.J.);
Praznovsky v. Sablyack, [1977] V.R. 111 (Australia) (permitting Mareva injunction in action
seeking damages for tort of conspiracy).
367. See supra part III.A.
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were not removed from England,36 so "[i]f the assets are likely to
remain in the jurisdiction, then the plaintiff, like all others with claims
against the defendant, must run the risk... that the defendant may
dissipate his assets."369 The Court of Appeal later rejected this rea-
soning, however, and has since stated that "the Mareva injunction
extends to cases where there is a danger that the assets will be dissi-
pated in this country as well as by removal out of the jurisdiction. ' ' 70
Thus, just as the American plaintiff must demonstrate a risk of irrepa-
rable harm, the English plaintiff seeking a Mareva injunction must
establish that "there are... reasons to believe that the defendant...
may well take steps designed to ensure that [his assets] are no longer
available or traceable when judgment is given against him. ' 37 1
368. Barclay-Johnson v. Yuill, [1980] 1 W.L.R. 1259, 1264 (Ch. D.) (stating that "the heart
and core of the Mareva injunction is the risk of the defendant removing his assets from the
jurisdiction and so stultifying any judgment given by the courts in the action") (Megarry, V.-C.)
(emphasis added); Third Chandris, [1979] 1 Q.B. at 669 (stating that '[t]he plaintiff should give
some grounds for believing that there is a risk of the assets being removed before the judgment or
award is satisfied") (Denning, M.R.) (emphasis added); A.J. Bekhor & Co. v. Bilton, [1981] 1
Q.B. 923, 941 (C.A.) (noting that "the foundation of the jurisdiction is the need to prevent
judgments of the court from being rendered ineffective by the removal of the defendant's assets
from the jurisdiction") (Ackner, L.J.).
369. Barclay-Johnson, [1980] 1 W.L.R. at 1264.
370. Z Ltd. v. A-Z and AA-LL, [1982] 1 Q.B. 558, 571 (C.A. 1981); see also id. at 584
(concurring that it is "logical to extend the scope of this jurisdiction whenever there is a risk of a
judgment which plaintiff seems likely to obtain being defeated in this way") (Kerr, L.J.);
Ninemia Maritime Corp. v. Trave Schiffahrtsgesellschaft m.b.H. & Co. K.G. (The
Niedersachsen), [1984] 1 All E.R. 398, 419 (Q.B.D. 1983) (stating that "Mareva injunctions can,
and nowadays frequently are, also granted where there is a danger of dissipation of assets within
this country") (Kerr, L.J.) appeal dismissed, [1984] 1 All E.R. 413 (C.A. 1983); Rules of the
Supreme Court 1965 (0.29, r.1), note 29/1/20, in 1 THE SUPREME COURT PRAcnCE 506
(1991). In concluding that the Mareva injunction should be available to restrain domestic
dissipation of assets, Lord Denning stated that the language in the Supreme Court Act 1981,
which authorized the High Court to grant interlocutory injunctions "restraining a party... from
removing from the jurisdiction of the High Court, or otherwise dealing with, assets located
within that jurisdiction," should be given "a wide meaning. They are not to be construed as
ejusdem generis with 'removing from the jurisdiction.'" Z Ltd., [1982] 1 Q.B. at 571 (quoting
Supreme Court Act 1981, 15 & 16 Geo. 5, ch. 49, § 37(3)); see also Rahman (Prince Abdul) Bin
Turki Al Sudairy v. Abu-Taha, [1980] 1 W.L.R. 1268, 1273 (C.A.) (holding that "a Mareva
injunction can be granted ... if the circumstances are such that there is a danger of [the
defendant's] absconding, or a danger of the assets being removed out of the jurisdiction or
disposed of within the jurisdiction, or otherwise dealt with so that there is a danger that the
plaintiff, if he gets judgment, will not be able to get it satisfied") (Denning, M.R.) (emphasis
added); Kirby v. Banks (C.A. 1980) (Transcript No. 624 of 1980 unreported opinion), cited in Z
Ltd., [1982] 1 Q.B. at 571 (granting a Mareva injunction even though the "defendant was within
the jurisdiction" and the danger was only that "he would dispose of £60,000-within the
jurisdiction-in such a way as to be beyond the reach of the plaintiffs").
371. Z Ltd., [1982] 1 Q.B. at 585; see also The Niedersachsen, [1984] 1 All E.R. at 419
(stating that "the test is whether.., the court concludes, on the whole of the evidence then
before it, that the refusal of a Mareva injunction would involve a real risk that a judgment or
award in favour of the plaintiff would remain unsatisfied").
Preliminary Injunctions
The plaintiff can make a prima facie showing of this risk "by show-
ing that the asset is present and that it is movable, and by drawing
some inference from the fact that the defendant is abroad (or, if within
the jurisdiction, will not divulge his whereabouts). 372 One commen-
tator has suggested that "inferential evidence of the defendant's 'good
character' or 'bad character' may play a material part in the determi-
nation of whether to grant the injunction. '37 3 And a judge has sug-
gested that inferences regarding risk of default may be drawn from
facts "about the defendant's business..., including.., its size, ori-
gins, business domicile, the location of its known assets and the cir-
cumstances in which the dispute has arisen. 374
Fourth, the Court of Appeal has acknowledged the need "to provide
certain safeguards for a defendant or other person who might suffer
hardship if subjected to an order in the unadorned form which was in
use at the outset. '375 Thus, it has limited the amount to be restrained
by the injunction, 376 allowed the defendant to draw on separate
accounts for reasonable living expenses and attorneys' fees,377 consid-
372. F.D. Rose, The Mareva Injunction-Attachment in Personam-Part Il 1981 LLOYD'S
MAR. & COM. L.Q. 177, 179 (footnotes omitted).
373. OUGH, supra note 337, at 72 (footnotes omitted). In Third Chandris, the Court of
Appeals stated:
The mere fact that the defendant is abroad is not by itself sufficient. No one would wish any
reputable foreign company to be plagued with a Mareva injunction simply because it has
agreed to London arbitration. But there are some foreign companies whose structure invites
comment. We often see in this court a corporation which is registered in a country where
the company law is so loose that nothing is known about it-where it does no work and has
no officers and no assets. Nothing can be found out about the membership, or its control, or
its assets, or the charges on them. Judgment cannot be enforced against it. There is no
reciprocal enforcement ofjudgments .... In such cases, the very fact of incorporation there
gives some ground for believing there is a risk that, if judgment or award is obtained, it may
go unsatisfied.
Third Chandris Shipping Corp. v. Unimarine S.A., [1979] 1 Q.B. 645, 669 (C.A.) (Denning,
M.R.) (emphasis added); see also Chambers, supra note 32, at 13 (discussing offshore trusts cre-
ated under the laws of the Isle of Man, an island in the Irish Sea, which does not enforce judg-
ments of foreign countries); Bruce, et al., supra note 32, at 1 (same).
374. Third Chandris, 1 Q.B. at 672 (Lawton, L.J.).
375. The Niedersachsen, [1984] 1 All E.R. at 401.
376. Z Ltd. v. A-Z and AA-LL, [1982] 1 Q.B. 558, 576 (C.A.) (noting that "[n]owadays it has
become usual to insert the maximum amount to be restrained. The maximum amount is the sum
claimed by the plaintiff from the defendant.") (Denning, M.R.); id. at 589 (preferring "maximum
sum" orders, which "only freeze the defendant's assets up to the level of the plaintiff's prima
facie justifiable claim," to blanket injunctions) (Kerr, L.J.); Rules of the Supreme Court 1965,
0.72, A.27, in 1 THE SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 1195-96 (1991); OUGH, supra note 337, at 15.
377. See, eg., Derby & Co. v. Weldon, [1989] 2 W.L.R. 412, 419 (C.A.) (noting that "it is not
[the Mareva injunction's] purpose to prevent a defendant carrying on business in the ordinary
way or, if an individual, living his life normally pending the determination of the dispute, nor to
impede him in any way in defending himself against the claim") (Donaldson of Lymington,
M.R.); S.C.F. Finance Co. v. Masri, [1985] 1 W.L.R. 876, 880 (C.A.) (stating that "[ilt is now
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ered the defendant's needs in operating a business, 37 8 required the
plaintiff to give an undertaking to protect the defendant from damages
and third parties from any expenses reasonably incurred in complying
with the Mareva injunction, 37 9 and confirmed that the injunction is not
designed to improve the plaintiff's position in the event of the defend-
ant's insolvency or otherwise to give the plaintiff a lien.380 These pro-
tections, like those urged in the "Balance of Hardships" section of this
well settled that an injunction will be varied where necessary so as to enable a defendant to pay
his ordinary trading debts as they fall due, or to meet his ordinary living expenses") (Lloyd, L.J.);
PCW (Underwriting Agencies) Ltd. v. Dixon, [1983] 2 All E.R. 697 (C.A.) (varying trial court's
order to permit defendant to draw on specified accounts for living expenses and solictors' costs);
Z Ltd., [1982] 1 Q.B. at 576 (stating that "if in any case it is thought desirable to allow the
defendant to have the use of sums for 'normal living expenses,' or such like, the injunction should
specify the sums as figures") (Denning, M.R.); Rules of the Supreme Court 1965, 0.29, r.1, note
29/1/22, in 1 THE SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 507-10 (1991); OUGH, supra note 337, at 15-17.
378. See, eg., Rasu Maritima S.A. v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi
Negara (Pertamina), [1978] 1 Q.B. 644, 662 (C.A.) (stating that "[]are should be taken before an
injunction is granted over assets which will bring the defendant's trade or business to a standstill
or will inflict on him great loss") (Denning, M.R.); The Rena K, [1979] 1 Q.B. 377, 410 (noting
that the "one apparently strong point against granting an injunction" was that the defendant's
principal asset, a ship, "was a trading asset, and that, if the shipowners were compelled by an
injunction to keep her here, they would lose the benefit of trading her") (Brandon, J.); Barclay-
Johnson v. YullI, [1980] 1 W.L.R. 1259, 1266 (Ch. D.) (stating that if the Mareva injunction "is
likely to affect the defendant seriously, I think that he is entitled to have this put into the scales
against the grant of the injunction .... [I]f he is trading here and the injunction would 'freeze'
his bank account, the injury may e grave. I think that he should be able to rely on the Lister
principle except so far as it cannot be fairly reconciled with the needs of the Mareva doctrine")
(Megarry, V.-C.); Dellborg v. Corix Properties (C.A. 1980) (LEXIS, Enggen library, Cases file)
(noting the "particular] importan[ce] that [defendant] should not be inhibited from making
profits" by selling the properties it was incorporated to develop) (Lawton, L.J.); see also OUGH,
supra note 337, at 16-17; Rose, supra note 366, at 14 (noting that "it is always possible to make
the order in such a form as to permit bonafide dealings in the course of business .... to draft an
order in terms that application can be made to the court to sanctiQn particular dealings, or for
the court to vary the order").
379. See, e.g., Searose Ltd. v. Seatrain UK Ltd., [1981] 1 W.L.R. 894, 896 (Q.B.D.) (requiring
plaintiff to give an undertaking to the effect "that a bank to whom notce of an injunction is given
can, before taking steps to ascertain whether the defendants have an account at any particular
branch, obtain an undertaking from the plaintiffs' solicitors to pay their reasonable costs incurred
in so doing") (Robert Goff, J.); Z Ltd., [1982] 1 Q.B. at 577 (noting that "[t]he plaintiff...
should normally give an undertaking in damages to the defendant, ar d also an undertaking to a
bank"; giving judge discretion to require a bond or other security for the undertaking) (Denning,
M.R.); Rules of the Supreme Court 1965, 0.29, r.1, note 29/1/22, in 1 THE SUPREME COURT
PRACTIcE 507-10 (1991); OUGH, supra note 337, at 14-15.
380. See, e.g., A.J. Bekhor & Co. v. Bilton, [1981] 1 Q.B. 923, 94.2 (C.A.) (noting that "the
purpose of the Mareva jurisdiction was not to improve the position of claimants in an insolvency,
but simply to prevent the injustice of a defendant removing his assets from the jurisdiction")
(Ackner, L.J.); Iraqi Ministry of Defence v. Arcepey Shipping Co. S.A., [1981] 1 Q.B. 65, 72
(Robert Goff, J.); Cretanor Maritime Co. v. Irish Marine Management Ltd., [1978] 1 W.L.R.
966, 974 (C.A.) (distinguishing the Mareva injunction from prejudgment attachment, which
"means a seizure of assets ... normally with a view to their being .. held as ... security")
(Buckley, L.J.).
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Article,8 1 are designed to reduce the risk of harm to the defendant
and other innocent parties without exposing the plaintiff to active ter-
tiary harm.382
Fifth, consistent with the early view that the Mareva injunction was
designed only to ensure that assets within England were not removed
therefrom, 83 English courts initially refrained from restraining assets
outside the territory of England.384 With the increasing recognition
that the injunction is intended, more broadly, to bar a defendant from
frustrating subsequent orders of the court or the plaintiff's potential
judgment,385 the Court of Appeal has acknowledged that restraining
the defendant from disposing of foreign assets may be necessary.38 6
Thus, just as a preliminary injunction issued by an American court
can restrain a defendant from disposing of assets outside the state,3 87
381. See supra part III.C.
382. In reviewing ex parte grants of Mareva injunctions, the English courts actually may pay
greater deference to the defendant's potential harm than American courts typically do in
"balancing the hardships." In The Niedersachsen, for example, the Court of Appeal stated in
passing that:
if, or to the extent that, the grant of a Mareva injunction inflicts hardship on the defendants,
their legitimate interests must prevail over those of the plaintiffs, who seek to obtain security
for a claim which may appear to be well-founded but which still remains to be established at
the trial.
[1984] 1 All E.R. 398, 422 (Q.B.D. 1983) (Kerr, L.J.), appeal dismissed, [1984] 1 All E.R. 413
(C.A. 1983). This statement seems to suggest that any substantial showing of harm by the
defendant, whether or not outweighed by potential harm to the plaintiff, would bar the issuance
or affirmance of a Mareva injunction.
383. See supra note 368.
384. Shenton, supra note 174, at 104. Shenton notes that:
so far, the Courts have only been willing to grant Mareva injunctions in respect of assets
actually within the jurisdiction of the Court, irrespective of whether the Defendant is within
or without the jurisdiction. Logically, the Court should be able to restrain a respondent
within the jurisdiction from disposing of assets outside the jurisdiction.
See, eg., Third Chandris Shipping Corp. v. Unimarine S.A., [1979] 1 Q.B. 645, 668 (C.A.)
(requiring that "[t]he plaintiff should give some grounds for believing that the defendant has
assets here") (Denning, M.R.).
385. See supra note 370 and accompanying text.
386. Derby & Co. v. Weldon, [1989] 2 W.L.R. 412, 422 (C.A. 1988) (stating that "no court
should permit a defendant to take action designed to frustrate subsequent orders of the court. If
for the achievement of this purpose it is necessary to make orders concerning foreign assets, such
orders should be made, subject, of course, to ordinary principles of international law.")
(Donaldson of Lymington, M.R.); id. at 435 (stating "unequivocally that in an appropriate case
the court has power to grant an interlocutory injunction even on a worldwide basis against any
person who is properly before the court, so as to prevent that person by the transfer of his
property frustrating a future judgment of the court") (Neill, L.J.); Babanaft Int'l Co. S.A. v.
Bassatne, [1989] 2 W.L.R. 232, 242 (C.A.) (stating that "in appropriate cases, though these may
well be rare, there is nothing to preclude our Courts from granting Marera type injunctions
against defendants which extend to their assets outside the jurisdiction.") (Kerr, L.J.).
387. See supra notes 180-81 and accompanying text.
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so can a Mareva injunction bar an English defendant from disposing of
assets outside the country.388
Sixth, the English courts have always recognized that to be effective,
the Mareva injunction must issue ex parte,38 9 and that to be fair to the
defendant, the court must hold a prompt inter partes hearing upon the
defendant's request. 390 The Supreme Court Rules codify this practice,
specifically authorizing ex parte applications for Mareva injunc-
tions. 3 9 1 One commentator has noted that:
heavy pressure is... put on the applicant's advisers at the ex parte stage
to put such information before the Court as is likely to produce an
Order in the form in which it would be likely to be after the inter partes
hearing, alternatively to use all efforts to agree on a form of Order with
388. In part, this conclusion obtains because the Mareva injunction operates in personam
against the defendant rather than in rem against the assets themselves. See, eg., The Tuyuti,
[1984] 2 All E.R. 546, [1984] 2 Lloyd's L.R. 51, 56 (C.A.) (noting that "there are ... many
fundamental differences between an injunction, which is an order directed to the owners and
master of the ship not to take a ship out of the jurisdiction and an arr. st by which the Admiralty
Marshall takes custody of the ship") (Sheen, J.), opinion found only in Lloyd's Reports; Orwell
Steel (Erection and Fabrication) Ltd. v. Asphalt and Tarmac (U.K.) Ltd., [1984] 1 W.L.R. 1097,
1100 (Q.B.D.) (noting that "the Mareva injunction acts in personam on the defendant and does
not give the plaintiff any rights over the goods of the defendant nor involve any attachment of
them") (Farquharson, J.); Derby & Co. v. Weldon, [1989] 2 W.L.R. 412, 425, [1989] 1 All Eng.
Rep. 1002, 1011 (C.A. 1988) (stating that "[a] Mareva injunction operates solely in personam")
(Donaldson of Lymington, M.R.). But see Z Ltd. v. A-Z and AA-LL, [1982] 1 Q.B. 558, 573
(C.A.) (stating that a Mareva injunction "is a method of attaching th! asset itself. It operates in
rem ... just as the process of foreign attachment used to do in the City of London, and still does
in the United States of America") (Denning, M.R.).
If all of the defendant's assets are located outside the country, the plaintiff will have to bring a
second action in the country in which the property is located to enforce the English judgment,
assuming that country honors foreign judgments. Cf Bruce et al., supra note 32; Chambers,
supra note 32.
389. See, eg., Third Chandris Shipping Corp. v. Unimarine S.A., [1979] 1 Q.B. 645, 669
(C.A.) (setting forth guidelines for ex parte Mareva proceedings, and noting that "speed is of the
essence. Ex parte is of the essence") (Denning, M.R.); Z Ltd., [1982] 1 Q.B. at 577 (C.A.)
(noting that "[w]hen granting a Mareva injunction ex parte, the court may sometimes think it
right only to grant it for a few days") (Denning, M.R.); Rules of the Supreme Court 1965, 0.29,
r.1, note 29/1/21, in I THE SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 506-07 (1991) (acknowledging that "to
be efficacious, [the Mareva injunction] must be swift and secret, in the sense that the injunction
must always be granted ex parte, without notice to the defendant").
390. Dormeuil Freres S.A. v. Nicolian Int'l (Textiles) Ltd., [1988] 1 W.L.R. 1362, 1370 (Ch.
D.) (stating that "[w]hen the motion comes before the court inter partes, the court can then on
the evidence before it from both sides decide what is the correct form of the Mareva relief to
grant until trial"); Z Ltd., [1982] 1 Q.B. at 577 (noting that after an ex parte Mareva injunction
issues, "the defendant and the bank or other innocent third party ... should be given the earliest
possible opportunity to be heard") (Denning, M.R.).
391. Rules of the Supreme Court 1965 (0.29, r.l), in 1 THE SUPREME COURT PRACTICE
supra note 370, at 497.
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the Respondent's solicitors which can be signed by the Judge without a
second hearing.3
92
Finally, the English courts have recognized the difficulty plaintiffs
may have in knowing "how much, if anything, is in any of [the defend-
ant's bank accounts]; nor does each of the defendant's bankers know
what is in the other accounts. Without information about the state of
each account it is difficult, if not impossible, to operate the Mareva
jurisdiction properly." '393 In light of these difficulties, the courts have
concluded they have power to order discovery "in order to ensure that
the Mareva jurisdiction is properly exercised and thereby to secure its
objective..., the prevention of abuse."3 94 They have ordered discov-
ery not only against the defendant,395 but also against third party
bankers with knowledge of the whereabouts of the defendant's
assets.
396
The British experience with Mareva injunctions confirms both the
utility of such preliminary injunctions to freeze assets and the risks
they pose to defendants and third parties if issued without restraint or
precaution. The Mareva experience highlights methods for reducing
these risks: courts can limit the scope of preliminary injunctions to
permit defendants to pay attorneys' fees, incur ordinary living
expenses, and make transfers in the ordinary course of business; courts
392. Shenton, supra note 174, at 104.
393. A. v. C., [1981] Q.B. 956, 959-60 (1980) (Robert Goff, J.).
394. Id. at 960; accord Bankers Trust Co. v. Shapira, [1980] 1 W.L.R. 1274 (C.A.)
(permitting discovery against defendant bank in which individual defendants had deposited
moneys they had obtained by forgery from plaintiff bank) (Denning, M.R.); A.J. Bekhor & Co. v.
Bilton, [1981] 1 Q.B. 923, 943-44 (C.A.) (concluding that court has "power to make an order
for discovery in 'aid' of a Mareva injunction"; to "police" the Mareva injunction, "plaintiffs could
have applied for an order for the cross-examination of the defendant on his affidavit, or the court
itself could have made such an order") (Ackner, L.J.); id. at 949 (stating that "it may be
necessary to order discovery to make the injunction effective and I would hold that the court has
the power to make such ancillary orders as are necessary to secure that the injunctive relief given
to the plaintiff is effective") (Grifliths, L.J.); Z Ltd. v. A-Z and AA-LL, [1982] 1 Q.B. 558,
577-78 (C.A. 1981) (noting that "it is very desirable that the defendant should be required in a
proper case to make discovery .... There is ample power in the court to order discovery.")
(Denning, M.R.). See generally Eric Gertner, Prejudgment Remedies: A Need for
Rationalization, 19 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 503, 533-35 (1981) (discussing the availability of
discovery to ensure the effectiveness of a Mareva injunction); OUGH, supra note 337, at 43-44.
395. See eg., A. v. C, [1981] Q.B. at 959-60 (Robert Goff, J.).
396. See eg., Bankers Trust Co. v. Shapira, [1980] 1 W.L.R. 1274, 1282 (C.A.) (ordering
discovery against a bank named as a nominal defendant, which faced no personal liability; adding
that discovery against a bank should "only be done when there is a good ground for thinking the
money in the bank is the plaintiff's money-as, for instance when, the customer has got the
money by fraud-or other wrongdoing, and paid it into his account at the bank") (Denning,
M.R.). But see AJ. Bekhor & Co. v. Bilton, [1981] 1 Q.B. 923, 937-38 (C.A.) (declining to limit
authority to order discovery in aid of Mareva jurisdiction to actions "in which the plaintiff seeks
to trace property which in equity belongs to him") (Ackner, L.J.).
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can require the plaintiff to post a bond out of which the defendant's
losses will be paid if the injunction issued erroneously and a third
party's expenses in complying with the injunction will be reimbursed;
and courts can require the plaintiff to make a strong showing on the
merits of her claim and the risk of harm she will suffer if the defendant
is not restrained.
CONCLUSION
There is little doubt that some defendants, once sued (or even
before), will attempt to transfer, hide or dissipate their assets in an
effort to frustrate the potential judgment to be rendered against them.
There is little doubt that such conduct causes harm to the plaintiff-
active tertiary harm-because she will not be able to collect promptly
on her judgment, if ever. And there is little doubt that courts can
prevent this active tertiary harm. There is doubt, however, as to the
means courts may employ to prevent this harm.
If the plaintiff's suit is for money damages, some courts have con-
cluded that the money judgment itself is an adequate remedy, thereby
obviating the need for any preliminary injunctive relief, or that attach-
ment is the only permissible prejudgment remedy for preventing active
tertiary harm. The money judgment and the attachment remedy are
not adequate, however, in that they fail to reach all of the defendant's
assets, and intrude unnecessarily on the defendant's freedom and the
rights and interests of third parties. Furthermore, as long as the plain-
tiff can demonstrate irreparable harm, the judicial preference for legal
remedies over equitable ones serves no useful purpose in this context.
Therefore, courts should use preliminary injunctions to freeze assets in
cases where the risk of irreparable tertiary harm to the plaintiff
exceeds the risk of harm to the defendant and the plaintiff establishes a
likelihood of success on the merits.
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